Essays on the Governance of Agricultural Products: Cooperatives and Contract Farming by Hu, Y. (Yamei)
PREPS
C M
Y K
PREPS
C M
Y K
PREPS
C M
Y K
PREPS
C M
Y K
C M
Y K
Essays on the Governance of Agricultural Products
Cooperatives and Contract Farming
This thesis studies decision making procedures and decision rights
allocation of two governance structures in agricultural sectors:
cooperatives and contract farming. The main research questions are
how authority coordinates upstream and downstream activities
within various governance structures in a transitional institutional
setting (China), and under what conditions one particular governance
structure is efficient. The theoretical research focuses on the role of
the board of directors in agricultural cooperatives, while the
empirical research focuses on the organizational and strategic
attributes of Chinese farmer specialized cooperatives and the
contracting arrangements in the Chinese fruit and vegetable industry.
It is found that, firstly, the board of directors adds value to
cooperatives because of its dual screening characteristic. The
screening levels are strategic substitutes. Secondly, the Chinese
farmer specialized cooperatives are co-governed by both core
members and non core-members based on relations and abilities.
Human asset specificity in terms of establishing and maintaining
relations and access to markets seems to be more important than
physical asset specificity in accounting for governance structure
choice in the current institutional setting. Thirdly, under contract
farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms.
Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms positively
influence the number of decision rights allocated to agri-business
firms, while monopsony-oligopsony power and specific investments
by farmers do not play a role in allocating decision rights.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-145-1 
YAMEI HU
Essays on the
Governance of
Agricultural Products
Cooperatives and Contract Farming
D
esig
n
: B
&
T O
n
tw
erp
 en
 ad
vies w
w
w
.b
-en
-t.n
l
Prin
t:H
aveka w
w
w
.h
aveka.n
l
113
Y
A
M
E
I H
U
 
E
ssa
y
s o
n
 th
e
 G
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 o
f A
g
ricu
ltu
ra
l P
ro
d
u
cts
Erim - 07 omslag Hu  9/3/07  2:38 PM  Pagina 1
Yamei Hu
+31-10- 4081966
yhu@rsm.nl
If you have any questions
concerning the ceremony feel free
to contact either my ‘paranimfen’:
Tao Jiang
tjiang@rsm.nl
+31-10 4081918
Li Feng
lfeng@rsm.nl
+31-10 4081970
Essays on the Governance
of Agricultural Products 
Cooperatives and Contract Farming
by
YAMEI HU
Thursday, 4 October, 2007
at 16:00 hrs 
Senaatszaal
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3062 PA Rotterdam
After the defence a reception will be
held in The Cum Laude, A Building
I would be delighted to see you! 
Invitation
You are most kindly invited
to attend the public defence
of the dissertation
Erim - 07 uitnod. Hu  9/3/07  2:37 PM  Pa
$s
ifA
_E
rim
 om
sla
g H
u.j
ob
_P
roc
es
s C
ya
n
$s
ifA
_E
rim
 om
sla
g H
u.j
ob
_P
roc
es
s M
ag
en
ta
$s
ifA
_E
rim
 om
sla
g H
u.j
ob
_P
roc
es
s Y
ell
ow
$s
ifA
_E
rim
 om
sla
g H
u.j
ob
_P
roc
es
s B
lac
k
$s
ifA
_E
rim
 om
sla
g H
u.j
ob
_S
SiC
us
tom
Co
lor
1
$s
ifA
_E
rim
 om
sla
g H
u.j
ob
_S
SiC
us
tom
Co
lor
3
$s
ifA
_E
rim
 om
sla
g H
u.j
ob
_S
SiC
us
tom
Co
lor
2
CMYB CMYB
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON THE GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
COOPERATIVES AND CONTRACT FARMING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yamei Hu 
                                                                                                             
                                                                               
                                       
 
Essays on the Governance of Agricultural Products 
Cooperatives and contract farming 
 
 
Verhandelingen over beheersstructuren in de landbouw sector: cooperaties en 
contractuele relaties 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
 
 
to obtain the degree of Doctor from the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
by command of the 
rector magnificus 
 
Prof.dr. S.W.J. Lamberts 
 
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board. 
 
 
 
The public defence shall be held on 
 
Thursday 4 October 2007 at 16:00 hrs 
 
by 
 
Yamei Hu 
born in Dezhou, P.R. China 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
                                                                               
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
 
Promoters:   Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse 
Prof.dr. B. Krug 
 
Other members:   
 
Dr. Ph. Engeldorp Gastelaars 
Prof.dr. R. Ruben 
Dr. A. van Tilburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
RSM Erasmus University / Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
Internet: http://www.erim.eur.nl 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal:  http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
 
 
ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management 113 
 
ISBN 978 – 90 – 5892 – 145 – 1 
 
Cover image: Farmer and businessman with gear heads. © Images.com/Corbis  
Design: B&T Ontwerp en advies www.b-en-t.nl  / Print: Haveka www.haveka.nl
 
© 2007, Yamei Hu 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by 
any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information 
storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the author. 
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Mingsheng and Eric 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               i                                       
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Upstream primary producers and downstream processors in agricultural sectors are 
vertically coordinated via various governance structures, such as spot market, investor-
owned firms, cooperatives, contract farming, and other hybrid forms. It is very interesting 
to observe that these governance structures co-exist in many markets, and that they interact 
with the institutional setting. How does each governance structure function? What 
accounts for co-existence and efficiency of various governance structures? What is the 
effect of the institutional setting? These questions deserve in-depth exploring to add new 
knowledge to the theory of firm on the one hand, and to provide suggestions to managers 
on the other hand.  
          Governance structures can be approached by delineating income rights and decision 
rights. The allocation of decision rights tells who has the right to guide or direct activities, 
i.e., how authority is allocated among various stakeholders. The allocation of income rights 
specifies how benefits and costs are allocated among different stakeholders. This thesis 
studies decision making procedures and decision rights allocation of two governance 
structures: cooperatives and contract farming. The main research questions are how 
authority coordinates upstream and downstream activities within various governance 
structures in a transitional institutional setting (China), and under what conditions one 
particular governance structure is efficient. The theoretical research focuses on the role of 
the board of directors in agricultural cooperatives, while the empirical research focuses on 
the organizational and strategic attributes of Chinese farmer specialized cooperatives and 
the contracting arrangements in the Chinese fruit and vegetable industry.  
          This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research 
objective and research questions. The second chapter develops a game model to explore 
how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial 
structures. The third chapter describes the institutional setting in China and investigates 
how new farmer specialized cooperatives are organized in the particular setting from the 
perspective of systems of attributes. The fourth chapter examines 12 fruit and vegetable 
contracting networks to explain the determinant factors for the allocation patterns of 
decision rights and the extent of completeness of agricultural contracts. The fifth chapter 
concludes.  
          The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the board of directors adds value to 
cooperatives when screening investment projects because of its dual screening 
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characteristic. The screening levels are strategic substitutes. Secondly, the Chinese farmer 
specialized cooperatives are co-governed by both core members and non core-members 
based on their relations (guan-xi in Chinese) and abilities. Human asset specificity in terms 
of establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more 
important than physical asset specificity in accounting for governance structure choice in 
the current institutional setting. Thirdly, the extent of completeness of agricultural 
contracts and the allocation pattern of decision rights vary substantially across different 
supply chains in China. Under contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from 
farmers to firms. Quality and market uncertainty determines the completeness of 
agricultural contracts. Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms positively 
influence the number of decision rights allocated to agri-business firms, while monopsony-
oligopsony power and specific investments by farmers do not determine the allocation 
pattern of decision rights. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
 
We live in a world where the market mechanism is the dominant form of governance of 
transactions. However, most people are involved in organizations which are obviously 
different from market governance, such as firms, universities, political parties, to name a 
few. An efficient organization is at least as important as a well-functioning system of 
markets. Thus, it is significant for us to truly understand how various organizations 
function. New developments regarding the theory of the firm provide us with rich 
approaches to explore the issues regarding internal functioning and outside coordinating of 
organizations. According to Williamson (1985), both market and all kinds of other 
organizations including investor-owned firms, co-cooperatives, franchising, etc could be 
treated as a particular kind of governance structure which organizes production and 
transactions as well as coordinating the allocation of resources. 
In recent decades, the organization of transactions with agricultural products has 
undergone major changes. Boehlje, Hofing and Schrader (1999) observe that the modern 
food production and distribution systems in the U.S.A are moving away from open 
markets to more tightly aligned supply chains, driven by increased specificity of end-user 
demands, product differentiation and complexity of product processes. The Dutch 
Cooperative Council (NCR, 1990) distinguishes three developments regarding the 
changing environment. First, production of a large number of agricultural products has 
reached self-sufficiency at the level of the European Union. Second, a different product 
assortment is required in order to be successful in a market which has changed from a 
seller market to a buyers market. Thirdly, the emergence of the internal market in Europe 
induced many merger activities which have resulted in a few large, multinational private 
corporations. Bijman (2002) points out that the most fundamental one is the shift from 
production orientation to market orientation in the strategy of producers. All these changes 
raise challenges to efficient ways of vertical co-ordination in the agricultural industry. 
Various institutional arrangements regarding vertical co-ordination are viable in 
agrifood sectors, such as investor-owned agribusiness firms, agricultural cooperatives, and 
contract farming. An investor-owned agribusiness firm is a firm owned by investors and is 
active at one stage of agricultural production. An agricultural cooperative is a partly 
vertical integrated firm, where the primary growers act as the owners of the firm and thus 
2                                                                    Chapter 1  
                                                                               
forward integrate into downstream activities. Contract farming is the contractual 
arrangement regarding vertical coordination among the production stage and 
processing/marketing stage. These arrangements have been significantly influenced by the 
above mentioned changes. For example, cooperatives used to be an efficient governance 
structure to organize farmers into the value-added supply chains and thus share the benefit 
from vertical coordination and industrialization. However, a traditional cooperative may 
not adjust well for the changes, thus becomes less efficient and need restructuring. Similar 
to cooperatives, investor-owned firms and contract farming have their own advantages and 
disadvantages.  
How could we classify and characterize various governance structures in 
agricultural sectors? Are there efficient governance structures regarding vertical 
coordination in the rapidly changing environment? If there are, could we specify the 
circumstances under which a certain kind of governance structure or a sort of governance 
structures is efficient? How do various governance structures coordinate upstream and 
downstream activities in different institutional settings? How do governance structures 
affect inter-firm and inside-firm activities and to what extent? These questions will be 
addressed in this thesis.  
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
Out of the introduction of the research background and identification of the problems, we 
now formulate the research objectives. The objective is made more concrete by specifying 
research questions.  
The research objectives of this thesis consist of theoretical, empirical and 
managerial ones:  
 
(1) To add new knowledge regarding cooperatives by highlighting the role and added 
value of board of directors in screening investment projects (theoretical objective); 
(2) To add to the research on systems of attributes by incorporating and aligning 
complex and interacted organizational properties (empirical objective);  
(3) To contribute to the advancement of research in the field of incomplete 
contracting by exploring contractual completeness as well as allocation patterns 
of decision rights under contract farming (theoretical and empirical objective); 
(4) To provide useful insights and categories for managers of agribusiness to tackle 
practical problems in the governance of quality and standardization of agro-food 
as well as the aligning various stakeholders’ interests (managerial objective).  
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The research objectives will be approached by addressing the following research 
questions:  
 
Q1: What are the difference between cooperatives and investor-owned firms 
regarding the structure of the decision making process?  
Q2: How does the difference influence the efficiency of various governance 
structures?  
Q3: How are the new farmer specialized cooperatives in China organized?  
Q4: What determines the form and extent of decision rights allocation between 
farmer growers and downstream processors in contract farming? 
 
These questions will be addressed in Chapter 2 to 4. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
first and second research questions, and Chapter 3 deals with the third question, while 
chapter 4 addresses the fourth question.  
1.3 Core Concepts 
 
Governance, cooperatives and contract farming are core concepts in this thesis. A clear 
definition of these concepts prevents confusions and misunderstanding, thus, we will 
specify these concepts in this section.  
 
Governance 
Governance concerns the organization of transactions, whereas a governance 
structure consists of a collection of rules structuring the transactions between the various 
stakeholders (Pencavel, 2001; Hendrikse, 2003). Hansmann (1996) has defined a 
governance structure as the allocation of decision rights and income rights over relevant 
assets. Decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the question 
‘Who has authority or control (regarding the use of assets)?’. Decision rights concern all 
rights and rules regarding the use and deployment of assets (Hansmann, 1996). They 
specify who directs the firm’s activities, i.e. the allocation of authority. Important themes 
regarding authority are its allocation (‘make-or-buy’ decision), formal versus real authority, 
relational contracts, access, decision control (ratification, monitoring), decision 
management (initiation, implementation), task design, conflict resolution, and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Decision rights matter because contracts are in general incomplete, and the 
incompleteness of contracts is completed by allocating authority to somebody to decide in 
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circumstances not covered by the contract.1 Decision rights can be further distinguished as 
specific control rights and residual control rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Specific 
control rights (or specific decision rights) are those which are explicitly specified by 
contracts or laws, whereas all non-specified rights are residual control rights (or residual 
decision rights).  
 Income rights address the question ‘How are benefits and costs allocated?’. 
Income rights specify the rights to receive the benefits, and obligations to pay the costs, 
that are associated with the use of an asset, thereby creating the incentive system faced by 
decision makers. They will be reflected in the composition of costs and payment schemes.2 
Important themes regarding income rights are payment schemes, cost allocation schemes, 
the compensation package for the CEO and the other members of the board of directors, 
and the effects of horizontal as well as vertical competition. 
 
Cooperatives 
Agricultural marketing cooperatives emerged in the 19th century. They played an 
important role in organizing and coordinating agricultural production and transactions in 
many agricultural industries. There are several ways of defining a co-operative. One way is 
to look at its goals and activities; one way is to find out basic principles it follows; another 
alternative is by studying its governance structure. According to the first view, the main 
function of an agricultural cooperative is to further members’ income by providing specific 
services that align with the activities of the member-firms (Bijman, 2002). On the basis of 
the activities carried out by the co-operative, NCR (1993) distinguishes five categories of 
agricultural co-operatives: co-operative purchasing and producing inputs for farming; co-
operative processing and marketing agricultural and horticultural products; co-operative 
banks providing credit; co-operative auctions; cooperatives providing other services such 
as insurance, contract work, accountancy and farm relief. As cooperatives develop, they 
may expand their activities beyond the above descriptions, such as emergence of so-called 
environmental co-operatives (Slangen and Polman, 1999). Regarding the second view, the 
definition of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) is well accepted (1995). 
However, as market conditions experienced violent changes since 1980s, some new 
generation cooperatives emerged which changed some principles such as closed 
 
1 Incomplete contracting theory addresses decision rights / authority. The starting point is that the 
design of contracts is costly, which results in incomplete contracts. Incomplete contracts allocate 
decision power in situations left open by formal (incentive) contracts. The focus is on non-verifiable 
actions. 
2 The analysis of income rights / incentives is the realm of complete contracting theory in the form of 
agency relationships. The working hypothesis is that everything that is known, can and will be 
incorporated in the design of optimal remuneration schemes / contracts without costs. 
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membership and membership market, and in some cases new grower groups emerged (e.g., 
Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002).  
The third perspective regarding a co-operative, which we follow in this thesis, 
goes beyond the legal definitions and abstracts from specific activities. It looks at who has 
control over and who receives income from the co-operative firm. In other word, the co-
operative firm is treated as a particular governance structure in vertically coordinating 
activities and/or transactions among various production and distribution stages. A 
cooperative is a society of many independent growers/producers (horizontal relationship) 
who jointly own a downstream processor / retailer (vertical relationship). To clarify its 
organizational characteristics, many researchers compare a co-operative firm with an 
investor-owned firm (e.g., Staatz, 1987a; Hendrikse and Veerman, 1997; Hendrikse, 1998). 
For example, Hendrikse (1998) constructs a game-theoretic model of investment decisions 
in which the choice of organizational form (cooperative vs IOF) is the key st5rategic 
variable. Organizations are perceived as a collection of decision units. It is argued that the 
central difference between coops and IOFs in decision-making structure is the existence of 
two decision-making units in coops compared to one in IOFs.  
A simple figure helps to classify cooperatives and investor-owned firms 
intuitively. Figure 1.1 shows that, contrasted with an investor-owned firm, a cooperative is 
by principle member-owned and member-used and thus the (formal) authority resides with 
members. These member-owned organizations are usually not stock-listed, and have 
distinguishing features (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p12) like ‘an 
orientation to provide benefits to members and satisfy their needs, democratic goal setting 
and decision-making methods, special rules for dealing with capital and profit, and general 
interest objectives (in some cases)’.  
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Investor-owned firms Cooperatives 
Stockholders (owners) Members (owners and 
patrons/customers) 
Top Management 
Operational entities Cooperative entity 
Customers 
 
Figure 1.1  Investor-owned firms versus Cooperatives 
 
Contract farming  
Contract farming is mainly an agreement between a farmer and a firm, where the 
farmer produces a fresh or partially processed product and the firm has a commitment to 
buy it (Grosh, 1994). Contract farming operates as an intermediate economic institution 
between spot market and vertical integration (Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; 
Patrick, 2004), and rises as a response to changed consumer demands (Barkema, 1993; 
Reardon et. al. 2003), or to market imperfection, like in the area of credit, insurance, 
information, factors of production and product markets (Key and Runsten, 1999), or to 
controlling operational risks (Boehlje and Schrader, 1998).  
1.4 Positioning the Thesis 
 
This thesis can be positioned in the literature of new institutional economics, since we use 
major part of new institutional economics, i.e., transaction cost theory and new property 
rights theory as our theoretical foundations. Williamson distinguishes four levels of 
institutional analyses (2000). The most general level is Embeddedness, where informal 
institutions, customs, traditions, norms, and religion are at the center of analysis. Change 
occurs only once in 100-1000 years. Social theory is used for this analysis. Level 2, i.e., 
the Institutional Environment, is concerned with the formal rules of the game, like 
bureaucracy, polity, and the judiciary. Change occurs in 10-100 years. Economics of 
property is suitable for the analysis. The third level concerns Governance, which is about 
contracting and aligning governance structures with transactions. Changes occur in a time 
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frame of 1-10 years. Transaction costs economics is used here. Level 4 focuses on 
Resource Allocation and Employment. Neo-classical economics is used for the analysis. 
Our thesis can be classified into Level 3, where getting the governance structures right is 
the main purpose.  
The two approaches, i.e., transaction cost theory and incomplete contracting 
theory are summarized here, and the application of the approaches will be further 
illustrated in Chapter 2 to 4.  
 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) 
Before Ronald Coase (1937) raised the famous question of ‘why do firms exist ’, 
mainstream neoclassical economics pays little attention to institutional arrangements, both 
macro-level and micro-level. The firm is simply treated as a production function subject to 
technology constraints, which could be vividly graphed as a black box with input on one 
side and outputs on the other side. The black box was initially opened by Coase in his 
famous article of ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937). He mainly answered two questions. 
Firstly, why do firms exist? Or alternatively, what is the nature of firm? Transaction costs, 
i.e. the costs associated with the price mechanism to establish efficient exchange, were 
introduced to explain why sometimes markets are substituted by firms. In certain 
circumstances, market exchange is more costly than exchange within a firm. The 
fundamental nature of the firm is therefore referred to as selective intervention. Secondly, 
what determines the boundary of the firm? The reason why a firm cannot expand 
unlimitedly is because transacting via the firm also involves costs. According to Coase, the 
size of a firm is determined by the point where the marginal cost of transacting in the 
market equals the marginal cost of additional mistakes and more administrative rigidity in 
the firm.  
Although Coase formulated an agenda for developing organizational economics, 
he did not specify transaction costs. Williamson further developed the concept of 
transaction costs3 and to some extent made the hypotheses of transaction costs empirically 
meaningful.  
Instead of organization or firm, Williamson (1985) uses the term ‘governance 
structure’. A starting-point for the analysis of governance structure choice is to assume that 
a governance structure is chosen in order to minimize total costs, i.e. the joint transaction 
and production costs. TCE simplifies this analysis by assuming that transaction costs and 
production costs are determined separately and can be added together in order to determine 
 
3 For example, Williamson distinguished two types of transaction costs: ex ante costs and ex post 
costs. Ex ante transaction costs are the costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding agreement (as 
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the total costs of a certain way of organizing. It implies that the choice of governance 
structure is driven by minimizing transaction costs.  
One of Williamson’s contributions to organizational theory is that he first 
specifies three-characteristics of transactions which together determine transactions costs, 
and then successfully links them with different governance structures. The three 
characteristics of transactions are the frequency with which a transaction occurs, the degree 
of asset specificity, and the degree of uncertainty which surrounds the transaction. Given 
critical behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, the three 
exogenous variables determine the endogenous variable, i.e. governance structure. For 
example, the higher the specificity of a transaction, the higher the corresponding 
transaction costs, as a result, a hierarchy is preferred. Originally, Williamson (1985) only 
made a distinction between two governance structures: spot market and hierarchy. Later he 
distinguished a third type -hybrid- in between market and hierarchy (Williamson, 1991).  
Other researchers have emphasized the continuum of governance structure, ranging from 
spot market as one extreme to hierarchy as the other extreme (e.g., Mahoney, 1992; Frank 
and Henderson, 1992).  
TCE has been subject to quite some criticisms (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; 
Holstrom and Roberts, 1998). Among others, Hart admitted that Williamson linked 
transaction costs to efficient governance structure, however, he did not convincingly 
explained how that happened. Now we will turn to incomplete contracting theory (or new 
property rights theory) which was formulated by Grossman and Hart to see how they 
convincingly provide the missing mechanism. 
 
Incomplete contracting theory  
Incomplete contracting theory starts from the basic idea that it is often difficult 
to write enforceable comprehensive contracts (Hart and Moore, 1999). Real world 
contracts are almost always incomplete in the sense that there are inevitably circumstances 
or contingencies that are left out of the contract, because they were neither unforeseen or 
simply too expensive to enumerate in sufficient detail. As contracts are incomplete, actions 
and payments must often be determined ex post, either unilaterally or through negotiation. 
Consequentially, contracting agents should be concerned ex ante with the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour and the results of possible renegotiation. This is particularly 
problematic if ex ante transaction-specific investments must be made. These investments 
create the opportunity for ex post appropriation of quasi-surplus (surplus plus specific 
investment costs) by the non-investing agent to the transaction. The anticipation of 
 
suggested by Coase). Ex post transaction costs only rise when the contract has been put to work. Ex 
ante and ex post costs are preferred to be considered together because these costs are interrelated. 
Introduction                                                                    9 
 
possible hold-up may lead to under-investment in the economic relationship. This is the 
(inefficient) hold-up problem (Klein et al., 1978). Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson 
(1979, 1985) have suggested that vertical integration may solve this inefficiency problem. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) argued that vertical integration brings costs as well as 
benefits. GHM (Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990) define a firm as a 
collection of non-human assets under common ownership, where ownership means 
holding residual rights of control. Residual rights are all rights to an asset that are not 
expressly assigned to another agent. The allocation of residual rights of control influences 
the bargaining position of agents to a contract after they have made relationship-specific 
investments. In the absence of comprehensive contracts, property rights largely determine 
which ex post bargaining position will prevail. An agent owning assets that are essential 
for value creation in the relationship is in a position to reap at least some of the benefits 
from the relationship that were not explicitly allocated in the contract by threatening to 
withhold the assets otherwise. Thus, a shift of ownership affects the ex ante investment 
incentives of contracting agents.  
The GHM model has been extended in various directions. For example, 
Brynjolfsson (1994) has extended the model by incorporating human capital, specially the 
productive knowledge of agents. Rajan and Zingalas (1998) apply GHM into the 
exploration of the sources of power. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) analyze relational 
contracts. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy distinguish decision from control rights. 
A second way of positioning our thesis is to distinguish on the one hand various 
behavioural hypotheses and on the other hand various degree of rationality. Figure 1.2 acts 
as an illustration. There are three kinds of behavioral hypotheses, i.e., opportunistic-
oriented agents, self-interested agents and idealistic agents. The degree of rationality can 
be classified into three levels: complete rationality, limited rationality and procedural 
rationality. In our thesis, the assumptions of opportunistic agents and limited rationality are 
adopted.  
  Behavioural hypothesis 
  Opportunistic Self-
interested
Idealistic 
Degree  of Complete rationality   
rationality Limited rationality ×   
 Procedural rationality   
 
Figure 1.2  Positioning of the theoretical perspective (Hendrikse, 2003, p. 201) 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
 
To answer the first research question, we use non-cooperative game theory as a 
tool to construct model. 4  To answer the second and third research question, we use 
multiple case studies as our research method. Figure 1.3 is taken from the classical book 
by Yin (2003) regarding case studies. It illustrates the various aspects involved in multiple 
cases studies. They will be dealt with extensively in the chapter 3 and 4.  
To answer the second and third research question, we use multiple case studies as 
our research method. Figure 1.3 is taken from the classical book by Yin (2003) regarding 
case studies. It illustrates the various aspects involved in multiple cases studies. They will 
be dealt with extensively in the chapter 3 and 4. 
Develop 
theory 
Design data 
collection 
protocol 
 
Select cases 
Conduct 1st case 
study 
Conduct 2nd case 
study 
Conduct remaining 
case studies 
write individual 
case report 
Write individual 
case report 
Write individual 
case report 
Draw cross-case 
conclusions 
 
Modify theory 
Develop policy 
implications 
Write cross-case 
report 
DEFINE&DESIGN PREPARE, COLLECT, &ANALYZE DEFINE&DESIGN 
 
Figure 1.3  Multiple case study (Yin, 2003, p.50) 
 
 
 
4 Non-cooperative game theory is a mathematical method to describe the interactions between 
different players. 
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of an introduction (Chapter 1), three essays on agricultural 
cooperatives and contract farming (Chapter 2, 3, and 4), and conclusions (Chapter 5). The 
structure of the thesis is depicted in Figure 1.4.  
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 Ratification and 
Screening in Cooperatives 
versus Corporations 
Chapter 3 Organization and 
Strategy of Farmer Specialized 
Cooperatives in China
Chapter 4 Allocation of 
Decision Rights in Vegetable and 
Fruit Contracts 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
Figure 1.4  Structure of the thesis 
 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the research subject and the 
definition of the problem, and specifies the research objective and research questions. In 
Chapter 2, we develop a game model to capture the differences between cooperatives and 
investor-owned firms by focusing on the structure of the internal decision making process. 
A cooperative consists of a society of (upstream) members and a (downstream) enterprise, 
whereas a corporation consists of only an enterprise. This difference will be explored in a 
ratification model with endogenous screening rules at the level of the society of members 
as well as the enterprise. A lower screening level is chosen in a cooperative in order to 
compensate for its hierarchical decision-making structure. Screening levels are strategic 
substitutes because a lower screening level by the rival enterprise makes it more likely that 
the market has to be shared when a project is good. The payoff maximizing response is to 
increase the screening level at local bureaus. A governance structure externality is 
identified as well as a behavioral heterogeneity independent of the ratification structure. 
Conditions are specified for the coexistence of cooperatives and corporations. 
In Chapter 3, we explore agricultural cooperatives in the setting of a transitional 
economy, i.e., China, from the perspective of a system of attributes. How are the new 
farmer specialized cooperatives in China organized? This question is addressed by 
presenting data at three levels. First, data are presented regarding the historical 
development of farmer cooperatives in China. Second, data are presented regarding the 
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membership composition of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in the Zhejiang province. 
Third, data are presented regarding the various attributes (governance, quality control 
system, and strategy) of a watermelon cooperative in this province. Many cooperatives are 
being transformed in organizations with a market orientation. The data indicate that 
cooperatives exhibit substantial heterogeneity, in terms of farmers being member and 
skewness in the distribution of control rights. Human asset specificity in terms of 
establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more important 
than physical asset specificity in accounting for governance structure choice in the current 
institutional setting. 
In Chapter 4, we focus on the use of contracts as a way of organizing transactions 
between primary farmers and downstream agri-business. Contract farming is spreading in 
many agricultural sectors. One observation is that many restrictive arrangements are 
adopted in agricultural contracts. The restrictive contractual arrangements specify 
issues/decisions ex ante, and/or move decision rights across fixed firm boundaries. What 
determines the extent and form of decision rights allocation under contract farming? Based 
on several theoretical and empirical studies, we identify quality, reputation and uncertainty 
as the explanatory factors leading to various degree of completeness of contracts, and 
quality, reputation, specific investment and monopoly-oligopsony power as the 
explanatory factors for different allocation patterns of decision rights. 12 vegetable and 
fruit contracting networks in China are examined to test the relevance of the explanatory 
variables.  
In Chapter 5, we summarize the main findings from the research and present the 
main conclusions of the thesis.  
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2 Ratification and Screening in Cooperatives 
versus Corporations 
 
 
 ‘In an investor-owned firm, the chief executive officer (CEO) often has a large, if not 
dominant voice, in selecting the board of directors. Strong CEOs look for persons who 
share their vision for the future of the company and respect their managerial ability in 
selecting directors. When a new CEO takes over, directors who do not share his or her 
views are often encouraged to relinquish their seats on the board. This places the manager 
in a position of strong control over both setting and implementing company policy. In a 
cooperative, the CEO usually has significantly less influence over who sits on the board. 
Incumbent directors may have outlasted several managerial changes. When a board seat 
opens up, the influence of the CEO in the selection of the new director varies greatly 
depending on the culture of the association. Some cooperatives look for guidance from the 
manager, others deeply resent any involvement by the manager. As a result, directors often 
do not feel beholden to the manager for their position and have the independence, if they 
choose to exercise it, to question management decisions and reject its recommendations.’ 
USDA (2002, p11) 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs) are alterative forms of business 
organizations that buy, sell, and produce goods and services. Contrasted with investor-
owned firm, a cooperative is by principle member-owned and member-used. A cooperative 
is a society of many independent growers/producers (horizontal relationship) who jointly 
own a downstream processor / retailer (vertical relationship). These producer-owned 
organizations are usually not stock-listed, and have distinguishing features (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2001, p12) like ‘an orientation to provide benefits to members 
and satisfy their needs, democratic goal setting and decision-making methods, special rules 
for dealing with capital and profit, and general interest objectives (in some cases)’.  
Various studies show that cooperatives and investor-owned firms behave 
differently. For example, Van der Krogt (2005) shows that these organizations differ in 
their growth strategies. Cooperatives choose mainly alliance and consolidation strategies, 
whereas IOFs prefer take-over strategies. Hendrikse and Van Oijen (2004) show that 
cooperatives are active in fewer industries than corporations and that cooperatives have a 
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higher ratio of unrelated to total diversification than corporations. There are not only 
differences between these two classes of organizations, but there is also behavioral 
heterogeneity within a class. For example, Chaddad and Cook (2004) describe a striking 
variety of choices regarding the financing of dairy cooperatives around the world. 
Another empirical observation is that cooperatives and investor owned firms 
coexist in many agricultural markets. This is puzzling from the perspective of standard 
economic theory. It predicts that the efficient organizational form will drive out those that 
are not, resulting in an industry structure consisting of identical enterprises. However, the 
data suggest that organizational heterogeneity is pervasive, e.g. grain, fertilizers, pesticides, 
seeds, pork, wheat poultry, forestry, eggs, vegetables in Sweden (Nilsson, 1997), pork, 
beef, poultry, eggs, milk, sugarbeet, grain, fruit, vegetables in Europe (Hendrikse, 1998), 
and hogs, corn, soybeans, wheat, and cattle in the USA (Carriquiry and Babcock, 2004). 
These observations generate an interesting question: why and when different 
governance structures co-exist in a market? Prior literature shows that a cooperative, as a 
governance structure, has a number of advantages and disadvantages compared to an 
investor-owned firm (Vitaliano, 1983; Cook, 1995).  One obvious disadvantage is that a 
cooperative faces restrictions to issue claims against the residual profits of the organization. 
Not being listed in the stock market implies that cooperatives must finance investments 
through internally generated funds and debt, rather than issuing common stock. The 
absence of a stock listing also implies that equity-based compensation cannot be used and 
that there is no active takeover market replacing poorly performing managers. Thus, a 
cooperative has less freedom to design incentive compensation schemes to motivate 
managers. However, cooperatives exist in many industries. So, there must also be 
advantages of adopting a cooperative as a governance structure. 
One advantage may be related with tax preference. Cooperatives often receive 
favourable tax treatment compared to an investor owned firm. However, tax preferences 
for cooperatives become less common in developed countries. A second advantage may be 
related with market-related costs. Using markets entails costs (Coase, 1936; Williamson, 
1975). Bonus (1986) shows that the upstream concentration of bargaining power by 
upstream ownership of assets creates value when asset specificity is relatively important at 
the upstream stage of production.  
 A third advantage may derive from different decision making structure. It is well 
known that there are differences regarding the board of directors (Vitaliano, 1983). Board 
monitoring is a public good, but more active participation by members in board monitoring 
is expected in cooperatives due to the substantial financial stake in the cooperative by the 
members (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) address the 
relationship between shareholders and the board of directors in stock-listed enterprises. 
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They argue that there is substantial scope for managerial power due to actual incentives of 
directors being geared towards the interests of the CEO rather than the interests of the 
owners. One source of this managerial power is that the CEO has superior information 
about product markets, which may result in the choice of investment projects having a high 
personal value for the CEO. Another source is that the CEO has most likely superior 
information about the compensation packages for his position. However, managerial power 
is according to them limited by three variables: outrage costs, outsiders’ perception of a 
CEO’s compensation, and ‘camouflage’. The extent of rent-extraction by the CEO depends 
on how much ‘outrage’ a proposed compensation arrangement is expected to generate 
among relevant outsiders. Outrage costs are likely to be higher in cooperatives than in 
stock listed enterprises due to the considerable financial involvement of the members in 
the cooperative, the regular member meetings, and the feature that shares of a cooperative 
are not traded in the stock market. Similarly, the background and interests of members in a 
cooperative have a favourable impact on their recognition of rent extraction and makes 
camouflage activities more difficult.  
We focus on the value of screening and ratifying the decisions of the board by 
members in a cooperative. The above argument and the USDA citation motivate 
characterizing a cooperative by a dual screening decision process, whereas an investor-
owned firm consists of a single screening decision process. The organization of the 
screening process matters, because it affects the errors made by individuals within the 
organization, and how those errors are aggregated at the organizational as well as industry 
level. A model highlighting the difference in the structure of the internal decision making 
process of these two governance is developed to see how the screening process influences 
behaviours and performance of business organizations. 
It is shown that a corporation is prone to accept more investment projects than a 
cooperative because a cooperative requires approval of the society of members as well as 
the management of the cooperative. However, lower screening levels are chosen in a 
cooperative in order to compensate for its hierarchical decision-making structure. 
Cooperatives are predicted in markets with attractive portfolio compositions because the 
cooperative is good at rejecting bad projects. Similarly, corporations thrive in markets with 
bad portfolio compositions because they select good projects more frequently than 
cooperatives. Governance structure choice entails an externality because choosing a 
corporation as organizational form makes the market less attractive for the rival enterprise. 
The heterogeneity of behaviour of enterprises with the same governance structure as well 
as the coexistence of cooperatives and corporations is driven by the same trade-off. The 
advantage of being more frequently a monopolist compensates for accepting more bad 
projects. 
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Our model can be positioned in the literature in various ways. First, Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986) argue that individuals’ judgement entails errors, and that the architecture of 
an organization affects the errors made by the organization as well as individuals in the 
system. The term ‘architecture’ is used to describe the decision-making units, how they are 
arranged together in a system, how the decision-making authority and ability is distributed 
within a system, who gathers what information, and who communicates what with whom. 
In our setting, different screening structures influence performance of the organization, 
where an organization can be viewed as a collection of decision-making units. A 
cooperative is in their terminology described by two decision-making units or bureaus, 
whereas a corporation consists of one bureau. Fulton (1990) adopts the Sah and Stiglitz 
framework to distinguish three cooperative structures: federated, centralized, and mixed-
decentralized. Our characterization of a cooperative is most close to her mixed-
decentralized type, i.e. ‘All projects are first reviewed centrally and, if accepted, are 
forwarded to the decentralized firms which independently evaluate and accept or reject 
projects.’ (Fulton, 1990, p16). The focus of the analysis is on how expenditure on 
information varies with organization structure in a monopolistic setting. Hendrikse (1998) 
extends the model of Sah and Stiglitz to a competitive setting when screening levels are 
exogenous. The focus is therefore on ratification only. This article considers how 
endogenous screening rules, i.e. each individual decision-making unit chooses its 
acceptance/rejection probabilities, affect behaviour and performance of cooperatives 
versus corporations. 
Second, Williamson (1985) distinguishes in his economic analysis of the 
institutions of capitalism two behavioural assumptions, opportunism and bounded 
rationality, and three aspects of transactions, asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. 
Opportunism and asset specificity are dominant in his transaction costs analysis, whereas 
our model highlights the behavioural assumption of bounded rationality by people making 
mistakes in screening, and uncertainty regarding the nature of the product that is being 
evaluated. 
Third, according to the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the decision 
process can be separated into the two compound components of decision management (i.e., 
the initiation and implementation of decisions) and decision control (i.e., the ratification 
and monitoring of decisions). For modern firms, including cooperatives and corporations, 
this separation of the decision process is common. Our model has initiation of decisions at 
the processor stage of production in the cooperative as well as the corporation. The 
difference between these organizations is in the ratification process. The cooperative 
requires that the society of members ratifies an investment proposal in addition to the 
ratification at the downstream stage of production, whereas the corporation does not. 
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Finally, Teece, among others, (1994, p19) characterizes organizational 
competence by allocative competence, i.e. deciding what to produce and how to price it; 
transactional competence, i.e. deciding whether to make or buy, and whether to do so alone 
or in partnership; and administrative competence, i.e. how to design organizational 
structures and policies to enable efficient performance. Our model is about the relationship 
between administrative competence and allocative efficiency regarding the adoption of 
projects at the downstream, or processing, stage of production. 
Understanding the differences between decision-making processes in various 
organizational forms is significant to both organisational economics and industrial 
organization because it provides insights in the efficient governance of enterprises and 
efficient industry structures. Dual screening may not only generate superior performance 
by the cooperative, but may also create competitive advantage. The paper is organized as 
follows. In section 2, we present the model and analyse the monopoly case. Section 3 is 
dedicated to the duopoly case. Section 4 formulates a summary and indicates possibilities 
for further research. 
2.2 Model 
 
We consider a production and processing stage of production. Farmers grow agricultural 
products at the upstream stage, while the produce is processed at the downstream stage. A 
crucial difference between a cooperative (C) and an investor owned firm (F) is that farmers 
own the downstream stage of production in C, while they do not in F. The focus of the 
model is on the selection of projects at the downstream stage of production. A new project 
is evaluated at the downstream stage of production in both governance structures. If the 
project is accepted by the downstream bureau, then it is accepted by enterprise F. 
Acceptance of a new project by the enterprise C requires also screening and approval by 
the upstream bureau. A Cooperative consists therefore of an upstream and a downstream 
bureau, whereas a Firm consists of just a downstream bureau. Figure 2.1 depicts these 
differences between C and F. 
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Figure 2.1  Ratification structure in Cooperative (C) versus Firm (F) 
 
Define x as the net benefit of a project, where x = V with probability α and x = -
W with probability 1 - α. Assume that the project evaluator observes y = x + θ, where θ is 
uniformly distributed and independent of x. Denote the density function of θ by m(θ) and 
its distribution function by M(θ). The uniform distribution of θ is summarized by U(-ϕ,ϕ). 
Imperfect screening is assumed and entails that V - ϕ < -W + ϕ, i.e. there is an interval of 
y-values where x can be either a good or a bad project. Project evaluators use reservation 
screening levels for screening: a project is accepted if its observed profit is above the 
reservation screening level S, and is rejected otherwise. The screening function p(x,S) is 
defined as the probability that a project is judged to be good. It depends on its quality x 
and the screening level S, i.e. p(x,S) = Prob[y≥S] = 1-M(S-x). 
Our model consists of a four stage game. The first stage consists of the choice of 
architecture. Screening levels are chosen in the second stage of the game. Third, nature 
chooses the type of project. Finally, project acceptance decisions are made by the 
organization. Backward induction will be used as solution method, i.e. the screening level 
will be determined first as a function of the choice of architecture (section 2.1), and 
subsequently the choice of architecture is determined (section 2.2). 
2.2.1 Screening Level Choice 
 
We notice that the expected payoff maximizing screening level of an architecture will 
never be set lower than V - ϕ or higher than –W + ϕ. It will never be set lower than V- ϕ 
because that will only increase the probability of accepting bad projects, i.e. increasing the 
number of type II errors, while screening levels higher than –W + ϕ will only increase the 
probability of rejecting good projects, i.e. increasing the number of type I errors. The 
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expected payoff maximizing screening level of an architecture will therefore be in the 
interval [V - ϕ,-W + ϕ]. 
A Firm chooses its screening level S in order to maximize 
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The parts independent of Si do not matter, therefore Si((1-α)W - αV)/2ϕ has to be 
maximized. This is a linear function in S. It implies that either V-ϕ or –W+ϕ is the 
expected payoff maximizing screening level of the firm. The Firm chooses V-ϕ when (1-
α)W - αV < 0, otherwise it chooses -W+ϕ. It reflects that the expected payoff maximizing 
screening level is high when the portfolio of projects is bad, i.e. either V is low, or W is 
large, or α is low. Similarly, the low screening level V-ϕ is chosen when the portfolio of 
projects is attractive. 
Assume that screening levels are chosen simultaneous and independent by bureau 
i and bureau j in a Cooperative.5 Bureau i chooses Si in order to maximize 
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The parts independent of Si do not matter, therefore {(1-α)Wp(-W, Sj) - αVp(V, 
Sj)}Si has to be maximized. This is a linear function in Si. Again, it implies that either V - 
ϕ or –W + ϕ is an expected payoff maximizing screening level. The Cooperative chooses 
V-ϕ when (1-α)Wp(-W, Sj) - αVp(V, Sj) < 0, otherwise it chooses -W+ϕ. 
                                                 
5 Notice that figure 1 indicates the possibility of Bayesian updating when the upstream 
bureau receives a project from the downstream bureau for a second evaluation. We do not 
take this into account because it does not change the qualitative results of our paper. Sah 
and Stiglitz (1988) address this issue. 
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W 
V
(1-α)W = αVp(V, Sj)/p(-W, Sj)
(1-α)W = αV
SC= V – ϕ 
SF= V – ϕ
SC = V – ϕ 
SF = –W + ϕ 
SC = –W + ϕ 
SF = –W + ϕ 
 
Figure 2.2  Screening level choice by a monopolist 
 
Figure 2.2 summarizes the payoff maximizing screening level choice in the 
second stage of the game as a function of V and W for the Firm as well as the Cooperative, 
given the level of α. There are two areas where the payoff maximizing screening level is 
the same for both governance structures. If W is relatively large compared to V, i.e. the 
portfolio is relatively bad, then the high screening level -W+ϕ is chosen in order to prevent 
that bad projects are accepted. Similarly, if V is relatively large compared to W, i.e. the 
portfolio is relatively good, then the low screening level V-ϕ is chosen in order to prevent 
that good projects are rejected. There is also a set of values of V and W where the 
Cooperative chooses the low screening level V-ϕ and the Firm the high screening level -
W+ϕ. It captures that a Cooperative will adjust the screening level downwards due to its 
tendency to commit a relatively large number of type I errors, while a Firm will adjust the 
screening level upwards due to its tendency to commit a relatively large number of type II 
errors. These results are in line with Sah and Stiglitz (1986). 
These screening level choices determine the composition and the size of the 
product portfolio of these enterprises. If V is large and W is small, then both governance 
structures accept all good projects, and some bad projects. However, the Cooperative will 
accept fewer bad projects than the Firm. It implies that the portfolio of projects of a 
Cooperative is smaller, but it is on average of higher quality, than the portfolio of projects 
accepted by a Firm when the number of projects evaluated by both governance structures 
is identical. If V is small and W is large, then the quality of the portfolio of accepted 
products of both governance structures is again identical because they accept only good 
projects. However, the size of the portfolio of the Firm is larger than the size of the 
portfolio of a Cooperative, because the Cooperative commits more type I errors. Finally, if 
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V is roughly the same as W, i.e. the intermediate section in figure 2.2, then these results 
are reversed. The average quality of the portfolio of accepted projects is highest in the 
Firm because it only accepts good projects, whereas a Cooperative accepts all good 
projects and some bad projects. The size of the portfolio of accepted projects of the 
Cooperative is therefore also larger than the portfolio of a Firm. Figure 2.3 summarizes 
these results. 
 
Screening level
 
Portfolio feature 
SC = V – ϕ 
SF = V – ϕ 
SC = V – ϕ 
SF = -W + ϕ 
 
SC = -W + ϕ 
SF = -W + ϕ 
 
Largest size F C F 
Highest average quality C F F=C 
Figure 2.3  Portfolio features of Cooperatives and Firms 
2.2.2 Architecture Choice  
 
Figure 2.4 presents the payoff maximizing architecture choice by a monopolist. The 
economic intuition is formulated in terms of a ratification and a screening effect. The 
ratification effect captures the single versus double screening of the two governance 
structures, whereas the screening effect focuses on the number of type I versus type II 
errors committed due to the screening level choice. Distinguish again the three areas of 
figure 2.2. Suppose that the values of V and W are such that the expected payoff 
maximizing screening level choice is V–ϕ for a Cooperative as well as a Firm, then p(V, 
V–ϕ) = 1 and p(–W, V–ϕ) > 0. There is no screening effect because the bureaus in both 
governance structures use the same screening level. However, there is a ratification effect 
because p(-W, V–ϕ) > 0, i.e. there are type II errors. (There are no type I errors because 
p(V, V–ϕ) = 1.) The expected payoff maximizing architecture choice is a Cooperative, 
because a Cooperative is good at preventing type II errors. Similarly, a Firm is chosen 
when the expected payoff maximizing screening level choice is -W+ϕ for both 
architectures. There is again only a ratification effect. The choice –W+ϕ entails that p(V, -
W+ϕ) < 1 and p(-W, -W+ϕ) = 0, i.e. there are only type I errors because 1-p(V, -W+ϕ) > 0. 
A Firm is good at preventing type I errors. 
Finally, there is a ratification and a screening effect in the intermediate region. 
The ratification effect entails that the Cooperative is more conservative in accepting 
projects than a Firm. This is attractive from the perspective of preventing type II errors, but 
not from the perspective of preventing type I errors. The screening level effect, i.e. the 
effect of lowering the screening level from –W+ϕ in a Firm to V-ϕ in a Cooperative, 
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increases the likelihood of type II errors, but reduces the type I errors committed by the 
Cooperative. This screening effect dominates the conservative ratification effect of a 
Cooperative when the portfolio is relatively good. It implies that a Cooperative is chosen 
in the intermediate region if and only if when W is smaller than a certain level of V. To be 
more specific, the governance structure Firm is chosen when (1-α)W < αV/(1-(V+W)/2ϕ). 
 
C 
F 
(1-α)W = αV/(1-(V+W)/2ϕ) 
 W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 
 
Figure 2.4  Architecture choice by a monopolist 
 
2.3 Duopoly 
 
The four stage game of the previous section is used again to analyse the competitive 
effects of governance structure choice in a duopoly setting. It is assumed that architecture 
choices are made simultaneously and independently in the first stage of the game. 
Screening levels are chosen in the second stage of the game. Third, nature chooses the type 
of project. Finally, project acceptance decisions are made by the organization. Again, 
acceptance decisions are made simultaneously and independently.  
This section is organized as follows. The duopoly payoffs are specified in section 
3.1. Section 3.2 determines the screening level choice and a governance externality in the 
choice of screening level. Equilibrium screening levels are determined in section 3.3. 
Architecture choices are the focus of section 3.4.  
2.3.1 Duopoly Payoffs 
 
An enterprise faces two possible values of accepting a good project in a duopoly because it 
depends on whether or not the market has to be shared with a rival. If the rival enterprise 
rejects the project, then the monopoly payoffs of the previous section apply. However, 
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when the rival enterprise also accepts the project, then the market has to be shared. We 
assume that the gains associated with a good project are split equally between the two 
enterprises when both accept the project. The loss associated with accepting a bad project 
is again W, independent of market structure. 
Different competitive scenarios can be distinguished in a competitive setting, like 
Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, and collusion. We summarize the intensity of 
competition by a parameter β∈[0,.5]. If the intensity of competition is very intense, like 
Bertrand competition in a market with homogeneous products and unlimited capacity, then 
β=0. Sharing the market in a situation with a cartel is captured by β=.5. The case of 
Cournot competition is characterized by β∈(0,.5). An enterprise will therefore encounter 
three types of projects: a good project with value V, or a good project with value βV, or a 
bad project with value –W. Figures 2.5A and 2.5B summarize these assumptions. 
 
Architecture 2  
Architecture 1 
Accept Reject 
Accept (βV, βV) (V,0) 
Reject (0,V) (0,0) 
Figure 2.5A  Duopoly payoffs when the project is good 
 
Architecture 2  
Architecture 1 
Accept Reject 
Accept (–W,–W) (–W,0) 
Reject (0,–W) (0,0) 
Figure 2.5B  Duopoly payoffs when the project is bad 
 
2.3.2 Reaction Functions 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates that the payoff maximizing screening level choice of a bureau 
depends on V, W, α, ϕ, and the choice of architecture. The screening level and architecture 
choice of the rival enterprise has to be added to this list in a duopoly. In order to address 
the impact of competition on the choice of screening level and architecture, we define 
reaction function Rij as the payoff maximizing screening level choice of a bureau in 
architecture i, facing architecture j. 
Section 2.1 has determined that the payoff maximizing screening level choice of a 
bureau is either V-ϕ or -W+ϕ. The slope of the reaction function is therefore piecewise 
vertical. Suppose that the screening level in architecture j is at least V+ϕ, i.e. architecture 2 
rejects all projects. Architecture i will choose its screening level independent of the choice 
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of screening level in architecture j, i.e. the monopoly situation is actual. It entails that the 
reaction function is vertical and does not depend on the choice of screening level in 
architecture j. Suppose that the screening level of architecture j is at most V-ϕ, i.e. 
architecture j accepts all good projects. Architecture i will choose its screening level 
independent of the choice of screening level of architecture j. This situation is very similar 
to the monopoly situation, except that V has to be replaced by βV. 
There may be a discontinuity in the reaction function of architecture i at an 
intermediate level of the screening level in architecture j. If the screening level of 
architecture j drops below a certain level, then the payoff maximizing screening level of 
architecture i increases. Suppose that the screening level of architecture j is in the interval 
[V-ϕ,V+ϕ]. If the values of V and W are such that the choice of screening level in 
architecture i is –W+ϕ in the monopoly situation, then it will also be –W+ϕ in the duopoly 
situation. The reaction function is vertical and does not depend on the choice of screening 
level of architecture j. However, if the values of V and W are such that the choice of 
screening level of architecture i is V–ϕ in the monopoly situation, then there are cases 
where the choice of screening level depends on the screening level choice in architecture j. 
The screening level in architecture j may decrease to such an extent that the lower expected 
payoff of a good project makes it attractive for architecture i to increase the screening level 
choice from V-ϕ to –W+ϕ. Figure 2.6 depicts this case. The reaction function shows the 
payoff maximizing screening level choice of a bureau in architecture i as a function of the 
screening level choice of a bureau in the architecture of rival j. If the screening level choice 
Sj decreases, then the expected payoff of a good project decreases (or stays the same). 
Figure 2.6 implies that the payoff maximizing screening level will increase (or stays the 
same). It reflects that a decrease in Sj, i.e. the competitor is more frequently in the market, 
makes the market less attractive for architecture i. Architecture i will respond by increasing 
its screening level Si because it becomes more important to reject bad projects. In sum, an 
organization will never reduce its screening levels when its competitor reduces its 
screening levels. Screening levels are therefore strategic substitutes (Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1984). 
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Sj 
SiV-ϕ 
V-ϕ 
V+ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
Rij 
 
Figure 2.6  Reaction function of a bureau in architecture i, facing architecture j 
 
The switching point in figure 2.6 depends on the choice of architecture of both 
organizations. Figure 2.7 addresses the impact of architecture i on the payoff maximizing 
level of Si, while figure 2.8 shows the impact of architecture j on the payoff maximizing 
level of Si. The impact of the choice of architecture on the payoff maximizing screening 
level choice is presented in figure 2.2. A Cooperative has never a higher screening level 
than a Firm. The translation of this result in terms of figure 2.6 is that the switching point 
is lower for a Cooperative than for a Firm. Competition has an impact on the expected 
value of a good project, but not on the value of a bad project. A lower value of Sj reduces 
the expected value of a good project for a bureau in architecture i, given the choice of 
architecture of the rival. Figure 2.2 shows that there exists for every value of W a range of 
values of V for which a Cooperative chooses a low screening level and a Firm a high 
screening level. Figure 2.7 presents this result.6  
 
 
6 Appendix 2-1 shows this formally. 
 
26                                                                    Chapter 2  
                                                                               
                                                
Sj 
SiV-ϕ 
V-ϕ 
V+ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
RFj
RCj
 
Figure 2.7  Screening level choice of a bureau in architecture i (=C,F) facing architecture j 
 
The choice of architecture by rival j exerts an externality on the screening level 
choice of a bureau in architecture i. A Firm will never accept fewer projects than a 
Cooperative when Sj is fixed. It implies that architecture i has to share the market more 
frequently with rival j when j has adopted architecture F rather than C. The payoff 
maximizing response of a bureau to a lower expected payoff of a good project is to 
increase the screening level (Figure 2.2). There is therefore a range of values of Sj where 
the payoff maximizing Si is equal to V-ϕ when facing a Cooperative, and -W+ϕ when 
facing a Firm. The switching point of the reaction function is therefore highest when 
facing a Firm. Figure 2.8 presents this governance externality.7
 
7 Appendix 2-1 shows this formally. 
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Sj 
SiV-ϕ 
V-ϕ 
V+ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
RiF
RiC
 
Figure 2.8  Governance externality of architecture j on the screening level choice of a 
bureau in architecture i 
 
It follows directly from combining the figures 2.7 and 2.8 that the level of Sj at 
which the discontinuity in the reaction function occurs is lowest for RCC and highest for 
RFF for all parameter values. The ranking of the level of Sj for the intermediate cases RCF 
and RFC depends on the parameter values. So, there are only two cases regarding the 
ranking of switching points of the four reaction functions. 
2.3.3 Equilibrium Screening Level Choice 
 
The equilibrium screening levels in the second stage of the game depend on the 
architecture choices in the first stage of the game. Figure 2.9 presents the common features 
regarding equilibrium screening level choice for all industry configurations as a function 
of V and W, given the level of α and β.8 The comparative statistic results regarding the 
portfolio composition and intensity of competition parameters are straightforward. A 
worsening of the portfolio, i.e. a lower level of α, or an increase in the intensity of 
competition, i.e. a lower level of β, decreases the range of parameters for which low 
screening level V-ϕ is chosen. Preventing type-II errors becomes more important because 
the expected benefit of good projects decreases, while the expected costs of bad projects 
does not decrease. 
 
8 The appendix 2-2 distinguishes all cases. 
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to such an extent that it does not compensate for the loss associated with the increased 
Si= V-ϕ 
Sj= -W+ϕ 
Si= -W+ϕ 
Sj= -W+ϕ 
Si= V-ϕ
Sj= V-ϕ
Si=-W+ϕ
Sj= V-ϕ 
or
W 
V 
 
Figure 2.9  Equilibrium screening level choice, i,j=C,F 
 
There are two areas where the equilibrium screening level is the same for both 
enterprises regardless their choice of architecture. If W is relatively large compared to V, 
i.e. the portfolio is relatively bad, then the high screening level -W+ϕ is chosen by each 
organization in order to prevent that bad projects are accepted. No organization is inclined 
to depart from this screening level, because the additional expected loss from accepting 
more bad projects with low screening level V-ϕ outweighs the additional expected benefit 
from accepting more good projects. Similarly, if V is relatively large compared to W, i.e. 
the portfolio is relatively good, then the low screening level V-ϕ is chosen by each 
organization in order to prevent that good projects are rejected. 
Figure 2.9 shows that there is always a set of values of V and W where one 
organization chooses the low screening level V-ϕ and the other the high screening level -
W+ϕ. This result applies to an industry consisting of two Firms, an industry consisting of 
two Cooperatives, as well as an industry consisting of a Firm and a Cooperative. It is 
therefore entirely explained by the screening effect. Suppose that both organizations 
choose their screening level at -W+ϕ, i.e. they reject all bad projects as well as some good 
projects. There are values of V and W such that one organization is able to increase its 
expected payoff by lowering its screening level to V-ϕ, i.e. all good projects are accepted 
as well as some bad ones. The advantage of being sometimes a monopolist compensates 
for accepting once in a while a bad project. However, it is not a Nash equilibrium that both 
organizations choose V-ϕ because this would reduce the probability of being a monopolist 
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2.3.4 Equilibrium Architecture Choice 
.10 presents the strategic form regarding architecture choice, where Yij is defined as the 
Architecture j 
probability of accepting bad projects. Two Cooperatives, or two Firms, in the same 
industry may exhibit therefore different behaviour, despite having the same ratification 
structure. 
 
2
profit of architecture i facing architecture j. The value of Yij depends on the equilibrium 
screening level choice, and therefore on the value of V as well as W. A large number of 
cases have been identified in the previous section. The Nash equilibrium architecture 
choice has to be identified in each case. 
 
Architecture i 
Cooperative Firm 
Cooperative (Y ) (YCC, YCC) CF, YFC
Firm (YFC, YCF) (YFF, YFF) 
 
igure 2.10  Strategic form of architecture choice game 
arding equilibrium architecture 
choice as
                                                
F
 
Figure 2.11 presents the common features reg
 a function of V and W, given the level of α and β.9 Three segments of the 
parameter space are distinguished and duopoly choices are indicated. For example, (F,C) 
indicates that the duopoly will consist of one Firm and one Cooperative in equilibrium. 
Both enterprises choose a Cooperative when the portfolio is relatively good. All good 
projects will be accepted by Firms as well as Cooperatives when the screening level is V-ϕ, 
i.e. there are no type I errors, but the conservative decision making in a Cooperative is 
better at preventing type II errors due to its ratification structure of dual screening. 
Similarly, both enterprises choose a Firm when the portfolio is relatively bad. All bad 
projects will be rejected by Firms as well as Cooperatives when the screening level is –
W+ϕ, i.e. there are no type II errors, but the Firm is better at preventing type I errors due to 
screening only once. 
 
9 Appendix 2-3 provides the details. 
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(F,C) 
(F,F) 
(C,C) 
W 
V 
 
Figure 2.11  Equilibrium architecture choices 
 
Figure 2.11 shows that there is a set of values of V and W where a Cooperative 
and a Firm coexist in equilibrium. An explanation similar to the explanation of the 
intermediate region of figure 2.8 applies, but the emphasis is now on the impact of 
difference in ratification structure. Suppose that both organizations choose a Cooperative. 
One organization is able to increase its expected payoff by switching to a Firm ratification 
structure. The advantage of being sometimes a monopolist compensates for accepting more 
frequently a bad project. However, it is not a Nash equilibrium that both organizations 
switch to Firm because this would reduce the probability of being a monopolist to such an 
extent that it does not compensate for the loss associated with the increased probability of 
accepting bad projects. A Cooperative and a Firm may therefore coexist in the same 
industry. 
The comparative statistc results regarding the intensity of competition are the 
same as in the monopoly situation. More intense competition, i.e. β decreases, reduces the 
attractiveness of the Cooperative as architecture choice. Equilibrium screening levels are 
high in a market with intense competition, i.e. all bad projects are rejected. A Firm is the 
preferred choice of architecture because it commits fewer type I errors than a Cooperative. 
More intense competition results in less centralized governance structures.10
 
10 Notice that the equilibrium architecture choices may constitute a prisoners dilemma. 
There are two possible cases. Either both organizations choosing a Cooperative is a 
prisoners dilemma when YCC < YFF, YFC < YCC, and YFF < YCF, or both organizations 
choosing a Firm is a prisoners dilemma when YCC > YFF, YFC > YCC, and YFF > YCF. The 
first case is not possible. 
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The assumption regarding the first stage of the game is that architecture choices 
are made simultaneously. However, there is scope for strategic architecture choice when 
one organization is able to choose its architecture before the other organization is choosing. 
According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), three variables have to be specified in order to 
determine the profit maximizing organisational choice/investment in a strategic setting: the 
nature of investment, the nature of competitive process, and the entry condition. First, 
define the investment as the extent of decentralized decision-making. A Cooperative is less 
decentralized than a Firm due to its double screening ratification procedure. More 
decentralized decision structures entails that more projects are accepted, which will reduce 
rival firm’ profit in a market. Thus, the investment is hard, because it establishes a negative 
relationship between investment in decentralized decision-making and profits of rival firms. 
Second, the nature of the competition process is characterized as strategic substitutes 
(figure 2.6). Third, two cases regarding the condition of market entry have to be 
distinguished (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984): entry is inevitable or it is not. However, the 
payoff maximizing investment choice is the same in both cases when the market is 
characterized by a hard investment and strategic substitutes. The profit maximizing 
investment profile is to be aggressive in order to elicit a passive response by the rival, i.e. 
over-invest in a decentralized ratification procedure, i.e. a Firm. 
2.4 Conclusion and Further Research 
 
A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient 
organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that a corporation is prone to 
accept more investment projects than a cooperative because a cooperative requires 
approval of the society of members as well as the management of the cooperative. 
However, lower screening levels are chosen in a cooperative in order to compensate for its 
hierarchical decision-making structure. Cooperatives are predicted in markets with 
attractive portfolio compositions because the cooperative is good at rejecting bad projects. 
Similarly, corporations thrive in markets with bad portfolio compositions because they 
select good projects more frequently than cooperatives. More intense competition results in 
less centralized governance structures in order to increase the likelihood of accepting good 
projects. Screening level choice may therefore outweigh architecture choice. The 
heterogeneity of behaviour of enterprises with the same governance structure as well as the 
coexistence of cooperatives and corporations is driven by the same trade-off. The 
advantage of being more frequently a monopolist compensates for accepting more bad 
projects. 
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There are a number of avenues for future research, theoretical as well as empirical. 
First, the model is geared towards projects, but silent regarding the composition of the 
diversification portfolio of enterprises. It is important to know in this context what is 
meant by a project. Screening and ratification may be regarding accepting a new project, or 
divesting an existing project. The current model does not distinguish these two cases. 
Second, our result regarding lower screening levels in cooperatives is the same as in Cook 
(1994, p46), but his rationale is quite different. He states that the more offensive attitude of 
cooperatives nowadays might be explained by ‘…A start-up threshold with a lower 
expected return because of user demand.’ Our result is driven by the ratification procedure 
of a cooperative, whereas his remark seems to be driven by voting of a farmer in order to 
maximize his portfolio of farm assets rather than the portfolio of assets of the Cooperative. 
Third, in agriculture markets where cooperatives are active players, drastically increased 
competition since the 1980s has been reported in the literature. At the same time, many 
cooperatives are also reported to change the traditional structure in many ways, including 
switching to investor-owned firm structure or adopting more Firm relevant properties. This 
is in line with the predictions of the model, but alternative explanations may be formulated. 
Empirical analyses have to provide guidance. 
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Appendix 2-1: Discontinuity in the four reaction functions 
 
 
This appendix consists of four parts. Section A1.1 determines the payoff 
maximizing screening level. Section A1.2 and A1.3 show mathematically the difference in 
the switching points in the figures 2.7 and 2.8. Section A1.4 focuses on the difference 
between RCF and RFC. 
 
A1 Payoff maximizing screening level 
 
Denote Rij as the payoff maximizing screening level Si in architecture i (either F 
or C), given architecture j (either F or C). Denote m(X,Si) as the probability that 
architecture i with screening level Si accepts a project with payoff X and n(X,Sj) as the 
probability that architecture j with screening level Sj accepts a project with payoff X. 
Architecture i will choose its payoff maximizing screening level by 
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Thus, we have 
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A2 Figure 2.7 
 
The difference in the switching point in figure 2.6 will now be determined. We 
will look at the impact of a switch in governance structure i on the location of Rij, given a 
specific choice of j. One way to do this it to use the probability n(V, Sj) and the fraction 
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It means that the range of values of Sj satisfying the inequality is smaller in a Firm 
than in a Cooperative. It implies that RCj is left of RFj. This is presented in figure A2-1-1a. 
  
Sj 
SiV-ϕ 
V-ϕ 
V+ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
RFF
RCF
 
Figure A2-1-1a: Reaction functions Rij when j=F and i=F,C 
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Another way to determine the location of Rij, given a specific choice of j, is to 
calculate the level of Sj at which the switch occurs. The switching point occurs when the 
‘≤’ is equal to ‘=’ in the expression of the payoff maximizing screening level at the end of 
section A1.1. The discontinuity point of RFF is therefore equal to 
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Obviously the latter is smaller than the former. 
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The discontinuity point in RCC is determined by 
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bviously the latter is lower than the former. Figure A2-1-1b captures it. O
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Figure A2-1-1b: Reaction functions Rij when j=C and i=F,C 
  
The two figures are summarized by  Figure 2.7 in the text, i.e. the discontinuity 
point of RCj is lower than that of RFj. 
 
A3 Figure 2.8 
 
The impact of the choice of architecture of the rival firm on the reaction function 
is determined again by using the inequality of section A1.1.  
We have 22 ]2)([),(),( ϕϕ jjj SVSVpSVn −+==  when j=C, while 
ϕϕ 2)(),(),( jjj SVSVpSVn −+==  when j=F.  
Let m(.) be fixed, i.e., i is either C or F. The difference between these two cases in 
term of the inequality of section A1.1 is captured by figure A2-1-2. The range of values of 
Sj satisfying this inequality, and therefore the payoff maximizing Si equal to V-ϕ, is always 
at least as large for a Cooperative as for a Firm. It implies that RiC is left of RiF. 
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Figure A2-1-2: The impact of the choice of architecture of the rival on the range of values 
of Sj for which the payoff maximizing screening level in V-ϕ 
 
Figure A2-1-3a and A2-1-3b capture the cases where i=F and i=C respectively. 
j=F 
j=C 
Equality 
Sj
n(V,Sj) 
C F 
1 
V+ϕV-ϕ 
Sj 
Si
V-ϕ 
V-ϕ 
V+ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
RFF
RFC
 
 
Figure A2-1-3a: Reaction function Rij when i=F and j=F,C 
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Figure A2-1-3b: Reaction function Rij when i=C and j=F,C 
 
Figure 2.7 in the main text summarizes the above two figures, i.e., the discontinuity point 
of RiC is lower than that of RiF. 
 
A4 The ranking of the level of Sj of RCF and RFC at which the discontinuity in the reaction 
function occurs depends on the parameter values 
 
According to Figure 2.7A and Figure 2.6B, we have RFF>RFC>RCC. According to 
Figure 2.6A and Figure 2.7B, we have RFF>RCF>RCC. Thus, the discontinuity point in RFF 
is the highest, and the discontinuity point in RCC lowest, regardless of parameter values. 
However, the ranking of the level of Sj of RCF and RFC at which the discontinuity in the 
reaction function occurs depends on the parameter values. Two cases can be distinguished. 
The discontinuity point in RCF is larger than the discontinuity point in RFC when  
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Denote ϕω 2)( WV += . The above inequality requires that  
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Consequentially, the discontinuity point in RCF is smaller than the discontinuity 
point in RFC otherwise. It is depicted by the following figure. 
 
W 
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Figure A2-1-4 Ranking of the discontinuity point of RCF and RFC
 
A5 Reaction function when the portfolio is either very bad or very good 
 
Reaction function may be vertical when the portfolio is either very bad or very 
good. When the portfolio is very bad, architecture i will adopt tight screening to prevent 
type 2 errors, regardless screening choice of rival architecture.  When the portfolio is very 
good, architecture i will adopt loose screening to prevent type 1 errors, regardless 
screening choice of rival architecture. In other word, for certain values of parameters, the 
optimum screening level for an architecture will holds as V-ϕ (–W+ϕ). In such cases, there 
is no governance externality. Figure A2-1.5. and A2-1.6  capture these. 
In specific, we have 
 
 
40                                                                    Chapter 2  
                                                                               
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
≤−
−−−+−
≥−
−−−−=
0
)1(
)1(
1
1,
1
)1(
)1(
1
1,
*
V
WwhenW
V
WwhenV
S F
βα
α
βϕ
βα
α
βϕ ,  
 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
≤−++
−−−−−+−
≥−++
−−−−−−=
0
)1()2(
)1)(2(
1
1,
1
)1()2(
)1)(2(
1
1,
*
VWV
WWVwhenW
VWV
WWVwhenV
S C
βαϕ
αϕ
βϕ
βαϕ
αϕ
βϕ . 
 
 
Sj 
Si
V-ϕ 
V-ϕ 
V+ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
Rij
 
Figure A2-1-5: Reaction function Rij facing a very bad portfolio  
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Figure A2-1-6: Reaction function Rij facing a very good portfolio 
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Appendix 2-2:  Equilibrium screening levels 
 
 
This appendix consists of four sections. Section A1 depicts all possible market 
situations. The next three sections reflect that screening level choices are determined in the 
second stage of the game.  The screening level choices are conditional on the choice of 
architecture in the first stage of the game. There are three possible industry configurations 
in the first stage of the game: both architectures choose Firm, both architectures choose 
Cooperative, and the two architectures choose different internal structures. The equilibrium 
screening levels are determined for each possible combination of architecture choices in 
the sections A2 to A4. 
 
A1 Market situations 
 
The shape of the reaction function Rij implies that there are 5 possible situations. 
Each market situation has an odd number of equilibria. Figure A2-2-1 presents the market 
situation with three equilibria, while the figures A2-2-2 to A2-2-5 present various 
possibilities with one equilibrium. 
If there are three equilibria, then the two architectures choose different screening 
levels in the two pure strategy equilibria. This is reflected in figure A2.2. 
Sj 
Si
V-ϕ 
V-ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
-W+ϕ 
Rij
Rji
 
Figure A2-2-1: Three equilibria 
 
Figure A2-2-2 presents a situation with one equilibrium and different screening 
level choices by the two architectures. 
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-W+ϕ 
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Figure A2-2-2: Architecture i chooses V-ϕ and architecture j chooses –W+ϕ 
 
Figure A2-2-3 presents also a situation with one equilibrium and different 
screening level choices by the two architectures. 
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Figure A2-2-3: Architecture i chooses –W+ϕ and architecture j chooses V-ϕ 
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Figure A2-2-4 presents a situation with one equilibrium and both architectures 
choose the high screening level. 
 
Figure A2-2-4: Both architectures choose –W+ϕ 
 
Figure A2-2-5 presents a situation with one equilibrium and both architectures 
choose the low screening level. 
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Figure A2-2-5: Both architectures choose V-ϕ 
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A2 Both architectures choose Firm 
 
Figure A2-2-6 presents the strategic form when both architectures have chosen 
Firm. Notation is simplified by defining ω = (V+W)/2ϕ. 
 
Sj  
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V-ϕ -W+ϕ 
V-ϕ ( WV )1)(1( ωααβ −−− , 
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–W+ϕ ( Vαβω , 
WV )1)(1())1(( ωαωωβα −−−−+ ) 
( V)1( ωωβαω −+ , V)1( ωωβαω −+ ) 
 
Figure A2-2-6: Strategic form when both architectures have chosen Firm 
 
Three cases are distinguished regarding the values of parameters. First, if 
WV )1)(1( ωααβ −−− > Vαβω , and WV )1)(1())1(( ωαωωβα −−−−+ > V)1( ωωβαω −+ , 
then Si=Sj= V-ϕ. This corresponds with figure A2-2-5. Second, if 
WV )1)(1( ωααβ −−− < Vαβω , and WV )1)(1())1(( ωαωωβα −−−−+ > V)1( ωωβαω −+ , 
then there are two pure strategy equilibria, i.e.,  Si=V-ϕ and Sj= -W+-ϕ, or, Si=-W+-ϕ and 
Sj=V-ϕ, and one mixed strategy equilibrium. This corresponds with figure A2-2-1. Third, 
if WV )1)(1( ωααβ −−− < Vαβω , and WV )1)(1())1(( ωαωωβα −−−−+ < V)1( ωωβαω −+ , 
then Si= Sj= -W+-ϕ. This corresponds with figure A2-2-4. Figure A2-2-7 presents and 
summarizes these results in terms of the values of good and bad projects. 
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Figure A2-2-7: Equilibrium screening level choice when both architectures have chosen 
Firm 
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A3 Both architectures choose Cooperative 
 
Figure A2-2-8 presents the payoffs of architecture i and j when both i and j choose 
Firm.  
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Figure A2-2-7: Strategic form when both architectures have chosen Cooperative 
 
Three cases are distinguished regarding the values of parameters. First, if 
> , and 
> , then S
WV 2)1)(1( ωααβ −−− V2αβω
WV 222 )1)(1())1(( ωαωβωα −−−−+ V))1(( 222 ωβωαω −+ i=Sj= V-ϕ. This 
corresponds with figure A2-2-5. Second, if < , and 
> , then there are two pure 
strategy equilibria, i.e.,  S
WV 2)1)(1( ωααβ −−− V2αβω
WV 222 )1)(1())1(( ωαωβωα −−−−+ V))1(( 222 ωβωαω −+
i=V-ϕ and Sj= -W+-ϕ, or, Si=-W+-ϕ and Sj=V-ϕ, and one mixed 
strategy equilibrium. This corresponds with figure A2-2-1. Third, if 
< , and 
< , then S
WV 2)1)(1( ωααβ −−− V2αβω
WV 222 )1)(1())1(( ωαωβωα −−−−+ V))1(( 222 ωβωαω −+ i= Sj= -W+-ϕ. This 
corresponds with figure A2-2-4. Figure A2-2-8 presents and summarizes these results in 
terms of the values of good and bad projects. 
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Figure A2-2-9: Equilibrium screening level choice when both architectures have chosen 
Cooperative 
 
A4 One Firm and one Cooperative 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume architecture i chooses Firm and architecture 
j chooses Cooperative. The payoffs are shown in the strategic form in Figure A2-2-10.  
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Figure A2-2-10: Strategic form when one architectures has chosen Firm and the other 
Cooperative 
 
The values of parameters can be grouped by four lines, i.e., line 1 characterized by 
VW ))1(1(
1
1)1( ωβω
ωαα −−−
+=− , line 2 characterized by , line 
3 characterized by 
VW ))1(1()1( 2ωβαα −−=−
VW βω
ωαα −
+=−
1
1)1( , and line 4 characterized by VW αβα =− )1( . It is 
easy to see that line 4 is the lowest line. Ranking of the rest three lines, which reflects 
different combination of parameter values, remains to be determined. 
Technically, there are 6 possible ranking situations (in descending order), i.e., line 
1,2,3; line 1,3,2; line 2,1,3; line 2,3,1; line 3,1,2; line 3,2,1. The latter three situations are 
impossible, because line 1 is always higher than line 3.  
The ranking of line 2,1,3 requires that line 2 is higher than line 1, which means that 
])1(1[)])1(1][)1()1([ 2ωβωβωω −−<−−−+ , i.e., . It is possible 
because 
0)])1()1[( 2 <−−+ βωωωω
ω  and β  are non-negative. Thus, only first two rankings are possible. Ranking 
of line 1,2,3 is captured by figure A2-2-11a, whereas ranking of line 1,3,2 is captured by 
figure A2-2-11b.  
Figures A2-2-11a and A2-2-11b capture the equilibria depending on the values of 
parameters. Figure A2-2-11a applies when β < (1+ω)(1-ω)2/(1+ω-(1-ω)ω2), i.e. 
competition is intense, while figure A2-2-11b applies when β > (1+ω)(1-ω)2/(1+ω-(1-
ω)ω2), i.e. competition is not intense.  
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Figure A2-2-11a: Equilibrium screening level choice when one architecture has chosen 
Firm and the other Cooperative and competition is intense 
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Figure A2-2-11b: Equilibrium screening level choice when one architectures has chosen 
Firm and the other Cooperative and competition is not intense 
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Appendix 2-3: Equilibrium architecture choice 
 
We distinguish three cases regarding the values of the parameter variables. The 
architecture choice at equilibrium will be calculated in the following. 
  
A1 the values of the parameters satisfying the sub-game Nash equilibrium screening level 
(V-ϕ, V-ϕ) 
 
In this case, both organizations choose loose screening level V-ϕ in order to 
maximize its payoff. Define the expected payoff for one organization as Yij, where ij 
means firm i (either F or C) facing the competition of firm j (either F or C). Loose 
screening implies entails that both organizations accept all good projects and accept some 
bad projects as well, i.e. p(V, V-ϕ)=1 and 0<p(-W, V-ϕ)<1.  
Figure A2-3-1 summarizes the payoffs in the payoff matrix when the equilibrium 
screening level is (V-ϕ, V-ϕ). 
 
Architecture j Architecture i Cooperative Firm 
 
Cooperative 
( WVWpV 2),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− ,
WVWpV 2),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− ) 
( WVWpV 2),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− ,
WVWpV ),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− ) 
 
Firm 
( WVWpV ),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−−
, WVWpV 2),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− )
( WVWpV ),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− ,
WVWpV ),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− ) 
 
Figure A2-3-1 Payoff matrix when the equilibrium screening level is (V-ϕ, V-ϕ) 
 
Given its rival choosing the architecture of Cooperative, the expected payoff 
maximizing architecture for the organization is Cooperative, because YCC>YFC. Given its 
rival choosing Firm, the expected payoff maximizing architecture for the organization is 
still Cooperative, because YCF>YFF. In sum, if organizations are rational and try to 
maximize their expected payoffs, choosing investor owned firm is one dominant strategy. 
Therefore, (C,C) constitutes Nash equilibrium. 
 The economics behind this is that there are no type І errors when organizations 
choose loose screening levels V-ϕ. It is important to prevent type ІІ errors in this case. 
Since Cooperative is good at preventing type І errors, it immediately follows that two 
organizations will both choose the architecture of Cooperative to increase their expected 
payoffs. No organization has motives to deviate from such an outcome, which constitutes 
exactly what is defined as Nash equilibrium.  
It is worth pointing out that the market structure of (C,C) is also an efficient structure 
in this case. In case that the equilibrium screening levels are low enough to accept all good 
projects, reject bad projects as much as possible will bring more profits from the 
perspective of whole society. Since Cooperative is good at preventing type ІІ errors, the 
market structure consisting of two Cooperative choosing loose screening level is more 
efficient than any other industrial structures. 
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A2 the values of the parameters satisfying the sub-game Nash equilibrium screening level 
(-W+ϕ, -W+ϕ) 
 
In this case, both organizations choose tight screening level (-W+ϕ,-W+ϕ) in order 
to maximize its payoff. Tight screening entails that both organizations reject all bad 
projects while reject some good projects as well, i.e., p(-W, -W+ϕ)=0 and 0<p(V, -
W+ϕ)<1.  
Figure A2-3-2 summarizes the payoffs in the payoff matrix when the sub-game 
Nash equilibrium is (-W+ϕ,-W+ϕ).  
 
Architecture j Architecture i Cooperative Firm 
 
Cooperative 
( VWVpWVp ]),()1(1[),( 22 ϕβϕα +−−−+− ,
VWVpWVp ]),()1(1[),( 22 ϕβϕα +−−−+− )
( VWVpWVp )],()1(1[),( 2 ϕβϕα +−−−+− ,
VWVpWVp ]),()1(1)[,( 2ϕβϕα +−−−+− ) 
 
Firm 
( VWVpWVp ]),()1(1)[,( 2ϕβϕα +−−−+− , 
WVWpV 2),()1()]1(1[ ϕαβα −−−−−− ) 
( VWVpWVp )],()1(1)[,( ϕβϕα +−−−+− ,
VWVpWVp )],()1(1)[,( ϕβϕα +−−−+− ) 
 
Figure A2-3-2  Payoff matrix when the equilibrium screening level is (-W+ϕ,-W+ϕ) 
 
Given its rival choosing the architecture of Cooperative, the expected payoff 
maximizing architecture for the organization is Firm, because YFC>YCC. Given its rival 
choosing Firm, the expected payoff maximizing architecture for the organization is still 
Firm, because YFF>YCF. In sum, if organizations are rational and try to maximize their 
expected payoffs, choosing investor owned firm is one dominant strategy. Therefore, (F,F) 
constitutes Nash equilibrium.  
The economics behind this is that there are no type ІІ errors when both 
organizations choose tight screening level ϕ+−W . It is therefore important to prevent type 
І errors in this case. Since Firm is good at preventing type І errors, it immediately follows 
that two organizations will both choose the architecture of Firm to increase their expected 
payoffs. No organization has motives to deviate from such an outcome, which constitutes 
exactly what is defined as Nash equilibrium.  
Notice that both organizations choosing a Firm may constitute a prisoners dilemma. 
It happens when YCC > YFF, YFC > YCC, and YFF > YCF. 
 
A3 the values of the parameters satisfying the sub-game Nash equilibrium screening level 
(V-ϕ, -W+ϕ) 
 
In this case, sub-game Nash equilibrium is either (V-ϕ, -W+ϕ) or (-W+ϕ, V-ϕ ) for 
organization i and j. Without loss of generality, suppose that organization i choose tight 
screening -W+ϕ and organization j choose loose screening v-ϕ at equilibrium. It entails 
that firm i rejects all bad projects while firm j accepts all good projects, i.e. 0<p(V, -
W+ϕ)<1 and p(-W, -W+ϕ)=0 for organization i, and,  p(V, V-ϕ)=1 and 0<p(-W, V-ϕ)<1 
for organization j. 
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Figure A2-3-3 presents the payoffs in the payoff matrix.  
 
 
 
Architecture j Archi- 
tecture i 
Cooperative Firm 
Coop ( VWVp )]1(1[),( 2 βϕα −−+− ,
WVWpVWVp 22 ),()1(]),()1(1[ ϕαϕβα −−−−+−−− )
( VWVp )]1(1[),( 2 βϕα −−+− ,
WVWpVWVp ),()1(]),()1(1[ 2 ϕαϕβα −−−−+−−− ) 
Firm ( VWVp )]1(1)[,( βϕα −−+− ,
WVWpVWVp 2),()1()],()1(1[ ϕαϕβα −−−−+−−− )
( VWVp )]1(1)[,( βϕα −−+− ,
WVWpVWVp ),()1()],()1(1[ ϕαϕβα −−−−+−−− ) 
 
Figure A2-3-3  Payoff matrix when the equilibrium screening level is (-W+ϕ, V-ϕ) 
 
Let us check the payoff maximizing strategy for organization i first. Given its rival 
choosing the architecture of Cooperative, the expected payoff maximizing architecture for 
the organization is Firm, because YFC>YCC. Given its rival choosing Firm, the expected 
payoff maximizing architecture for the organization is still Firm, because YFF>YCF. Thus, 
organization i has a dominant strategy regardless its rival’ strategies, i.e. Firm.  
Now the payoff maximizing strategy for organization j remains to be solved. 
Similarly, given its rival choosing Cooperative, the expected payoff maximizing 
architecture is Cooperative, because YCC>YFC. Given its rival choosing Firm, the expected 
payoff maximizing architecture is still Cooperative, because YCF>YFF. Therefore, 
organization j also has a dominant strategy regardless its rival’ strategies, i.e. Cooperative. 
In sum, if organizations are rational and try to maximize their expected payoffs, (F,C) 
constitutes Nash equilibrium when organization i chooses tight screening and organization 
j chooses loose screening. 
This result can be explained from another approach. For organization i, this situation 
is very similar to the monopoly situation, except that V has to be replaced by βV.  Because 
there are no type ІІ errors, preventing type І errors are significant. Consequentially, the 
architecture of Firm is preferred because it is good at preventing type І errors. On the 
contrast, there are no type І errors for organization 2. Because there are no type І errors, it 
is important to prevent type ІІ errors and thus the architecture of Cooperative is preferred. 
Therefore, (F, C) constitutes the equilibrium architecture choice.  
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Appendix 2-4: Strategic architecture choice 
 
 
In this appendix we will examine if strategic considerations may influence firms’ 
architecture choice. Assume now one firm acts first. It has to decide if it should take Firm 
or Cooperative. Its action will be observed by the other firm. The other firm decides, after 
observing the exiting firm’s decision, if it would enter market or not, and in the case of 
entering market which architecture form it should take. The figure 2-4-1 gives the 
extensive form of this game.  
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Figure 2-4-1  Extensive form of strategic choice game 
 
A1The values of the parameters satisfying the sub-game Nash equilibrium screening level 
(V-ϕ, V-ϕ) 
 
If firm 2 decides to enter the market, firm 2 will choose C because there are no type 
1 errors and Cooperative is good at preventing type 2 errors. However, firm 2 may not 
enter the market.  
If firm 1 takes Firm, then firm 2 enter the market, if and only if YCF>0, i.e.,  
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If firm 1 take Cooperative, then firm 2 enter the market, if and only if YCC>0, i.e.,  
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It means that firm 2 will enter the market as Cooperative no matter whether firm 1 
take Firm or Cooperative, when VW ))1(1()1( 2ωαβα −<− ; otherwise, firm 2 will choose No 
Entry. However, the latter situation is possible, because the subgame Nash equilibrium is 
not (V-ϕ, V-ϕ) when VW ))1(1()1( 2ωαβα −≥− . 
Thus, market entry is inevitable in this case, and firm 2 chooses Cooperative. Firm 
1 is as in monopoly case except that all benefits have to be shared with firm 2. Thus, firm 1 
will choose Cooperative because Cooperative is good at preventing type 2 errors. Figure 2-
4-2 captures the above equlibria. 
 
(C,C) 
W 
V 
 
Figure 2-4-2:  Strategic architecture choices by an existent firm and an entrant firm when 
the parameters satisfy the subgame Nash equilibrium (V-ϕ, -W+ϕ) 
 
A2 The values of the parameters satisfying the sub-game Nash equilibrium screening level 
(-W+ϕ, -W+ϕ) 
 
If firm 2 decides to enter the market, firm 2 will choose Firm because there are no 
type 2 errors and Firm is good at preventing type 1 errors. However, firm 2 may not enter 
the market.  
If firm 1 takes Firm, then firm 2 enter the market as Firm, if and only if YFF>0, i.e.,  
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The above inequality will always hold. It means that firm 2 will enter market as 
long as it observes firm 1 taking Firm.  
If firm 1 take Cooperative, then firm 2 enter the market as Firm, if and only if 
YFC>0, i.e.,  
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It is obvious too that the above inequality always holds. It means that firm 2 enters 
the market as Firm as long as it observes firm 1 taking Cooperative. 
In sum, market entry is inevitable and firm 2 will enter market as Firm. Since 
market entry is not evitable, firm 1 will choose Firm because YFC>YCC when there is no 
type 2 errors. Figure 2-4-3 captures the above equilibrium. 
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Figure 2-4-3:  Strategic architecture choices by an existent firm and an entrant firm when 
the parameters satisfy subgame Nash equilibrium (V-ϕ, -W+ϕ) 
 
A4.3 the values of the parameters satisfying the sub-game Nash equilibrium screening 
level (V-ϕ, -W+ϕ) 
 
Consider first firm 1 takes Cooperative. For firm 2, we have 
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It follows immediately that firm 2 will choose F, as long as it decides to enter the 
market. However, firm may not enter the market. Firm 2 will choose No Entry, if and only 
if  
 [ ] .0),()1(1),(0 2 <−−−+−⇔< ϕβϕα VVpWVpYFC  
 
It is obvious that the above inequality will never hold. It means that firm 2 will 
enter the market as Firm as long as it observes that firm 1 chooses Cooperative. 
Assume now firm 1 take Firm. For firm 2, we have 
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It follows immediately that firm 2 will choose Cooperative, as long as it decides to 
enter the market. However, firm may not enter the market. Firm 2 will choose No entry, if 
and only if 
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Thus, when VW ])1())1(1([)1( 2ωωβαα −−−>− , firm 2 will choose NO Entry 
after observing that firm 1 choose Firm; and, firm 2 will choose Cooperative otherwise. 
Because firm 1 can expect what firm 2 acts too, it will take Firm 
when VW ])1())1(1([)1( 2ωωβαα −−−>− , if and only if 
 
.])1()1(][)1([
])2))(((1[]2)()()[1(
)],(1[),()1(
),()1()],()1(1[),(
),()1(),(
2
VW
VVVWVW
VWVpWVWp
WVWpVWVpVVp
WWWpVWVpYY CFF
ωβωαα
ϕϕϕβαϕϕϕα
ϕβαϕα
ϕαϕβϕα
ϕαϕα
−−−>⇔
−−+−>−−+−−⇔
+−−>−−−⇔
−−−−+−−−−>
+−−−−+−⇔>
 
 
Firm 1 will take Firm when VW ])1())1(1([)1( 2ωωβαα −−−≤− , if and only if  
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Figure 2-4-4 captures the above equlibria.  
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Figure 2-4-4:  Strategic architecture choices by an existent firm and an entrant firm when 
the parameters satisfy subgame Nash equilibrium (V-ϕ, -W+ϕ) 
 
A 4 Summary 
 
Figure 2-4-4 summarizes strategic architecture choices by an existent firm and an entrant 
firm in three cases. 
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Figure 2-4-5: Strategic architecture choices by an existent firm and an entrant firm 
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3 Organization and Strategy of Farmer 
Specialized Cooperatives in China 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The economic organization of agriculture is a timely research topic. Among other 
organizational forms, cooperatives have always been a prominent organizational form. 
Broadly defined, a cooperative is an organizational form of many independent growers 
(horizontal relationship) who jointly own a downstream processor / retailer (vertical 
relationship). Cooperatives are important to agriculture in developed as well as developing 
countries. For example, there are 132,000 cooperatives with 83.5 million members and 2.3 
million employees in the European Union in 2001, 47,000 cooperatives with 100 million 
members in the United States of America in 2001, and 94,771 cooperatives with 1,193 
million members in China in 2002. 
    Studying agricultural cooperatives in China is of particular interest for three 
reasons. First, as noted by new institutional economists such as North and Williamson, the 
institutional environment interacts with the governance structure of firms. Menard and 
Klein (2004, p.750) point out, ‘These background conditions should not be regarded 
merely as constraints that hamper modernization. They also create incentives for the 
discovery of more efficient modes of organization. Comparing firms across different 
institutional environments to see what settings facilitate organizational innovation and 
what settings hamper it contributes dramatically to our understanding of the dynamics of a 
market economy’. The institutional environment in a transition country like China is quite 
different from those in developed countries such as U.S.A and Western European countries. 
China provides the necessary variety in institutional environment in order to gain insight in 
the relationship between the governance of enterprises and the institutional environment. 
    China’s economy is unique in many aspects. There are more than 200 million 
farmer households (i.e. a vast population of 0.8 billion farmers), each farming a plot of 
land that is similar to a garden plot elsewhere. For these small farmers, a major problem in 
the transition period is the breakdown of the relationships of the farm with input suppliers 
and output markets. They face serious constraints in accessing essential inputs, such as 
feed, fertilizer, seed, capital, and in selling their products. Our main research question is 
therefore: How are the new farmer specialized cooperatives in China organized? 
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    This descriptive question will be addressed at three levels. They are inspired 
by the levels of institutional analysis distinguished by Williamson (2000). The most 
general level is Embeddedness, where informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, 
and religion are at the center of analysis. Change occurs only once in 100-1000 years. The 
Institutional Environment is concerned with the formal rules of the game, like bureaucracy, 
polity, and the judiciary. Change occurs in 10-100 years. Governance is about contracting 
and aligning governance structures with transactions. Changes occur in a time frame of 1-
10 years. The first level requires investigating whether the Chinese cultural and 
institutional background matters for the cooperative as a governance structure? We will 
provide a brief history of farmer cooperatives in China. 
    Second, compared with stock listed corporations, cooperatives have their own 
salient characteristics such as member-ownership and member-control (Staatz 1987; 
Vataliano 1983; Cook 1995; Hendrikse 1998; Hendrikse and Veerman 1997). However, 
these characteristics are described and examined mainly against the background of 
developed economies/agricultural sectors. Are these characteristics also descriptive of 
agricultural cooperatives in countries in transition? Since the late 1980s, new farmer 
cooperative organizations have emerged and developed rapidly all over China. These new 
cooperative organizations are quite different from the cooperatives in the 1950s and 1960s. 
What are the governance structure choices in these cooperative organizations? What are 
the factors driving such choices? 
    Third, appropriately organizing the farmers into the agricultural chain of 
production, transaction and consumption will not only benefit farmers but also benefit the 
overall performance of the economy. As China entered WTO, world industrial markets as 
well as agricultural markets have been affected by this vast economy. The study on how to 
organize and position Chinese farmers in agricultural supply chains is meaningful for the 
health of the Chinese economy as well as the world economy. Are Chinese cooperative 
organizations a feasible organizational form to the organization of farmers in an 
increasingly global agri-food supply chain? We address this question from the perspective 
of systems of attributes (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Attributes like decision rights, 
income rights, quality control systems and branding are distinguished. 
    Addressing these questions contributes to the literature on comparative 
institutional analysis as well as to the theory of the firm. The article is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes the history of farmer cooperatives in China (2.1), i.e. Institutional 
Environment, and Chinese society (2.2), i.e. Embeddedness in the terminology of 
Williamson (2000). This provides the background for our study. Section 3 is institutional 
analysis at the level of Governance. It presents the data regarding 66 farmer cooperatives 
in Zhejiang province. In section 4, we will enrich the observations of section 3 by 
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describing the interaction between the attributes governance structure, strategy, and quality 
control system of a specific cooperative. In section 5, we look at these developments from 
a number of theoretical perspectives and formulate various conclusions. Section 6 
concludes. 
3.2 Farmer Cooperatives in China during the Last Century 
 
This section consists of two parts. We start with a brief history regarding cooperatives in 
China in subsection 2.1. Subsection 2.2 is dedicated to a number of observations regarding 
Chinese society because it plays a role in understanding farmer cooperatives in China. 
3.2.1 One Century of Cooperatives in China 
 
Cooperative organizations are not new phenomena in China. Their history dates back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Five periods are distinguished. First, cooperatives 
emerged in some part of China as early as in 1920s. Cooperatives experienced a rapid 
increase from 722 in 1928 to 168,864 in 1948 (Du 2002, p.299). There is no detailed 
information regarding farmer cooperatives during this period, but it is clear that they were 
quite different from what we see today. One main reason is land ownership. Independent 
farmer households were the conventional farming units in the rural China. Landlords 
owned 40% of the cultivated rural land, and leased it to farmer households at a very high 
rent. The rent was often as high as 50% of the value of the crops.  
    Second, New China was established by the Communist Party coming to power 
in 1949. The central government gradually confiscated land from landlords and rich 
farmers, and then distributed it for free to poor and landless farmers. At the same time, to 
help farmers, who were short of tools and skills, to grow crops efficiently, various kinds of 
cooperative organizations were set up, motivated and later even directly organized by the 
government, to pool resources. Among many cooperative forms, ‘the Mutual Aid Team’ 
was most popular. On the basis of voluntary participation, four or five neighboring 
households pooled farm tools and draft animals and exchanged labor on a temporary or 
permanent basis, while land and harvests still belongs to individual households. From 1949 
to 1955, the cooperative form of ‘Mutual Aid Team’ was adopted as the primary way to 
pool resource in order to increase production. 
Third, from 1955 to 1979, the so-called ‘Cooperative Movement’ took place, and 
cooperative organizations were gradually deprived of their voluntary character and became 
a way for the government to centrally control and manage agricultural production, 
exchange and consumption. Agricultural production became collectivized. The 
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‘Elementary Co-operative’ emerged in 1954 and was the main choice of farmers during 
1954 to 1956. Compared to the Mutual Aid Team, more households (normally 20 or 30) 
participated in the Elementary Co-operative, and members pooled their land, besides farm 
tools and draft animals, together under a unified management. The net income of the co-
operative was distributed according to two principles: one payment for the input of land, 
draft animals, and farm contributed by each member; one payment for the labor input by 
each member. In this period, the attitude towards the cooperative development was 
cautious, and farmers were encouraged to participate in different kinds of cooperative 
organizations on voluntary basis.  
Among the various cooperative forms, ‘the Advanced Co-operative’ emerged 
around 1955, having a number of salient characteristics. All means of production including 
land were collectively owned, and members worked according to centralized management, 
and remuneration was solely based on the labor input from each member. In 1955, the 
central government decided to accelerate the pace of collectivization. As a result, the 
voluntary participation principle was deliberately omitted and farmers were persuaded or 
forced to participate in the Advance Co-operative. From 500 Advance Co-operatives in 
1955, the number rose toward 753,000 in 1957, covering 119 million households.  
In 1958 a new form of cooperative, the so-called ‘People’s Commune’ was 
introduced and played a decisive role in rural areas until 1978. One ‘People’s Commune’ 
consisted of about 30 Advanced Cooperatives and consisted of, on average, 5,000 
households and 10,000 acres of cultivated land. Unified production, management and 
distribution were adopted within the People Commune. Initially, payments in the 
commune was based partly according to subsistence needs and partly according to the 
work performed.  However, delegation of production and management to smaller units, i.e. 
the ‘Production Team’ which consisted of about 20-30 neighboring households, occurred 
in 1962. Since then, production teams were the basic producing, operating and accounting 
unit. Team members grow crops together, and working time was recorded under the title of 
‘Working Points’. At the end of year, income was distributed to individual members 
according to accumulated working points. The system of collective farming remained until 
1979.11  
Under the system of collective farming, supplying of farming inputs, producing 
and selling products are all centrally planned by governments. The so-called ‘Supplying 
and Marketing Cooperatives’ in rural areas were government organizations which supplied 
inputs and consumption goods to farmers. Agricultural products were collected and 
 
11   The cooperative organizations in 1960s and 1970s were not farmer-owned and farmer-controlled 
by nature. They turned into government or quasi-government organizations performing both 
economic and political functions.  
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distributed by governments, and were normally not allowed to trade freely in markets. In 
general, before 1980s, the ‘Unified Purchasing and Supplying System’ (UPSS, i.e. ‘tong-
gou-tong-xiao’ in Chinese) was adopted as the basic institution governing government and 
farmers regarding producing sales of agricultural products until early 1980s.12  
Fourth, China started an economic and political transition in 1978. Central 
planning of economic activities was gradually transformed to a market-oriented system. 
This ongoing institutional change has far-reaching influences for individuals as well as 
organizations. Firstly, the collective-based farming has been substituted by family-based 
farming. The Household Responsibility System (HRS) was initially adopted in 1978 by the 
farmers in An’hui province and provided the farmers with temporary control and income 
rights to land. The HRS is characterized by collective ownership of land on the one hand 
and farmer households as independent producing units on the other hand. The land is 
collectively owned by villages, while is leased to the households according to the number 
of people and workers in a household. The tenure specified in the contract was set to be 
one to three years at first, and then was extended to 15 years. In 2002, the contract duration 
for a new round was re-extended to 30 years. The contract specifies the household’s 
obligations to fulfill state procurement quotas and to pay various forms of local fees and 
taxes. The household then retains any residuals in excess of the stated obligations. It 
induces strong incentives for farmers to work and invest in the leased land. For example, 
as the reforms spread rapidly across the other parts of the rural areas, farm output rose by 
more than 30% in six years. 
 Secondly, the centrally planned agri-food purchasing and supplying system was 
gradually transformed to a market-oriented system. As the reform on rural land went on, 
UPSS was progressively abandoned by the government to encourage free trade in 
agricultural markets. As early as 1982, the government encouraged farmers to sell products 
in markets. In 1985, the central government decided to cancel UPSS.13 Since then, the 
government purchases grain and cotton by contracting, and pork, sea-food, vegetables and 
other products are open to free trade. 
As China transits from centrally-planned economy to market-oriented economy, 
traditionally small farmers are facing a new situation. Under the old collective producing 
and distribution system, farmers did not decide what to produce, how much to produce, 
and how to sell products. In the transitory period, they have to make these decisions by 
themselves. However, it is not easy to successfully make such decisions. The survival of 
 
12   The central government decided to take ‘planned purchasing and planned supplying’ on oil agri-
products and grain on November 1953, and expanded the planning spectrum to include cotton on 
September 1954. The policy issued on August 1955 specified the details. 
13   ‘Ten Policies on Further Activate Rural Economy’, issued by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party and State Council on January 1, 1985, specified the details.  
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farmers depends on how, and to what extent, they meet the demands of final consumers. It 
implies that they have to produce efficiently on the one hand, and to predict and meet 
market demands on the other hand. However, it is well known that small farmers lack 
access to inputs, technology, information, and markets. This puts them in a weak position 
in supply chains. Choosing appropriate strategies, which provide the access to inputs, 
technology, information, and markets and to added value of supply chain, is therefore 
crucial to them.   
Motivated by the new situation since the 1980s, new cooperative organizations 
emerged in many provinces of China in the late 1980s. At the beginning, the cooperative 
organizations, called the ‘Technology Association’, were established to communicate and 
promote new technologies among farmers. Local technologists, big specialized growers, 
and science associations were major players initiating and organizing such cooperative 
organizations. As the reform of the agricultural product circulation system proceeded in 
the 1980s, more farmer cooperative organizations emerged. Some cooperative 
organizations operate across different production stages, such as supplying agricultural 
inputs and/or selling products. At the same time, more players are involved in establishing 
cooperative organizations, such as large processing enterprises, state-owned supplying and 
marketing cooperatives, local rural governments, and villages etc. Since the 1990s, the 
development of cooperative organizations is speeding up in many provinces. Up to 2004, 
the number of new cooperative organizations is more than 150,000 (RDI CASS and 
RSECT NBSC 14, p157).  
The new cooperative organizations that have emerged since the 1980s may take 
different forms. In general, we can distinguish two basic forms: farmer specialized 
associations and farmer specialized cooperatives. Farmer specialized associations account 
for 65% and farmer specialized cooperatives account for 35% of the 150,000 cooperative 
organizations in 2004 (RDI CASS and RSECT NBSC, p.157). The main difference 
between the two forms is the ownership of fixed assets and performing functions like 
production, marketing, or processing. In general, specialized cooperatives are registered at 
the Administration of Industry and Commerce, have fixed assets, and are like cooperatives 
in western countries in terms of their production, marketing, and processing activities. 
Farmer specialized associations are registered at the Civil Affairs Bureau, have no fixed 
assets, charge no membership fee, provide some technical assistance, and share 
information. However, this distinction is too crude. The Farmer Specialized Association’ 
(FSA) is a very broad name, which consists of very large association supplying technology, 
 
14   RDI CASS is the abbreviation for Rural Development Institute Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, and RSECT NBSC is the abbreviation for Rural Social and Economic Census Team 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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information, to thousands or tens of thousand members as well as very small associations 
communicating technology and experience among several farmers. Some specialized 
associations are even cooperative enterprises and acts just like specialized cooperatives. 
This overlap can be explained partly by the fact that the cooperative law in China is quite 
new. The national cooperative law was enforced on 1 July, 2007. At the provincial 
government level, local laws on cooperatives are also limited. The first local cooperative 
law was enacted by the Zhejiang provincial government in January 2005. It needs more 
time to normalize cooperative organizations. 
3.2.2 Chinese Society 
 
Farmers choose a certain organizational form (i.e., a governance structure) to realize a fair 
return on investment. This choice is not independent of the society in which the farmer 
lives. It is important to realize that a person is not only a natural or economic person, but 
also a social person. He (she) lives in a society, which can be viewed as a nexus of various 
relations. This is particularly true for Chinese farmers with characteristics like community 
life, influence of traditional culture, and the imperfections of the current market system. 
There are three basic ways for most of Chinese farmers to participate in the society. The 
first is kinship, i.e., the relations between an individual and his or her spouse, parents, 
sisters and brothers, and cousins. The second is social relations, i.e., the relations between 
an individual and his or her friends, classmates, and colleagues. The third is potential 
relations, i.e., the relations between an individual and strangers; it is actually based on the 
first two relations. 
The origin and development of farmer cooperatives in China have therefore an 
informal institutional background based on relations. The kinship (or relation) plays an 
important role in the cooperatives. First, as an organization based on the rural communities, 
the farmer cooperative is characterized by kinship. Second, the kinship is an important way 
for Chinese farmers to access to various resources. It’s particularly important at the initial 
stage of farmer cooperatives. Third, the governance and operation of farmer cooperatives 
also relies on the principle of kinship. It’s a principle combining kin, loyalty and abilities. 
Therefore, it’s natural for the farmer cooperatives to have some characteristics of 
traditional social relations in the process of their development and operation. Such rural 
social relations are combined by kinship and market rules. A lot of farmer cooperatives in 
Zhejiang province find an effective balance in such social relations. The internal 
transaction costs based on such relations is quite low.  
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3.2.3 Farmer Cooperatives in the Zhejiang Province 
This section presents the data of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang province 
in China. Zhejiang province is located south of Shanghai, with 46 million inhabitants.  It 
was the pilot province for farmer specialized cooperative organizations chosen by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, China. To a certain extent, the institutional arrangement of farmer 
cooperatives in Zhejiang not only reflects the common characteristics of farmer 
cooperatives in the coastal areas of China, but may also represent the development trend of 
farmer specialized cooperatives in China.  
Farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang have experienced a rapid development since 
1990s. Like other regions in China, Zhejiang’s farmer cooperatives can be divided into 
specialized cooperatives and specialized associations. Both specialized cooperatives and 
specialized associations have increased rapidly, however, specialized cooperatives increase 
at faster rate than specialized associations. The farmer specialized cooperatives increased 
from 791 in 2002 to 1,789 in 2004. The number of farmer specialized associations was 
1,019 in 2004. The total number of the farm households joined in farmer cooperatives 
reached 554,000 and the total number of the farm households involved in farmer 
cooperatives reached 2,029,500 in 2004.15  
Table 3.1  Ownership structure of 66 sample cooperatives  
Co-ops No. of member 
No. of 
share- 
holder 
Capital 
stock [¥] 
Per-capita 
capital 
stock [¥] 
Share-
holders 
to 
members
R1 R3 R5 R8 R10
Max 
value 1000 812 7010000.00 584166.67 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Min 
value  36      2       6800.00         47.22 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Mean 
value  259 102   365089.00   23001.77 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.55 0.64 0.67
Standard 
deviation 216 145   896312.41   75027.32 0.42 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32
   
A sample of 66 farmer specialized cooperatives was chosen randomly from the 
Zhejiang province. Data regarding membership and ownership were collected by face to 
face interviews and archival research. Table 3.1 shows the number of members, the 
number of shareholders, the capital stock, the capital stock per-capita, the ratio of 
shareholders to all members and the shareholding concentration rate.16  
                                                 
15   Source: Zhejiang Provincial Department of Agriculture. 
     16   Shareholding concentration (Ri) refers to the ratio of the sum of the capital stock owned by the 
top i member(s) in a descending sort to the total capital stock in a cooperative. In 
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Several observations can be formulated regarding table 3.1. Firstly, in our 
sample of 66 farmer cooperatives, the size of cooperatives varies a lot. In terms of 
membership, the largest cooperative has 1,000 members, while the smallest cooperative 
has just 26 members. In terms of capital stock, the cooperatives vary from as low as 6,800 
yuan to over 7 million yuan. Table 3.2 provides the additional information regarding the 
size distribution of cooperatives. The number of cooperatives with more than 500 members 
and the cooperatives with less than 100 members are limited. Over half of cooperatives 
have more than 100 and less than 200 members.  
 
Table 3.2  Interval distribution of number of members  
No. of members ＞800 ＞500 ＞300 ＞200 ＞100 ＞50 ＞0 
No. of co-ops 4  8 20 27 62 65  66 
Frequency [%] 6.06 12.12 30.30 40.91 93.94 98.48 100.00 
 
Secondly, according to table 3.1, all cooperatives have shareholders. However, 
the numbers of shareholders of the sample cooperatives varies also drastically. The number 
of shareholders varies from 2 to 812. Table 3.3 illustrates the interval distribution of the 
number of shareholders in our sample. The cooperatives with more than 200 shareholders 
and those with less than 5 shareholders are fairly limited. 20 cooperatives, almost one third 
of the sample, have between 100 and 200 shareholders; 26 cooperatives, over one third of 
the sample, have between 5 and 30 shareholders.  
 
Table 3.3  Distribution of the number of shareholders 
No. of shareholders ＞200 ＞100 ＞50 ＞30 ＞10 ＞5 ＞0 
No. of  co-ops  9 29 31 34 48 60  66 
Frequency [%] 13.64 43.94 46.97 51.52 72.73 90.91 100.00 
 
Thirdly, the capital stock of the cooperatives varies between 7,000 and 7,000,000 
yuan; and the per-capita capital stock varies between 50 and 50,000 yuan. Table 3.4 shows 
the interval distributions of capital stock and per-capita capital stock. Regarding capital 
stocks, only two cooperatives held a capital stock of more than 1,000,000 yuan, and the 
cooperatives with a capital stock of more than 500,000 yuan are limited. For about one 
                                                                                                                           
detail, ∑∑= n im im XX 11 ( )R m n≤ ; Where Xi refers to the sum of the capital stock owned by 
the top i member in a descending sort; where N refers to the number of cooperative members.  
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third of the cooperatives, their capital stock is between 10,000 and 200,000 yuan. 
Regarding per-capita stock, about one third of cooperatives have more than 10,000 yuan 
per-capita capital stock, and about one third of cooperatives have a per-capita capital stock 
between 1,000 and 5,000 yuan. There is only one cooperative with less than 100 yuan per-
capita capital stock, and there are quite a few cooperatives whose per-capital capital stock 
is between 100 and 1,000 yuan. 
Fourthly, shareholding among members is pervasive. However, member 
shareholding varies a lot. The rate of shareholders to members is as large as 1 at one 
extreme and as small as 0.01 at the other extreme, with the mean value being equal to 0.45 
(see column 6, table 3.2). Table 3.5 further shows the detailed information on members’ 
shareholding. There are strong contrasts on the member shareholding structures in the 
sample. In 21 cooperatives, the rate of shareholder members to all members is higher than 
90%; in 24 cooperatives, this rate is lower than 10%, and in 15 cooperatives, this rate is 
between 10% and 50%. These cooperatives therefore can be divided into two groups: one 
group with high member shareholding, and the other group with low member shareholding.  
 
Table 3.4  Interval distributions of capital stock and per-capita capital stock 
Capital stock 
[10,000¥] ＞100 ＞50 ＞20 ＞10 ＞5 ＞1 ＞0 
No. of co-ops 
Frequency [%]
2 
3.03 
  8 
12.12 
27 
40.91 
42 
63.64
54 
81.82
65 
98.48 
 66 
100.00 
 
Capital stock 
per-capita [¥] ＞10000 ＞5000 ＞1000 ＞500 ＞200 ＞100 ＞0 
No. of co-ops 
Frequency [%]
21 
31.82 
26 
39.39 
54 
81.82 
60 
90.91
62 
93.94
65 
98.48 
 66 
100.00 
 
Table 3.5  Interval distribution of the proportion of shareholder members to all members  
Proportion of 
shareholder 
members to 
all members 
 
>0.9 
 
>0.8 
 
>0.7
 
>0.6
 
>0.5
 
>0.4
 
>0.3
 
>0.2 
 
>0.1 
 
>0.0 
No. of Co-ops 21 23 25 27 27 28 28 36 42  66 
Frequency 
[%] 
 
31.83 
 
34.85 
 
37.88
 
40.91
 
40.91
 
42.42
 
42.42
 
54.55 
 
63.64 
 
100 
 
Fifthly, shareholding is not uniformly distributed among shareholders, and large 
shareholders’ dominance in the provision of capital is salient. Table 3.1 shows, on average, 
Organization and Strategy of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in China                  69 
 
the top 5 largest shareholders account for 50% of the provision of capital in a cooperative, 
and the top 10 largest shareholders contribute for almost two thirds of the capital stock. 
Table 3.6 further captures how shareholdings are concentrated in cooperatives.  In 11 
cooperatives, the largest shareholder provides more than 50% of equity capital; in 25 
cooperatives, the top three largest shareholders provide more than 50%; the top 5 largest 
shareholders provide more than 50% of equity capital in half of the sample cooperatives. 
 
Table 3.6  Concentration of shareholding 
 Rm> 0.9 
Rm > 
0.8 
Rm> 
0.7 
Rm> 
0.6 
Rm >
0.5 
Rm >
0.4 
Rm >
0.3 
Rm >
0.2 
Rm > 
0.1 
Rm > 
0.0 
R1  0  1  4  5 11 17 21 26 45 66 
R3  5  9 15 20 25 31 39 47 59 66 
R5 14 18 24 28 33 40 47 57 59 66 
R8 22 26 31 37 40 49 53 58 60 66 
R10 26 31 35 40 42 51 55 58 62 66 
 
In sum, most cooperatives are small; shareholding is pervasive among most 
cooperatives; the cooperatives are usually composed of a minority of core members 
(usually big shareholders) and a majority of common members (usually users or patrons); 
the cooperatives can be generally divided into two types: one is with a minority of 
members as its shareholders; the other is with a majority or all members as its shareholders. 
For most cooperatives, shareholding is quite concentrated; big shareholders play a 
dominant role in providing capital.  
3.3 Wenling City Ruo-heng Watermelon Cooperative 
 
In this section, we will examine a specific cooperative in the Zhejiang province in order to 
enrich the observations of the previous section. Wenling City Ruo-heng Watermelon 
Cooperative (we call it Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative hereafter) is located in Ruoheng 
town, Wenling city, Zhejiang province.17  It was initiated in July 2001 by 29 farmers 
including the present General Director, and was registered as a share-cooperative 
enterprise by the local Industry and Commerce Administration in February 2002. The main 
                                                 
17  Wenling is a city of 780,000 citizens in Zhejiang province, China; Ruoheng is a town south of 
Wenling. 
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business of the cooperative involves growing and selling watermelons.18 In 2004, it had 
129 members with the fixed capital of 2.96 million Yuan. 
Organizations, and therefore cooperatives, can be characterized in many different 
ways. We adopt the systems of attributes characterization of Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1994). Three clusters of attributes are distinguished in describing this cooperative: 
governance structure (4.1), quality control system (4.2), and strategy (4.3). We conclude 
the section by paying attention to the complementarities between these attributes (4.4). 
3.3.1 Governance Structure 
 
We follow Hansmann (1996) by distinguishing decision and income rights of a governance 
structure. Decision rights specify who directs the firm’s activities, i.e. the allocation of 
authority. Various decision rights in Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative will be described, 
like membership composition, share contribution requirement, restricted ownership, 
delivery rights, quasi-individual ownership title, formal versus real authority, and member 
involvement. Income rights specify who appropriates the net earnings of the enterprise, i.e. 
delineate incentives. 
3.3.1.1. Decision Rights 
 
Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative has 129 members. Most members are watermelon 
growers and about 20 members are watermelon sellers. The cooperative requires all 
members to buy shares, where the number of the shares which members have to buy is 
determined by the planting scale. The larger the planting scale is, the more shares a 
member has to buy. However, the maximum shareholding for one member is set to be 20%.  
Membership is closed in this cooperative. Although the charter stipulates the 
membership policy as ‘free entry and free exit’, the practice of membership is different. On 
the one hand, to become a member, farmer growers have to reach a certain scale of 
growing watermelons and have to meet a certain technical requirement. The cooperative is 
very cautious to accept new members. For example, the cooperative will monitor the 
performance of a potential member for one year before making a final decision. On the 
other hand, to leave the cooperative, current members are required to submit a written 
application to the cooperative. The member can get their equity investment back when the 
application to leave is accepted by the board of directors. However, current members are 
not allowed to leave when the cooperative is experiencing losses.  
 
18   It also sells farming medicines, fertilizer, etc as a side business. 
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Delivery rights are restricted in Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative. Firstly, 
delivery rights are restricted in terms of quality requirements. Members have rights to 
deliver products to the cooperative, but their products must meet ex ante specified quality 
standards. Sample inspection and internal grading will be used to distinguish high quality 
products from low quality products. Secondly, delivery rights are restricted in sense that 
the delivery amount for one member is almost ex ante determined. 
Although Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative is collectively owned by members, 
each member’s claim on the cooperative seems to be clearly defined.  Firstly, individual 
members’ ownership is specified in terms of shares. Members are required to buy shares 
according to their planting capability/expected patronization. Secondly, the cooperative 
allows the members to participate in decision making according to shareholding structure. 
The one-member-one-vote principle is substituted by the restricted one-share-one-vote 
principle. The latter voting rights will motivate members to collect/commute information 
to participate in management of cooperatives. Thirdly, shares can be redeemed when 
members quit cooperative. Thus, members can get back his financial stakes in cooperatives.  
These facts illustrate that the ownership title is not strictly collective. However, the 
ownership title can not be viewed as individual either. Property rights in the cooperative 
can not be traded outside the cooperative. When transferring the property rights within the 
cooperative, it is the board of directors, not the involved members, having the power to 
decide whether the transaction can be performed. In sum, the ownership title in the 
cooperative is a hybrid-form between individual one and collective one. ‘Quasi-individual’ 
may be a suitable name.    
Ownership defines the allocation of formal authority. Figure 3.1 captures how 
formal authority is allocated in this cooperative. It resides with the member (representative) 
assembly. The (representative) assembly provides members with formal channels to revise 
organizational charters, elect and/or replace board members, determine finance and 
development plan, determine total share-value, per-share-value and the maximum number 
of shares purchased by one member, decide issues regarding merger, cooperation, etc. The 
member assembly will meet once or twice a year. When it is difficult for all members to 
come all together, members elect the representatives. The representative members 
constitute the representative assembly. Representative members have a three-year term and 
could be re-elected for many terms. Members participate in the (representative) member 
assembly by a restricted ‘one-share-one-vote’ principle. Voting rights are based on ‘one-
share-one-vote’, but one member has at most 20 votes. The decision making process in the 
(representative) member assembly is by a qualified majority. A decision is reached when 
more than 2/3 of the votes are in favour. 
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The (representative) 
member assembly 
The board of directors 
The board of supervisors
Other executive offices  
Figure 3.1  Allocation of formal authority 
 
Although formal authority clearly resides with the members and the assembly, 
real authority may reside with the others. Actually, many decisions have to be delegated to 
other groups. Normally, these groups include the board of directors and/or a group of 
managers. In Ruo-heng Watermelon Cooperative, the board of directors is having effective 
control of the cooperative. The board consists of three members, and they are elected by 
the general assembly. The General Director is elected by the board and is the legal 
representative of the cooperative.  
The board of supervisors is assigned with the rights to monitor the board of 
directors. The board of supervisors consists of 3 members elected by the (representative) 
member assembly. The supervisor members have a three-year term and can be re-elected 
for multiple terms. The supervisor members are expected to be independent from director 
members, thus, the charter clearly stipulates that the current director members and recently 
retired members and their relatives can not be supervisor members. 
Table 3.7  Allocation of decision power to non-Director members 
 No extent or to a 
very limited extent 
To some 
extent 
To large 
extent 
Input decision ×   
Quantity decision   × 
Price decision ×   
Quality standards decision   × 
Accounting system decision  ×  
Advertisement decision   × 
Technology training decision   × 
Investment decision   × 
Financing decision  ×  
Recruiting decision  ×  
Organization and Strategy of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in China                  73 
 
The allocation of real authority may vary widely within one formal 
organizational arrangement. This issue is illustrated by the outcome of a short 
questionnaire on the involvement of non-director members in decision making. The results 
are summarized in table 3.7.  
First, members give up their decision rights regarding inputs and price to director 
members. The cooperative requires standardization of production by members. What 
inputs are to be used, and how/when to use them are contracted ex ante between the 
cooperatives and members. For the cooperative, this is a method to control quality of 
products; for the members, they like to give up such decision rights to gain technical 
guidance on how to produce and to acquire inputs such as fertilizers and seeds supplied by 
the cooperative at production costs. The members give up their decision rights regarding 
price because their production scale is small and the inefficiencies in information 
collection. For member growers, small production scale implies that it is costly to collect 
market information and it is hard to access markets. In contrast, the cooperatives have 
better capabilities to gather and analyze market information and a larger scale to gain 
access to markets. 
Second, non-Director members are actively involved in making such decisions 
as quantity, quality standards, technology training, and investment. Quantity decisions are 
important for all members, because how much to produce will determine how much to 
contribute to the cooperative by buying shares. Normal members are motivated enough to 
participate in this decision. Regarding the high involvement of normal members in setting 
up quality standards decisions, it reflects that quality is now an important attribute of 
commodities. Since cooperatives are organized around one or several similar products, 
formulating quality standards is an important measure to regulate members’ behavior and 
reduce the adverse selection problem.  
It is not surprising that members are strongly motivated to take technical training 
decisions. In China, small farmer growers are lack of technology. As the market condition 
changes from shortage of supply to abundance of supply, consumers demand high quality 
products or more customer-friendly products. To meet such changes, new technologies and 
technological innovations are required. Because small growers are keen on technological 
training, they are motivated to decide the training projects and training frequency. The 
result is that providing technology services is one of important measures to test the 
performance of Chinese cooperatives. 
Third, financing decisions are mainly made by director members. This 
observation is a bit surprising, because normal members are expected to be cautious for 
financial issues in order to prevent risks and therefore are expected to tightly keep decision 
rights on financing.  The reason is that normal members are too small to take a stake in 
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financing and director members are normally larger growers who contribute a lot to 
financing issues. For example, the general director is a big grower, and his shares count for 
20% of all shares.  
In sum, in Ruo-heng Watermelon Cooperative, ownership is restricted to 
members; members are required to buy shares; membership is closed; delivery rights are 
restricted; the ownership title is quasi-individual; director members have substantial power 
in deciding prices, inputs, finance, recruiting, etc; non-director members participate 
actively in making most decisions regarding quantity, quality, standards, investments, and 
technological training.  
3.3.1.2. Income Rights 
 
The cooperative will allocate the shares among members according to their planting scale, 
which in turn determine their expected patronization on the cooperative. Since the share 
allocation is set up before the production of watermelon, the expected patronization and 
consequently the payment for delivering for individual members are almost fixed. By 
combining delivery rights and share-holding policy, the cooperative aligns the principle of 
patronization-based allocation with the principle of share-based allocation. Since member 
growers are required to purchase shares on the basis of expected patronage, the usage and 
the capital investment are perfectly aligned. 
Members have rights to share the yearly net returns of the cooperative according 
to shares. Generally, some parts of the share yearly net returns will be retained within the 
cooperative for further development and public use, and the rest will be allocated to 
members according to their shares. Ruo-heng Watermelon Cooperative does not directly 
allocate returns to members, because there are sub-units called ‘production bases’. These 
production bases are not only the units performing production tasks allocated by the 
cooperative, but also the units of accounting and allocating surplus. For each production 
base, the surplus to be allocated is the net returns in a production season deducted by the 
cost of production and management. The cooperative collects the risk insurance fund 
(10%) 19 and the public accumulation and public benefit fund (5%) from each production 
base; the rest of the allocable surplus in each production base is allocated to the base 
members proportional to individuals’ shares. Since the shares are determined ex ante by 
 
19   Note that the risk insurance fund is used for reimbursement for heavy losses caused by the 
production and marketing of production bases and is allocated to each member’s share account 
according to shares. For example, in 2003, one production base suffered a great loss from bad 
weather. The average loss for the members of this base was about 8,000 yuan per mu. The 
cooperative used the insurance fund to reimburse a part of loss of this production base. After 
reimbursing, members of this base lost only 2,000 yuan per mu. 
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expected patronage of the cooperative, allocation by shares/capital are perfectly aligned 
with allocation by patronage. In sum, members share the benefits (or costs) of the 
cooperative according to shares. The cooperative takes quality considerations into account 
in its pricing policy. It will pay different prices according to grading. In some cases, 
members are even punished (fined) to deliver bad products. 
3.3.1.3. Complementarities between Decision Rights and Income Rights 
 
Table 3.8 presents the values of the attributes of the governance structure in Ruo-heng 
watermelon cooperative. Decision rights are not uniformly distributed among the members. 
Director members have real control on important issues such as pricing, financing, 
investment screening, etc. Meanwhile, sharing benefits/costs among members are not 
solely based on membership. Income rights are confined by share contributions. 
 
Table 3.8  Attribute choices in the cluster Governance 
                                    Income rights 
 
Decision rights 
Share-based Membership-based 
Uniform   
Skewed ×  
 
In traditional cooperatives, benefit sharing based on patronization is essential for 
members, and capital returns are not important or deliberately limited to all members. In 
Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative, ownership is allocated in such a way that benefit 
sharing based on patronization and benefit sharing based on capital contribution is 
perfectly aligned. Since members benefit from the cooperative proportional to their share 
contribution/expected patronization, a skewed allocation of decision rights encourages 
members either to contribute to the cooperative or to make knowledge / access to market 
channels available. 
3.3.2 Quality Control System 
 
For agricultural products, as well as for other products, quality is an important attribute 
nowadays. The importance of quality is particularly pronounced for fruits and vegetables 
because these commodities are among the most likely to be observed and evaluated by 
consumers in their primary and unprocessed form. However, member growers have more 
information on quality of products than the cooperatives. Asymmetric information on 
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quality may lead to over-supply of low quality products. Thus, quality management is 
essential for cooperatives. Markets coordinate quality mainly by incentives (such as prices), 
and hierarchies coordinate quality mainly by administrative controls (monitoring of the 
activities). We define the system a cooperative uses to direct behavior of its member users 
and to motivate them to act in ways that benefit the cooperative as the quality control 
system. 
3.3.2.1. Quality Coordination Methods through Multiple Production Stages 
 
For the agri-business involved in multiple stages of production and distribution of products, 
vertical coordination on quality is necessary. Various methods could be used to vertically 
manage quality. We identify three quality coordination methods through multiple 
production stages in this cooperative: inputs control, production standardization, and 
unified packaging and marketing. Figure 3.2 illustrates the production stages involved by 
the cooperative and coordinating methods through these stages. 
Inputs Preparing 
site 
Planting 
Harvest 
Storage 
Processing 
Marketing, 
Retailing  
The Cooperative 
Farmer growers 
Unified supplying 
of inputs Standardization production
Unified packaging 
and marketing 
Planning 
 
Figure 3.2  Stages of production and coordination methods (adapted from Figure 9.3, Allen 
and Lueck, 2003, p.184) 
 
Although Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative is a marketing cooperative, its 
activities are not limited to selling. The figure shows the cooperative is involved in 
multiple stages of inputs, storing, and processing and marketing/retailing. Ruo-heng 
watermelon cooperative purchases inputs for members from outside companies. The 
procurement of inputs by the cooperative serves two purposes: firstly, quality of inputs is 
controlled; secondly, members acquire inputs at cheaper prices because the cooperative has 
considerable bargaining power towards input suppliers. 
Main activities of member growers are preparing sites, planting, and harvesting. 
The cooperative influences member growers’ activities by production standardization 
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requirements. Production methods, technical guidance, and detailed planting descriptions 
of production procedures are formulated by the cooperative. All members receive a 
guidance book with detailed standardized growing procedures, specifying detailed 
requirements regarding seeds, fertilizers, production procedures, and technologies 
regarding different stages of production. In sum, the cooperative coordinates members’ 
production in multiple stages of production by a unified supply of inputs, standardized 
production requirements, and unified packaging and marketing. 
3.3.2.2. Other Control Tools and Incentive Tools  
 
In addition to unified supply of inputs, standardized production methods, and unified 
packaging and marketing, several other control instruments are identified. One control 
instrument is the team based production / inspection. By working together on rural lands, 
member growers supervise each other. Production and quality management is organized in 
a three-layer structure. Figure 3.3 depicts this structure. The board of directors, on behalf 
of the cooperative, rents rural land each year and assigns members to grow watermelons on 
it. These lands are called ‘production bases’. In 2004, the cooperative had 8 production 
bases across the Zhejiang province. In 2005, the cooperative has 12 production bases. In 
each production base, member growers are grouped into 8 to 10 production groups. Each 
group hires farmer employees. The normal ratio is 1 farmer member to 3 hired farmer 
workers. These farmer workers are paid 900 yuan per month. Farmer members and 
workers grow watermelons together in a team. The cooperative provides inputs such as 
seeds, fertilizers and technical assistance. Farmer members provide technical guidance to 
farmer employees. At the end of one production cycle20, each production base collects 
watermelons from its production teams. These watermelons are sorted, graded and packed 
with the cooperative brand. The board of directors determines prices based on the market 
situation. Subsequently, the cooperative assigns about two seller members to each 
production base. These seller members are in charge of selling watermelons for their 
production base. 
 
 
20  The number of production cycles is 6, due to its technology and skills. Most enterprises have 4 
production cycles. 
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Production bases 
Production teams 
Member growers Farmer 
l  
Figure 3.3  Quality management in Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative 
 
Second, the products delivered by members are sorted and graded by the 
cooperative. By sorting and grading, the cooperative encourages members to adhere to ex 
ante specified quality standards. Third, members will be paid for their deliveries based on 
quality. Sample inspection, internal grading and sorting are used to measure quality 
differences, and then prices are paid accordingly. Quality-based pricing for deliveries is a 
salient incentive tool used by the cooperative to align interests of individual members with 
the entire cooperative. 
Fourth, there is cash punishment for failing to deliver quality, even after the 
internal inspection process. It entails that a customer receives another watermelon when a 
bad one is returned. This instrument of quality control is explicitly used in the marketing 
policy for selling fresh watermelons. It is called ‘double paying compensation’. Since the 
production team of each watermelon can be traced, all team members will be fined with a 
certain amount of money when losses occur due to delivering bad quality. A larger loss 
results in a higher cash punishment. This policy increases the incentives for group 
member’ to monitor each other during production as well as incentives for team 
supervisors to strictly inspect sorting and grading. 
3.3.2.3. Complementarities in the Quality Control System 
 
In Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative, the control tools include inputs control (i.e. unified 
supply of inputs), standardization, unified packaging and marketing, group 
production/inspection, sorting and grading, and incentive tools like quality-based pricing 
and cash punishment. The control tools are less efficient when pricing for deliveries is 
identical across all members. Tight control tools and flexible quality-sensitive pricing act 
in the same direction to manage members to adhere to quality standards and maintain the 
brand name. Table 3.9 depicts the choices regarding the attributes in the cluster quality 
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control at Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative. Compared with contract farming, the 
cooperative has low costs in enforcing quality. For example, field visits are not necessary, 
because members are motivated to supervise each other to prevent opportunist behavior. 
Low cost of control, complemented with high-powered incentives in terms of pricing, 
makes the cooperative efficient in managing quality in various stages of production. 
 
Table 3.9  Attribute choices in the cluster Quality Control 
                    Quality incentives 
Control Yes No 
Tight ×  
Loose   
 
There are ongoing debates on whether incentives and control tools adopted in the 
quality assurance system are substitutes or complements. Hueth, e.a. (1999) examined 
incentive tools and control tools used in the contracts used by first handlers of fruits and 
vegetables in California, and claimed that the instruments of control may be complements 
or substitutes, depending on the context. If the control instruments and the incentive 
instruments are complements, then their alignment produces synergies in the Quality 
control system. This is what we observed in this Chinese fruit cooperative. 
3.3.3 Branding Strategy and its Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
A cooperative may choose different business strategies when selling products for members. 
For example, it may just pool all products delivered by members together and sell them by 
batches at wholesale markets; or, it may sell the products under one or several brand names. 
We define the branding strategy as the way in which products are marketed and sold under 
brand name. 
The branding strategy determines the degree of commitment to ex ante specified 
high quality standards by a firm. To make this commitment credible, firms should have 
something valuable to loose. In Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative, this is the private brand 
‘Yu-ling’. There are two mechanisms to signal quality to consumers: private brands and 
public certification (Raynaud, e.a. 2005). The reputation capital of the owner is at stake 
under a private brand. The general director is a big watermelon grower and an expert in 
growing watermelons. Before he joined the cooperative, his watermelons were recognized 
as high quality. Many local people buy the watermelon from the cooperative because they 
trust the general director. His personal reputation is at stake in building up the reputation 
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for the ‘Yu-ling’ brand. Under public certification, the credibility of a quality label relies 
on governmental enforcement. 
 
Table 3.10  Attribute choices in the cluster Strategy 
                          Public certification 
 
Private brand 
Yes No 
Yes ×  
No   
 
Since the two mechanisms play similar roles in signaling quality, they may act as 
substitutes. However, in Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative, public certification is not a 
substitute to private brands. It acts as a major method for building up the reputation of the 
private brand. The cooperative entered the certification process of the local government, 
which resulted in ‘Yu-ling’ being certified as ‘Famous Brand in Zhejiang’ by the Zhejiang 
provincial government agency in 2004. One reason for public certification being a 
complement to private brands is that the costs of public certification are low. Actually, 
local governments encourage cooperatives to participate in public certification procedures. 
Another reason is that public certification is used in advertising in addition to the private 
brand. The general director stated that the advertisement expenditure on newspapers, 
television, etc is ‘very limited’, while pubic certification or public rewards are necessary 
for promoting brands. Table 3.10 summarizes the observations regarding the cluster 
Strategy. 
3.3.4 Complementarities between the Three Clusters of Attributes 
 
How to sell products and what products to sell are two questions closely linked with each 
other. The branding strategy distinguishes itself in terms of creating the commitment to ex 
ante specified high quality standards and creating a new market niche with higher margins. 
To guarantee the commitment and to earn high margins, tight quality control is essential in 
cooperatives taking the brand strategy. The adoption of these systems is facilitated by 
having centralized / skewed governance. Figure 3.4 depicts the three clusters of attributes 
in Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative. 
In Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative, the quality control system is tight in order 
to maintain high quality reputation/image of the cooperative. It is tight in three ways. 
Firstly, there are ex-ante contracted quality standards, which are agreed upon by all 
members and which are stricter than the legal requirements regarding fruits. Secondly, 
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many control tools are adopted to monitor and guide members through different stages of 
production. For example, input controls, production standardization, and group 
production/inspection are adopted to guarantee quality before and during the production 
process. Sample inspection and internal grading are used to measure members’ efforts in 
meeting quality requirements. Failures of meeting quality requirements, which are not 
detected by the internal grading system, are dealt with by cash punishments. Since the bad 
products can be tracked down to production bases/groups, cash punishment provides a 
strong incentive to grow high quality watermelons. Thirdly, quality-based pricing is used 
to complement the control tools. 
 
Uniform
Skewed
Tight 
Loose
No 
Yes 
Governance 
Quality control Branding 
 
Figure 3.4  Cluster choices in Ruo-heng watermelon cooperative 
 
3.4 Governance in the Institutional Environment of China: Abilities 
and Relations 
 
The above sections show that the development of Chinese cooperatives is characterized by 
two facts. Firstly, the number of new cooperatives increases rapidly all over China. The 
emergence and spread of new cooperatives in China is in line with the wave of the 
agricultural industrialization and global competition. For farmers operating in only one 
stage of the supply chain, i.e. the production stage, their benefits are endangered by the 
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potential appropriation by other players in the supply chain. The cooperative is a safeguard 
to guarantee farmers’ benefits by creating access to markets and produce value-added 
activities. 
In the process of forward integrating into downstream activities, such as 
wholesaling and/or retailing, physical assets such as preservation facilities and wholesale 
markets are important. However, human assets such as knowledge/abilities regarding 
marketing and advanced technology are more important for Chinese farmers. Firstly, the 
agri-food markets are now characterized by oversupply, i.e. selling products is a problem 
for most farmers. Access to markets is decisive for farmers’ survival. Secondly, in rural 
China, it is very difficult for farmers to get loans from business organizations such as 
banks because their scale is small and they may pose substantial risks for creditors. Only 
farmers with access to knowledge regarding technology and/or markets can get loans. 
These farmers are able to grow more products and/or sell more products. They distinguish 
themselves from other farmers by larger planting and/or selling scale. These signals give 
banks and other private creditors confidence that their loans will be paid back. So, human 
assets pave the way to build up physical assets.  
Secondly, the governance structure of Chinese farmer cooperatives is a co-
governance structure based on abilities and relations. The actual arrangements and 
operations are mainly based on the abilities of members. Trust and commitment derived 
from members’ relationships underpins these institutional arrangements by confining 
control rights to core members. 
The governance structure of Chinese cooperatives varies substantially. Members 
are heterogeneous in terms of farm size and supply of equity, and in some cases farmer 
members jointly own the cooperative with non-farmer members or firm members. The 
allocation of resources based on capital is pervasive at least in the coastal areas. There is 
usually a minority of core members (usually big shareholders) and a majority of normal 
members (usually users or patrons). Normal members enforce control rights by vote, voice 
and exit on the one hand, and delegate most control rights to core members on the other 
hand. 
Farmers are heterogonous in terms of producing and/or selling capability even 
when they produce similar products. Farmers are stratified in terms of their abilities in 
producing products and in accessing markets. Some farmers have these abilities, while 
most farmers have not. However, farmers are in general in a weak bargaining position with 
other players in the agri-food supply chain, regardless their abilities to sell products and to 
perform value-added activities. Uniting farmers and pooling resources in the formation of 
cooperatives seems to be a suitable strategy for both types of farmers. 
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According to the incomplete contracting theory, it’s efficient to allocate the 
control rights of cooperatives to the persons with superior access to market channels or 
having specific skills. In China, these persons are big farmer growers and/or sellers 
because they have either the abilities or relations to access downstream markets. They are 
granted substantial power in decision making decision in contingent situations. This is 
reflected in the skewness of the distribution of decision rights among core 
members/director members and normal members in the Zhejiang province. If there is a 
lack of big growers/sellers, agricultural firms and other non-farmers may be chosen and 
accepted by farmer members. The heterogeneity is much larger in this case, and the extent 
of the delegation of control rights to such core members is much larger. In some cases, 
normal members (pure farmer growers) only buy basic shares (i.e. membership shares) to 
get access to the cooperative, and most control rights are granted to big shareholders/core 
members. These diverse allocations of decision power among different stakeholders are 
confined by trust and commitment derived from the relationships among members. For 
small cooperatives, relationships play an important role in building trust and commitment. 
If core members have more close relationship with other members, normal members will 
be more willing to transfer (part of their) control rights to them. Thus, dominance of core 
members in ownership, and hence in residual control rights, is sustainable on the basis of 
kinships. 
3.5 Conclusion and Future Research 
 
Since the late 1980s, China has seen the rapid development of new cooperatives in rural 
areas. In general, the development of farmer cooperatives in China is still in an early stage. 
A number of features of these cooperatives are revealed by our data. Firstly, cooperatives 
are small, and most of them are local. Secondly, the organization and strategy of farmer 
specialized cooperatives in China are deeply influenced by the institutional environment. 
Human asset specificity in terms of establishing and maintaining relations and access to 
markets seems to be most important in the governance of cooperatives. The leader of a 
cooperative is often the person with the ability to access to downstream activities. Physical 
asset specificity and countervailing power seem to be the driving forces behind governance 
structure choice in Europe and the USA (Bonus 1986, Hendrikse and Veerman 2001a, 
2001b). 
    Thirdly, farmer cooperatives in China are rooted in the traditional Chinese 
culture centering on personal relations. Therefore, the origin and development of 
cooperatives are not only determined by members’ abilities but also subject to the informal 
institutions based on relations. A very effective way to conduct the governance of farmer 
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cooperatives in China may not be formal institution of, and commitment to cooperative 
concepts, but the personal relations or feelings. In a sense, the network of cooperative 
members is an effective mechanism to control the core members. This is in line with the 
findings of McMillan and Woodruff (1999) about the importance of inter-firm 
relationships. In short, both the control of core members based on ability and the 
constraints caused by members’ relations can be regarded as the basic foundation for the 
co-governance of farmer cooperatives in China. 
    Fourthly, heterogeneity of members in farmer cooperatives in China is 
pervasive. There are various types of heterogeneity. Firstly, small farmer members and 
large farmer members co-exist in a cooperative. They are different in terms of abilities and 
social relations. Secondly, in some cooperatives, there are seller members who are 
specialized in selling member's products instead of production, and they may have 
different interests than pure farmer growers. A non-farmer or process firm can be accepted 
as a core member as long as he facilitates members’ access to knowledge and/or markets. 
Core members/ director members are endowed with substantial decision power over 
normal members. Thirdly, in the cooperatives initiated by processor firms or other agri-
food business firms, farmer members as well as non farmer members have decision rights. 
Fourthly, there are cooperatives with full-time farmer members and part-time farmers 
having different interests. Finally, members are heterogeneous in terms of education, age, 
and gender of members. The first three types of heterogeneity have been addressed in this 
article. 
    These observations raise a number of issues for further research. Firstly, do 
the results regarding the Zhejiang province extend to other provinces? Similarly, do the 
results regarding the watermelon cooperative extend to other cooperatives? Secondly, 
Hansmann (1996) has stressed the importance of the homogeneity of patrons in enterprises. 
The new cooperatives in the Zhejiang province exhibit a substantial heterogeneity in the 
membership. This raises the issue on structuring cooperatives in such a way that they 
accommodate member heterogeneity best. Thirdly, growth of the cooperatives is to be 
expected, even across provinces with different institutional settings. Will the members in 
the different provinces be treated the same? Fourthly, a great variety of the forms of 
cooperative organizations have been observed in rural China recently. The farmer 
specialized cooperative, which is the focus of this paper, is only one form of the spectrum 
of cooperative organizations. To what extent do other cooperative organizations differ 
from farmer specialized cooperatives? And, to what extent do these differences influence 
performance of each organizational form? This posts interesting research directions in the 
future work.  
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4 Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and 
Vegetable Contracts 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The use of contracts as a way of vertically organizing transactions is spreading in many 
agricultural sectors. Although cash markets are still important in coordinating supply and 
demands, however, different kinds of contractual arrangements gradually demonstrate their 
significance in providing links to all stakeholders. According to USDA/ERS (2006), 
contracts covered 39 percent of the value of U.S. agricultural production in 2003, up from 
36 percent in 2001 and 28 percent in 1991. Commodities such as tomatoes and broilers 
have been produced almost exclusively under contracts between processors and 
independent growers for decades in the United States (Vukina and Leegomonchai, 2004). 
Developing countries in Africa have adopted contract farming as one effective way of 
developing the local agricultural economy for decades (Litte and Watt, 1994). Developing 
countries are experiencing a rapid increase in contract farming recently, driven by 
globalization, trade liberalization and agricultural industrialization (Cook and Chadda, 
2000). 
Growing and/or marketing agricultural products under contracts, or contract 
farming, is different from spot markets, because contract farming specifies a delivery 
requirement of a product or a service ex ante and a set of rules or provisions may be 
adopted for guarantying the final delivery.  Contract farming is a vertical relationship in 
the sense of combining upstream primary producers and downstream marketing or 
processing firms ex ante. Contract farming is said to have advantages above spot markets 
like reducing uncertainty and providing access, while disadvantages are specified like 
excluding smallholders out of the contract farming system and agribusiness firms 
appropriating contracted farmers’ surplus (MacDonald, 2004; Glover, 1984; Goldsmith, 
1985; Wiliams and Karen, 1985; Warning, 2002; Glover and Kusterere, 1990; Little and 
Watts, 1994). In contrast to fully vertically integrated systems, such as investor-owned 
agricultural corporations, contract farming offers primary producers more independence in 
making decisions and primary producers remain independent entities.  
Within the broad category of contract farming, contractual arrangements vary a 
lot across different supply chains/relations between downstream firms and primary grower. 
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First, some contracts assign the ownership of the commodity to the processor, while other 
contracts do not.  For example, a DuPont high-oil corn contract specifies that farmers do 
not obtain any ownership rights to the crop because DuPont owns the crop; rather, farmers 
are caring for DuPont’s property (Hamilton, 1999; Goodhue, 1999). Vukina and 
Leegomonchai (2004) observe similar contractual arrangements in the poultry industry, i.e., 
the processor hold the tile of ownership of chickens while the growers are compensated 
with fixed payments for raising chicken to market-weight.  
Second, some contracts specify restrictive provisions regarding input choice, 
and/or production method. Several prior studies notice the input control aspect in contracts 
(Goodhue, 1999; Hueth et. al, 1999). A contractual relations survey regarding growers and 
first handlers in California fruit and vegetable markets shows that 46 of 88 firms specified 
or provided seeds to control seed variety, and, some firms even specified the planting, 
pruning and harvest (Hueth et.al, 1999). In broiler industry contracts, processors may 
control almost every aspect of production from the distribution of inputs (chicken and feed) 
to decisions about when to harvest the mature bird and repopulate the houses with new 
flocks (Vukina and Leegomonchai, 2004). Menard (1996, p.170) identifies three types of 
contracts in the French poultry industry: fixed-price contracts; buy-and-sell contracts; and 
contracts of the putting-out type. Fixed-price contracts are agreements in which growers 
remain fully independent, and growers commit to deliver a certain quantity of chickens 
with specified characteristics at a certain date. Contracts of this type specify a fixed 
amount of money to be paid to growers. Buy-and-sell contracts are arrangements in which 
growers buy chicks and sell chicken, dealing with the same firm at both ends. Growers 
usually remain in charge of intermediate products, though there may be restrictive clauses. 
Contracts of the putting-out type are agreements in which growers are provided with 
chicks, food, equipment or they must get them from specific firms. 
Third, contracts are different in the pricing provisions to farmers. Some contracts 
purchase farmers’ products at fixed prices specified ex ante, some contracts use 
tournament pricing when compensating farmers and some contracts do not adopt market-
based pricing. 
These observations illustrate that contract farming is characterized by various 
rules and incentives to govern the parties involved. It raises the question: how are these 
rules and incentives designed and/or aligned to deal with a specific transaction/product? 
One tentative treatment to the above observations is pursued by ERS/USDA (2003; 2006) 
in distinguishing production contracts and marketing contracts. Agricultural contracts fall 
into these two broad groups, where the ownership of the contracted commodity is treated 
as one distinguishing feature. ERS/USDA (2006, p.6) claims: 
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Under a production contract, the farmer provides a set of services to 
the contractor, who usually owns the commodity while it is being 
produced. The contract specifies the services to be provided by the 
farmer, the manner in which the farmer is to be compensated for the 
services, and specific contractor’s responsibilities for provision of 
inputs.…         Marketing contracts focus on the commodity as it is 
delivered to the contractor, rather than on the services provided by 
the farmer. They specify a commodity’s price or a mechanism for 
determining the price, a delivery outlet, and a quantity to be 
delivered.’ 
 
According to this classification, production contracts assign the ownership of 
transacted product to agricultural firms (i.e., contractor) while marketing contracts do not. 
In addition, production contracts are more complete than market contracts in the sense that 
more contingencies and activities are identified ex ante. As the result of ex ante assignment 
of ownership and ex ante specifications of various rules and rights, the spectrum of 
decision rights for one and/or two parties is reduced. This classification highlights that the 
allocation of decision rights between two parties varies among different contracts, however, 
it remains unclear under what circumstances a set of decision rights should be allocated to 
a party, and why21. This is important because the allocation of decision rights, as a way of 
coordinating activities across various production processes and motivating behaviour of 
various stake-holders, determines how effective contract farming is.   
We address this gap by focusing on the details of decision rights in contractual 
arrangements commonly found under a contract farming governance structure. Decision 
rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the question ‘Who has authority 
or control (regarding the use of assets)?’. Decision rights concern all rights and rules 
regarding the deployment and use of assets (Hansmann, 1996). They specify who directs 
the firm’s activities. The allocation of decision rights between two parties varies. On the 
one hand, contract farming could be extensive by the processor allocating quota, 
controlling quality, controlling most production aspects, and even owing the residual 
claims of the commodity; on the other hand, contract farming could be limited by the 
processor to just a few dimensions of the transaction.  
 
21 In addition, this classification is not always accurate in terms of ownership allocation in some 
cases. For example, growers may leave the ownership of the contracted commodity to the contractors 
under production contracts, whereas seed, chemical inputs, and/or specifying planting/growing 
methods may be clearly specified and/or provided under marketing contracts. 
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Section 4.2 presents the research objective and the research question. Section 4.3 
formulates the hypotheses regarding contract farming, while section 4.4 specifies the 
research design. The data is analyzed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 draws conclusions.  
 
4.2 Positioning 
 
This section starts with distinguishing three types of contracts (4.2.1). Subsequentially, 
contract farming is conceptualized and elaborated as one form of vertical coordination 
(4.2.2). The research question is developed consequentially (4.2.3).  
4.2.1  Classifying Contracts 
 
Three types of contracts have been identified conceptually in the literature (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2005). Complete contingent contracting refers to a contract specifying 
exactly what is expected of each party under all possible future contingencies. Complete 
contracting refers to a contract specifying exactly what is expected of each party under all 
observable possible future contingencies. Incomplete contracting refers to a contract which 
does not fully specify actions under each future contingency.  
Figure 4.1 helps to clarify the conceptual difference of contracts from the 
perspective of specifying actions for situations/events/contingencies. Let s (  ) 
denote states/situations of a project, while a (
],...,[ 1 Nsss∈
],...,[ 1 Maaa∈ ) denotes a course of actions. A 
contract help parties to expect what other parties will do in the future 
contingencies/situations. However, it is not easy to specify in each situation a specific 
course of actions because of bounded rationality and/or high costs of formulating and 
enforcing the alignments (i.e., contracting costs). Thus, according to the extent of how a 
situation is described/linked with an action (or a course of actions), a contract can be 
classified into three categories: first, a complete contingent contract specifies a specific 
course of actions for every possible situation (i.e., r=d=0 in figure 4.1); second, a complete 
contract specifies a specific course of actions for each observable history (it is reflected by 
r≧2, d=0, s<r in figure 4.1); third, an incomplete contract specifies no specific actions, 
indicated by the symbol Φ  in figure 4.1, in some situations.  
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Figure 4.1 Contracts and mapping states into actions 
 
The allocation of decision rights plays no roles when contracts are complete or 
complete contingent, because all relevant aspects are covered by the contract (Hendrikse, 
2003). It starts to matter when some circumstances can not be covered by a contract. 
Contractual clauses have to be formulated regarding who has the rights to decide in such 
circumstances. Figure 4.2 classifies the three types of contracts.  
 
  Behavioural hypothesis 
  Opportunistic Self-interested Idealistic 
 
Degree  of 
Complete rationality Complete 
contracts 
Complete 
contingent 
contracts 
 
rationality Limited rationality Incomplete 
contracts 
  
 Procedural rationality    
 
Figure 4.2  Classifying contracts 
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4.2.2 Conceptualizing Contract Farming 
 
An important insight of incomplete contracting theory is the need to allocate the right to 
make decisions about issues that can not be contractually specified (Lerner and Mergers, 
1998). Decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the question 
‘Who has authority or control (regarding the use of assets)?’. Decision rights concern all 
rights and rules regarding the deployment and use of assets (Hansmann, 1996). They 
specify who directs the firm’s activities, i.e. the allocation of authority. Incomplete 
contracting has far-reaching implications for both ex ante investment choices and the ex 
post bargaining process between the involved parties. This research adopts the incomplete 
contracting perspective to analyze contracts in agricultural markets. 
Contract farming can be treated as a hybrid governance structure lying between 
the two polar forms of Spot Markets and Integration, which deal with successive 
production stages. Figure 4.3 distinguishes four governance structures from the perspective 
of allocating authority/ decision rights. The setting of a supply transaction involves an 
upstream party (farmer suppliers/growers), a downstream party (agribusiness/buyers) and 
two assets (e.g., production and processing equipment). The rectangles represent 
productive assets, the crosses inside rectangles represent decision rights of the assets, and 
the ovals represent the degree of vertical integration between the two parities. Three 
degrees of integration are distinguished. The degree of vertical integration is 0, i.e., no oval, 
when the governance structure Spot Market prevails. The degree of vertical integration is 1, 
i.e., solid oval, when either the governance structure Backward Integration or Forward 
Integration / Agricultural Cooperative is actual. Finally, the degree of vertical integration is 
between 0 and 1, i.e., dotted oval, in the governance structure Contract Farming. 
 
Spot Market Backward Integration Forward Integration/
Co-operative 
Farmer 
Processor 
Contract Farming 
Figure 4.3  Four governance structures 
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Under the governance structure Spot Market, the two parties are independent, 
and prices coordinate the activities of the involved parties. Under the governance structure 
Backward Integrated, upstream assets are owned by the downstream party. Ownership of 
the assets implies that the access to the productive assets (and consequentially the returns 
of the assets) is controlled by the downstream owner. Decision rights reside with 
downstream players, and authority acts as the major coordination mechanism. Upstream 
farmers work as employees. Investor-owned agribusinesses are the representative of such a 
governance structure. Under the governance structure Forward Integration, individual 
farmers own upstream production assets as well as downstream processing assets. Most 
agricultural cooperatives are representative of such a governance structure. Under the 
governance structure Contract Farming, upstream farmers remain independent in the sense 
that they work with their own productive assets such as land, growing facilities, etc. It 
means that farmers are autonomous to decide on how to use their assets and how to deal 
with the resulting products. However, this autonomy is limited by the contract with the 
downstream party via ex ante specified and/or ex post restriction on the scope of authority. 
Ownership may not change, but decision rights across fixed firm boundaries may be 
moved using contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2005). This character is captured by 
the dotted oval.  
4.2.3 Research Question 
 
Contract farming is characterized by some decision rights being moved across fixed firm 
boundaries (which is captured by the dotted cross in figure 4.3). Both features are related 
to the extent and form of decision rights allocated across the involved parties. Contract 
farming captures various arrangements because of the extent of decision rights specified ex 
ante and the allocation pattern of decision rights varies.  
To understand the reason for the various arrangements under contract farming, 
we have to address the following question: What determines the form and extent of 
decision rights allocation in contract farming? This question can be divided into two sub-
questions.  Firstly, many decisions/issues are specified in contracts ex ante. The more 
issues are specified in a contract, less space is left for parties to decide later on and 
behavioural uncertainty is decreased. Completeness of a contract is increased by including 
more specifications and reducing discretion for parties. Thus, by focusing on the 
specifications ex ante in a contract, we will address first question: What determines the 
completeness of a contract? By answering this sub-question, we will understand why some 
contracts are simple while other contracts are relatively complicated when dealing with 
similar agricultural products.  
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 Secondly, when contracts are not complete, decision rights should be allocated. 
There are two major parties involved in agricultural contracts: upstream farmer growers 
and downstream processors. The allocation of decision rights will be addressed by the 
question: When are decision rights allocated to downstream agricultural firms? By 
answering this sub-question, we will understand why some contracts deliberately limit the 
contracted farmers’ decisions/choices while other contracts grant farmers with extensive 
discretion.   
To summarize, our main research question is What determines the form and 
extent of decision rights allocation between farmer growers and downstream processors in 
contract farming? By examining empirically the determinants of the completeness of a 
contract and the allocation of decision rights in the vegetable and fruit sector, our 
theoretical objective is to contribute to the literature which tackles the endogeneity of the 
degree of ‘completeness’. Our practical objective is to better understand the practice of 
contract farming and thus provide support to managers to effectively manage the relations 
between producers and processors. 
4.3 Contract Farming Hypotheses 
 
This section start with formulating the hypotheses regarding completeness/incompleteness 
of contracts (4.3.1). Then the hypotheses predicting the allocation of decision rights to 
agricultural firms instead of farmers are elaborated (4.3.2). Finally, the conceptual model 
summarizes the hypotheses (4.3.3).  
4.3.1 Extent of Contractual Incompleteness Hypotheses 
 
Battigalli and Maggi (2002) model contractual incompleteness as arising 
endogenously from the costs of writing contracts, i.e., the costs of describing the 
environment and the parties’ behaviour. A contract is viewed as specifying obligations for 
the agent. Different from the prior studies emphasizing mainly missing clauses, they argue 
that the optimal contract is characterized both by discretion and by rigidity: discretion, 
meaning that the contract does not specify the parties’ behaviour with sufficient detail; and 
rigidity, meaning that the parties’ obligations are not sufficiently contingent on the external 
state. In their terminology, the clauses of a contract can be ranked in three groups: 
contingent clauses, describing both future contingencies and parties’ actions, incur the 
highest writing cost, and are used to regulate the most important tasks; rigid clauses, only 
describing parties’ actions (like instructions given by a superior to other agents), incur 
relatively lower writing cost, and are used to regulate less important tasks; discretion 
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clauses (i.e. missing contingencies), leaving the discretion to parties, incur no writing cost, 
and are used to regulate the least important tasks. The optimum degree of discretion and 
rigidity is determined by the trade-off between the writing costs and the potential surplus. 
Battigalli and Maggi (2002) examine how changes in the importance of writing 
costs relative to the potential gross surplus (gross of the writing costs) affect the optimal 
degree of rigidity and discretion of a contract. Denote the importance of writing costs (c) 
relative to the potential gross surplus (A) as y=c/A. The degree of discretion (captured by 
missing clauses in the model) is increasing in c/A and the amount of contingent clauses is 
decreasing in c/A. The intuition is simple. A smaller c/A implies that writing costs are 
decreasing or potential gross surplus is increasing, incorporating more clauses, and 
therefore less discretion becomes more attractive because it entails tailoring actions more 
to specific situations. Notice that an extremely small c/A, e.g, c/A=0, calls on contingent 
complete contract, that is, all states and the corresponding course of actions in each state 
will be specified in a contract. On the contrary, an extremely large c/A entails leaving all 
discretion to agents. The degree of rigidity (captured by the number of rigid clauses in the 
multi-task principle-agent model) is increasing in c/A for low values of c/A and decreasing 
in c/A for high values of c/A. Figure 4.4 depicts these relationships.  
 
Figure 4.4  Impact of change in y on the optimum contract (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002, 
p.808) 
 
A number of testable hypotheses regarding contractual incompleteness can be 
formulated. Let’s focus on A (i.e., the potential gross surplus (gross of the writing costs)). 
If the potential gross contracting surplus is very small, no contract can be agreed upon 
since the contracting costs may be too high to be worth formulating a contract.  If A 
increases, the optimum degree of discretion is expected to decrease, while the optimum 
 
94                                                                    Chapter 4  
                                                                               
degree of rigidity and the possibility of observing contingent clauses are both expected to 
increase.  If the potential gross contracting surplus is very large, the optimum contract 
specifies for each contingency an action because the writing cost can be neglected, i.e., 
complete (contingent) contracts emerge. There will be no scope for discretion. In addition 
to these two extreme situations, there are other situations where it is more interesting to 
predict and compare the completeness of contracts. When the potential gross contracting 
surplus is small, an optimum contract is expected to specify some (rigid) clauses while 
leaving substantial scope to agents’ discretion. Thus, the more potential gross surplus a 
contract may generate, the less discretion is left to the agents, and more issues are specified 
in a contract. Consequentially, the completeness of a contract is positively influenced by 
the potential gross surplus of a contract. 
The potential gross surplus of a contract can be represented by the value of 
contracting. Two cases can be distinguished regarding a change in the value of contracting. 
Firstly, if firms deal with high quality products, procuring material by contracting may 
have advantages over procurement from spot markets. In spot markets, both quantity and 
quality of products may not be stable enough for firms’ marketing or processing. To 
buying the required materials, firms have to spend lots of resources to search, screen, and 
bargain with suppliers. Contracting may save transaction costs for firms by locating 
suppliers ex ante and by guaranteeing quality of supplying ex ante and/or ex post. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Completeness of a contract increases when the firm deals with higher 
quality products. 
 
The second case concerns firms having a well recognized reputation. Reputation 
is intangible capital which facilitates firms’ business in many ways. It usually takes 
considerable investment to build up a reputation. However, it is fragile. Contracting can 
reduce the chances of destroying reputation by procuring unsatisfactory materials.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Completeness of a contract increases when the firm has a more well-
recognized reputation.  
 
Uncertainty is identified in Battigalli and Maggi (2002) as another factor 
determining the extent of incompleteness of a contract. They claim that rigidity is 
decreasing as uncertainty increases, while contingent contracting and discretion are 
increasing as uncertainty increase. The argument is as follows (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002, 
p.809): ‘when uncertainty is higher the efficiency cost of ignoring low-probability events 
and writing rigid clauses is higher, hence the number of rigid clauses is lower. Moreover, 
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when uncertainty is higher, both contingent clauses and missing clauses increase in 
number’. It is depicted by figure 4.5 (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002, p.809). The two dots 
indicate the critical levels of the incremental benefit from matching events with actions. 
They separate D (i.e. discretion) from Rn (i.e., Rigid clauses in contracts), and Rn from Cn 
(i.e., Contingent clauses). As uncertainty increase, an optimum contract will leave more 
scope for parties’ discretion, and reduce rigid/specified tasks/activities which are not 
dependent on contingencies.  
D Rn Cn 
 
Figure 4.5  Effect of increase in uncertainty on the optimum contract (Battigalli and Maggi, 
2002, p.809) 
 
Applying this prediction to agricultural contracts, we have the following 
hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 3: In a more uncertain environment, the completeness of a contract will 
decrease.  
4.3.2 Decision Rights Allocation Hypotheses 
 
The property rights model, i.e. GHM (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), 
addresses governance structure choice in the setting of incomplete contracting. They define 
the ownership of assets as the holder of residual decision rights: the rights to make any 
decision regarding the use of an asset that is not explicitly attenuated by law or assigned to 
other parties by contract. Integration involves benefits as well as costs, and the assignment 
of decision rights, hence ownership, should be allocated to the party who can create most 
value to a specific relation, because it affects ex ante investment incentives via the 
allocation of bargaining power ex post. 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) apply and develop the property rights model to the 
relationships between small research firms and larger financial firms.  According to them, 
two factors determine how decision rights are allocated: firstly, and consistent with the 
GHM model, the extent to which underinvestment by either or both of the parties 
jeopardized the success of the project; secondly, the relative bargaining power of the two 
parties. Bargaining power is constrained by the limited ability of many small high-
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technology firms to obtain outside financing. When research firms are short of financing, 
even the marginal impact of its research effort on the value of final output is greater than 
the marginal impact of the financing partners’ financial investment, the property rights 
may not be allocated to research firms.  
The underinvestment problem is a relevant issue for contract farming. Both 
farmers and processors have to make specific investments to make a transaction successful. 
Farmers need to deliver products with specified quality, and processors need to process 
and sell out the products at satisfactory prices. For farmers, they may need purchasing 
special productive assets, such as a greenhouse or an irrigation facility; and, they may need 
to spend time and effort on learning a new production technology. For processors, they 
may need to buy storing facility and/or special transportation; they may also need to train 
their employees to efficiently collect marketing information, and/or establish or maintain 
marketing channels, developing niche markets. For each party, breaching contracts is 
costly due to the sunk costs which can not be recovered by finding alternative 
buying/selling alternatives. Decision rights should be allocated carefully to induce two 
parties’ investment incentives. Thus, we expect decision rights in agricultural contracts to 
be allocated and balanced in such a way that both parties’ specific investments can be 
protected as much as possible.  The two hypotheses are therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4: More decision rights will be allocated to the firm, if the level of firms’ 
specific investment increases.  
  
Hypothesis 5: Less decision rights will be allocated to the firm, if the level of farmers’ 
specific investment increases. 
 
In agri-food transactions, bargaining power is also an important issue. 
Processors’ bargaining power generated from financial means are larger compared with 
individual small farmers. However, this bargaining power may be strengthened or 
weakened by processors’ competition status.  If the processor has monopsony-oligopsony 
power, that is, there are no or just a few competitve buyers (including markets) within a 
certain geographical area, then farmers have less choice to sell their products. To gain 
access to marketing channels, farmers may give up their autonomy in making decisions for 
market access via contracts. Monopsony-oligopsony power thus can be transformed into 
bargaining power of processor, and further induce more authority allocated to processors. 
Thus, we have  
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Hypothesis 6: More decision rights are allocated to firms, if firms have more monopsony-
oligopsony power.  
 
The GHM model predicts that the allocation of ex post decision rights is 
determined by the desire to improve the ex ante specific investment. However, the 
allocation of decision rights in the contracts may be determined by a different mechanism. 
Arrunda, Garicano and Vazquez (2001) examine the allocation of rights and monetary 
incentives in 23 automobile franchise contracts. The empirical findings show that all 
contracts substantially limit the decision rights of franchisees, and grant extensive 
implementation and enforcement powers to manufactures. The degree of the contractual 
asymmetry is explained by the incidence of moral hazards. They point out both vertical 
externalities (Klein and Murphy, 1988) and horizontal externalities (Telser, 1960) exist in 
the dealer manufacturer relationship. Manufacturers also have potential moral hazards 
problem, which is constrained by brand names. It is suggested that a trade-off between the 
risk of ex post opportunism on the two sides (i.e., both franchisor automobile 
manufacturers and franchisee dealers) drives the allocation pattern of decision rights. 
When the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufacturer opportunism is 
lower, the manufacturers hold more rights to determine the performance required from 
their dealers and to use mechanisms such as monitoring, termination, and monetary 
incentives to ensure that such performance is provided. As Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 
remark (2005, p.13), ‘They test the informal theory that it is the need to achieve efficient 
ex post adaptation that drives variation in the contractual allocation of decision rights 
across different dealership networks. They find that when dealer’s ex post actions can 
damage the network more, manufacturers are allocated more control and monitoring rights 
over dealer’s actions: ‘Manufacturers of higher-quality cars and those with larger networks 
are allocated…more discretion over the operation of their networks.’ Thus, AGV’s  
findings suggest that the ex post decision rights are not allocated to improve ex ante 
incentives to invest in the relationship, but rather to improve the ex post decision-making 
itself.’ 
The above informal theory may also explain the allocation of decision rights in 
agricultural contracts. Similar to franchising, agricultural contracts also entail externalities 
at the producers’ side. As agricultural products become more and more specialized, many 
contractors require high quality products by providing specific quality and safety attribute 
standards. However, quality attributes of agricultural commodities has inherently a high 
degree of heterogeneity (Ligon, 2002; Carriquirey 2003). This variability stems mainly 
from the randomness of the production environment and/or the heterogeneity of the 
practices employed by farmers.  
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A farmer grower may, without being detected within the supply chains, provide a 
low-quality product to the processor/retailer who processes or sells the brand product. By 
shirking, a farmer saves his efforts in providing a specified quality attribute. Shirking may 
have two negative effects. Firstly, the low-quality product attribute may be detected by 
final consumers, which eventually reduces their value perceptions on the brand. Thus, the 
costs of shirking are carried by the brand-owner, i.e. processor or retailer. Secondly, when 
bad behavior can not be detected, high quality producers will have to share the loss from 
decreased value of the commodity or the brand with the processor/retailer. Anticipating 
this, producers will under-invest in quality-enhancing techniques. This has been identified 
in the contract literature (for example, Hennessy (1996)). Thus, because of two negative 
effects of shirking behaviour, the more important quality attributes and the combined 
brand are to the processor or the retailer, the higher the costs of the vertical externality. 
As in franchising, ex post opportunism from processors in farmer-processor 
relationships is possible too. The centralized contract, that is the processor is in charge of 
most decisions, can result in opportunistic behavior by the processor (Bogetoft and Olesen, 
2002). Centralized contracts usually shift the authority to make most of the decisions away 
from producers to the processor. For example, many broiler contracts require a big initial 
investment on chick housing, and/or specifies guidance format to grow chickens.  Assume 
producers have made specific investment to deliver specified products. The processor may 
reject the delivery by downgrading quality attributes or ask for a discount on agreed-upon 
prices, when the market situation is not good for selling. Since it is hard to verify if the ex 
post renegotiation claims is based on a real situation or on simply opportunism, producers 
may have to give up all or the greater part of his share of quasi-rents since his investment 
is sunk into this specific relation. To anticipate this, producers may hesitate to make 
efficient relationship specific investments, even though his investment is valuable to create 
greater value for the whole chain. Thus, in agricultural contracts, hold-up problems faced 
by producers will influence producers’ decisions on accepting centralized contracts or 
decentralized contracts. 
In line with Arrunda, Garicano and Vazquez (2001), we expect that decision 
rights allocation would be determined by the extent of the opportunism risks of the two 
sides in a specific supply chain. When high quality of contracted products is important for 
the processor, the costs of opportunism risks from growers are greater. In this case, more 
decision rights will be allocated to processors. When processors have a good reputation, 
the risks of hold-ups will be reduced, the willingness of accepting authority from 
processors will be increased. Thus, we expect the following two hypotheses to hold: 
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Hypothesis 7: More decision rights are assigned to the firm, when the firm deals with 
higher quality products. 
  
Hypothesis 8:  More decision rights are assigned to the firm, when the reputation of the 
processor is better recognized. 
4.3.3 Conceptual Model 
 
We distinguish two endogenous variables and 6 endogenous variables, based on writing 
cost theory (i.e, Battigalli and Maggi’s model), property rights theory, ex post efficient 
decision-making theory (i.e., Arrunda, Garicano and Vazquez’s model). Figure 4.6 
presents the conceptual model and the eight hypotheses.  
 
Uncertainty 
Quality 
Reputation 
Firm’s specific 
investment 
Farmer’s specific 
investment 
Monopsony-
oligopsony power 
Contract 
completeness 
Decision rights 
allocated to firms
1: + 
2: +
3: - 
5: - 
8: + 
6: + 
4: + 
7: +
 
Figure 4.6  Conceptual model 
 
 
4.4 Research Design 
 
This section starts with motivating multiple case studies as the research strategy (4.4.1). 
Then, how to select cases is explained (4.4.2), and data collection methods are presented 
(4.4.3). Next, the measurement issue is illustrated (4.4.4). Finally, we discuss reliability 
and validity and formulate the tactics to address these two criteria (4.4.5).  
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4.4.1 Research Strategy 
 
Verschuren and Doorewaard (1999, p.3) classify seven types of research, i.e., theory-
developing research, theory-testing research, problem-finding research, diagnostic research, 
design-oriented research, intervening-oriented research and evaluation research. Since we 
develop several hypotheses from various theories regarding contractual completeness and 
decision rights allocation and are to test them for their validity, our research is 
characterized by theory-testing research. Different research strategies, such as experiment, 
survey, case study, can be selected for such tests. Which strategy is the preferred one 
depends on the type of research questions and research focus (Yin, 2003), and/or the 
specification of hypotheses (Dul and Hak, 2007).  
According to Yin (2003), case study research is appropriate to research how-type 
and why-type research questions on contemporary events without control of behavioral 
events. Our main research question is “what determines the form and extent of decision 
rights allocation in contract farming?’. At a first glance, it is a what-type question which 
calls on either explorative survey/experiment/case study (if it is exploratory) or survey and 
archival strategies (if it is actually a form of a ‘how many/much’ line of inquiry). However, 
it is actually more ‘explanatory’, since we are trying to explain, based on several theories, 
what factors lead to a complex contract and what factors shape the allocation of a set of 
decision rights between parties. In other words, it is actually a ‘why’-type question. In 
addition, our object of research is the contracting relationship between primary farmers 
(upstream growers) and agri-businesses (downstream processors, including all kinds of 
marketing and/or processing firms), which is a contemporary phenomena and difficult to 
be manipulate.  In sum, case study research is suggested to be the most appropriate 
strategy to test our hypotheses.  
Dul and Hak (2007) argue that, despite common belief, the case study is a useful 
strategy for theory-testing, and it is the preferred strategy for testing certain types of 
propositions. The specification of the proposition of a theory (i.e., a hypothesis) falls into 
two broad groups: deterministic propositions (e.g, if more A then more B) and 
probabilistic propositions (e.g., if more A then it is likely there is more B). There are three 
types of deterministic propositions, i.e., deterministic sufficient, deterministic necessary, 
and deterministic proportional, and two types of probabilistic propositions, i.e., 
probabilistic proportional co-variational relationships and probabilistic proportional causal 
relationship. The expression of deterministic proportional proposition is like ‘If A is higher, 
then B is higher’. All the eight hypotheses in our research follow this formulation pattern 
and thus can be classified as deterministic proportional relationships. For example, 
hypothesis 1 claims that ‘completeness of a contract increases when the firm deals with 
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higher quality products’. It can be re-formulated as ‘if the product transacted by a firm has 
a higher quality, then the extent of completeness of a contact is higher’. For a deterministic 
proportional relationship, Dul and Hak suggest that experiment is the preferred strategy, 
case study is second-best, while survey is not possible. It is not feasible to choose an 
experiment in our research project, because it entails manipulated changes of the 6 
independent variables, however, it is not possible to manipulate the independent variables 
such as reputation and specific investments. The case study is thus chosen as the second-
best strategy. 
The case study can be further classified as single case study and multiple case 
study. We adopt multiple case study as our research strategy. Yin (2003) suggests 
choosing the multiple-case design instead of one single-case design when you have the 
choice (and resources). Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that with fewer than four cases it will 
be difficult to generate theory with much complexity. Herriott and Firestone (1983) argue 
that the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and thus the 
conclusions are considered to be more robust.  In addition, we would like to achieve both 
depth and breath in analyzing data; however, one single case does not provide enough 
breadth. All these arguments imply that the multiple case study strategy is the most 
appropriate one to be adopted in our research, that is, multiple instances (i.e. cases) will be 
chosen, and they are compared in order to test the hypotheses.  
4.4.2 Selection of Cases 
 
A case study is characterized by a small number of research units (i.e., cases), thus the 
selection of the cases to be studied is of vital importance in the technical design phase 
(Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999). A survey usually requires random (or probabilistic) 
sampling, however, the sampling principle in the case study strategy follows the 
replication logic (Yin, 2003). Each case must be carefully selected so that it either predicts 
similar results or predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons.  
To explain the case selection for our research, we list the research question here 
again: What determines the form and extent of decision rights allocation in contract 
farming? It is informative to explore the above questions in different agricultural sectors, 
like the pork, poultry, vegetable industry, etc. However, it is out of our ability to consider 
all these sectors in one paper. To address the question carefully, we decide to focus on only 
the fruit and vegetable sector. There are two main reasons for choosing this particular 
agricultural sector. 
Firstly, the extent of contract farming varies a lot in the fruit and vegetable sector 
(USDA, 2006). There are simple contracts as well as complicated contracts, and there are 
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highly restrictive contracts as well as quite autonomous contracts. Our preliminary 
observations on the fruit and vegetable sector in China confirm this. We visited four fruit 
and vegetable cooperatives in Eastern China two times in 2004 and in 2005. Various 
arrangements of vertical coordination and decision rights were observed.  Thus, the fruit 
and vegetable sector provides the appropriate scenario for capturing the driving forces of 
our model. In contrast, concentration of decision rights by agricultural firms dominates in 
the pork industry and poultry industry.  
Secondly, compared with livestock sectors such as poultry, pork and beef, fruits 
and vegetables have received less attention in the prior literature regarding decision rights. 
For example, Goodhue (2000) explains why processors control growers’ inputs in the 
broiler industry, using an agency theory framework. In the setting of farmer heterogeneity, 
processors control inputs to reduce the information rents paid to agents. Reimer (2006) 
develops a property rights model that shows how in certain circumstances production 
contracts do not transfer sufficient control over the use of production assets to 
intermediaries. In sum, our focus on vegetables and fruits is motivated both by practical 
observations and theoretical considerations. 
Once the fruit and vegetable sector is chosen, what we have to decide next is the 
number of cases. A ‘case’ in our research is the contracting relationship between primary 
farmers (upstream growers) and agri-business (downstream processors, including all kinds 
of marketing and/or processing firms). The unit of analysis is the contractual arrangement 
between two parties. We have selected 12 fruit and vegetable contracting relations between 
farmers and agricultural firms from the Shandong province in China. Shandong province is 
located in eastern coastal China, and is chosen because it is well known for vegetable and 
fruit production. Three districts or counties in the Shandong province are chosen: 
Shouguang city, Laiyang city and Dezhou district to increase local variety. Shouguang and 
Laiyang are both famous for vegetable and fruit production, while Dezhou is particularly 
famous for one type of fruit, i.e., Chinese date. Shouguang and Laiyang are more 
developed than Dezhou. In addition, Shouguang is more domestic-oriented while Laiyang 
is more export-oriented. Each case is chosen by considering both variability regarding 
contracting practices and the researchers’ access capability to the case companies. 
4.4.3 Data Collection Methods 
 
Data used in our research are mainly primary data, generated by various labor-intensive 
methods. The major data collection method is face-to-face semi-structured interviews. It is 
useful to acquire written contracts, but written contracts can not be our major data source 
due to two reasons. Firstly, we expect it is difficult to gather commercial contracts because 
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of the confidentiality issue. Secondly, we also consider oral contracts. Thus, interviews are 
the right data extraction method for our purpose, and whenever possible, written contracts 
will be collected and analyzed too to increase data reliability. 
Interviews are based on a carefully designed questionnaire. The questionnaire is 
developed from prior empirical studies and our major concepts. A major part of the 
questionnaire is designed to collect data on decision rights specification and allocation in 
contracts. Interviewees are the persons from agri-businesses who know the details and 
operations of contracts. Because agricultural contracts are mainly take-it-or-leave-it by 
nature and hence agri-businesses play a major role in designing contracts, we focus our 
interview object on agri-businesses. It is interesting to interview and get information from 
farmers too, but it is not feasible to extract data from farmers because of limited time and 
access. 
The procedure of interviewing agricultural firms for contracting details is as 
follows. Firstly, we approach relevant local authorities in the three districts. These 
authorities either directly supervise/regulate the fruit and vegetable industry in their district, 
or are higher-level authorities co-ordinating supervising/regulating government agencies. 
The purpose for approaching these authorities is two-fold. On the one hand, these 
authorities have superior information regarding the relevant industry and the firms and 
farmers operating in the industry. On the other hand, in China, it is usually not feasible to 
approach a firm directly as a researcher to collect primary data. Many firms may reject 
your access simply because they are afraid that the local government may not like them to 
say something. The firms are more willing to cooperate with the researcher when the local 
officials introduce researchers to them and encourage them to cooperate. Secondly, we 
choose specific firms to interview by considering both the research framework and the 
access possibility provided by the local officials. Normally, we can choose from a list of 
firms suggested by the officials. Thirdly, we go to the chosen firms for face-to-face 
interviews. For each interview, it takes about two hours. It is not possible to always 
interview general managers. In some cases, we interview business managers. The 
information is normally written down in the questionnaire. We asked for recording 
interviews for each interviewed firm, however, this was rejected in most cases. Only 4 
interviews are recorded on tape.  
The individual interviews are supplemented by other methods to generate data, 
such as group interviews, on-site observations, factory and field visits, and a content 
analysis of textual materials. The triangulation of methods helps us to improve the validity 
of our data. 
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4.4.4 Major Concepts and Measurements 
 
There are two independent variables in this research, i.e., contract completeness and 
decision rights allocated to firms. The measurement issue of these two independent 
variables and the six explanatory variables are addressed in this section.  
 
Contract completeness 
As we have argued, the more issues are specified and written into a contract, the 
more complete a contract is. Thus, completeness of contracts is measured by the number of 
clauses in a contract. A clause is one distinct legal stipulation/provision in a contract. In a 
written contract, each clause starts with a distinct number such as I1, or 1. We calculate the 
sum of clauses by adding up all clauses.  In case of no written contract, we explain the 
definition of a clause and require the respondent/interviewee to state exactly the number of 
clauses in their oral/informal contracts.  
 
Decision rights allocated to firms 
Decision rights are a set of rights to direct activities or decide how to use assets. 
Across vegetable and fruit supply chains, many activities are involved in order to deliver 
products to final consumers. Figure 4.7 captures the important activities involved in the 
production and marketing process. 22  We distinguish input decision rights, in-process 
decision rights, after-process decision rights, monitoring decision rights and termination 
decision rights and some other decision rights. We add up the number of rights allocated to 
one party (i.e., firms in our analysis) as the index of authority allocated to one party. This 
method has been adopted in several empirical studies (Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez, 
2002; Lerner and Merges, 1998). Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) adopt another method: they 
distinguish two sets of decision rights in the contractual relationship between a portal and 
its partner. For one set of decision rights that could be assigned to either party, a provision 
is coded as +1 if it favours portal, -1 if it favours the partner, and 0 if neutral. For the 
second set of decision rights that mainly limited the activities for the partner, they code +1 
if such limitation rights are present and 0 if absent. Since our research is mainly focused on 
decision rights allocated to a firm, we decide to use the first method. Of course, simply 
adding up the number of decision rights has problems, because it treats each decision right 
                                                 
22 Inputs include seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and productive equipments such as green houses, 
watering equipments etc, and other physical materials. Before growing crops, farmers have to make 
plans: what to grow and how many to grow. Once decided on the type and quantity of crops, farmers 
will prepare site, plant, harvest and deliver the products. In the downstream marketing and 
processing stage, agricultural firms pack (including sorting, sizing, and packing), label, process, 
finally sell the products. Contracts combine two parties together by governing these activities. 
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with the same weight. To partly deal with this problem, we will further look into each sub-
group.  
       
 
Inputs Preparing 
site 
Planting 
Harvest 
 
Deliver
Packing 
Labeling Marketing, 
Retailing  Planning 
Processing
Figure 4.7  Activities/decisions involved in the production and marketing process (adapted 
from Allen and Lueck, 2003, p.184) 
 
Quality 
Quality is measured by the quality standards adopted by firms when procuring 
and marketing products. In China, there are three levels of national quality certification: 
NPF (Non-Pollution Food), GF (Green Food), OF (Organic Food). Vegetables with these 
national certifications are thought to have higher quality than non-certified vegetables. In 
addition, some vegetables are sold under international quality certifications. Some 
international quality certifications may be stricter than some national quality certifications. 
Thus, to measure the quality standards required by a firm, we let the interviewee first list 
the quality standards/certification they have. In case of international certification, they are 
required to compare this quality standard with GF standards. If a firm requires no national 
or international quality certification, the quality standard of vegetables of this firm is 
ranked as low; if a firm requires NPF and GF, its quality standards is ranked as medium; if 
a firm requires GF or international quality certification higher than GF, its quality standard 
is ranked as high. In sum, , three values regarding quality are identified: ‘High’ if a firm 
specifies/requires Organic Food Standards or any international quality standards which 
equals or is stricter than Organic Food, ‘Medium’ if a firm specifies/requires Green Food 
Standard or No Pollution Food Standards, and ‘low’ if the above two cases does not apply.  
 
Reputation  
Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez (2001) measure reputation by the length of the 
relationship between two contract parties. For our purpose, this measurement for 
reputation is not satisfactory, because contract farming is a new phenomenon in China and 
thus contracting experience may not vary enough among different firm-farmer supply 
chains.  We use two kinds of measurements. The first measurement is brand name capital. 
If a firm has invested substantially in its brand and accumulated brand name capital, the 
firm is more likely to develop and sustain reputation. Questions are therefore formulated 
regarding the firm’s branding strategy and expenses. Based on the overall answers, brand 
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name capital is ranked as one of three levels with decreasing order: national-recognized, 
local-recognized, and no-brand. These three levels of brand name capital represent 
high/medium/low reputation correspondingly.  
A second measurement is official honor/award. In China, governments still play 
an important role in coordinating and/or supervising enterprises, although they do not 
intervene in the operations of enterprises any more in most cases. In recent years, rural 
development and agricultural industrialization are a policy focus for both central and local 
governments. The governments have both the incentives and the ability to screen good or 
bad agricultural firms. The well-performing firms are honored or awarded by the 
government to encourage their further development. Such honor/awards normally consider 
the size of a firm, the farmers a firm is dealing with, share of the market, community 
contributions, employment, etc. Thus, the honors awarded to one specific firm can be 
treated as a way to reflect how well the firm establishes its reputation in the local society. 
For example, among many possible official honors or awards, however, honor of ‘dragon-
head agribusiness firm’23 is of particular importance and informative in agricultural sectors 
in indicating a firm’s performance. We distinguish four values regarding the measurement: 
‘national honors/awards’ if a firm receives some honors/awards from the central 
governments, ‘provincial honors/awards’ if a firm receives some honors/awards from 
provincial governments, ‘local’ honors/awards if a firm receives some honors/awards from 
local governments, and ‘no official honors/awards’ if a firm receives no honors/awards 
from any government. These four levels of official honors/awards represent the level of 
reputation in decreasing order. 
 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a complex concept. Behavioral uncertainty is an important focus 
in transaction cost economics and supply chain management (see for example, Kwon and 
Suh, 2004). For our purpose, we mainly focus on uncertainty of the environment. In an 
uncertain environment, firms have difficulties to predict supply and demand and the price 
may fluctuate a lot. We use the difficulty level of predicting the market (price and supply, 
demand) to measure uncertainty. The following question is asked to measure uncertainty, 
“for the vegetable you mainly deal with, is it difficult to predict demand, supply, price? ” 
The interviewee is required to choose among 5 levels: 1 not difficult at all; 2 not very 
difficult; 3 difficult; 4 very difficult; 5 extremely difficult. Uncertainty is scaled from 1 to 
5 in ascending order, i.e., 1 is the lowest level of uncertainty while 5 is the highest level of 
uncertainty. These five scales can be transformed into three levels of uncertainty: 1 and 2 
for ‘low’ uncertainty; 3 for ‘medium’ uncertainty, and 4 and 5 for ‘high’ uncertainty. 
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Firm’s specific investment 
Firm’s specific investment is measured by both specific physical investment and 
human capital investments. We ask 5 questions to measure the overall level of specific 
investment: the first two questions require the interviewee to evaluate the physical 
investment in procuring, processing and marketing products and potential loss in case of 
changing or closing current business. The third and fourth questions ask the interviewee to 
evaluate the training practice to employees on procuring, processing and marketing and 
potential loss in case of changing or closing current business. The fifth question asks the 
interviewee to evaluate the investment on quality control. All answers are scaled from 1 to 
5 in ascending order: 1 refers to no specific investment and 5 the highest level of specific 
investment. By summarizing the five answers, we obtain a measure of the level of firm’s 
specific investment.  
 
Farmers’ specific investment 
Farmers’ specific investment is measured by two aspects: physical specific 
investment and human capital investment. Since we interview the firms instead of farmer 
growers in our research, it is difficult and not feasible to find contracted growers to answer 
the two questions. Alternatively, we ask the interviewees to evaluate farmer’s specific 
investment. Better measurements can be acquired when the interviewees are both familiar 
with farmers’ operations and judge the level of investment fairly. During the interviews, 
we verified that the interviewees are familiar with farmers’ activities.  However, the 
validity of the measurement may be influenced by the interviewee’ arbitrary judgment. It 
implies that we have to be especially cautious when drawing any conclusion by using this 
measurement.    
 
Monopsony-oligopsony power 
The interviewee is required to evaluate the number of potential competitor firms 
which may contract with growers. If within the same period, many competitor firms may 
contract with growers, any individual firm is less powerful when bargaining with farmers. 
Thus, the monopsony-oligopsony power can be measured by potential competitor 
contractors available for growers. The more potential rival firms exist, the less 
monopsony-oligopsony power the firm has. We distinguish three possibilities regarding 
the degree of a firm’s monopsony-oligopsony power. If in a given area, farmers can only 
sign contracts with one firm, then the firm is perceived to have ‘high’ monopsony-
oligopsony power; if farmers can sign contracts with more than one but less than 5 firms, 
                                                                                                                           
23  It is called ‘Long-tou-qi-ye’ in Chinese. 
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then the firm is perceived to have ‘medium’ monopsony-oligopsony power; if farmers can 
sign contracts with more than 5 potential firms, then firms are perceived to have ‘low’ 
monopsony-oligopsony power.  
4.4.5 Validity and Reliability  
 
The quality of case study research can be evaluated by tests of reliability and validity, and 
several tactics can be used to establish or increase reliability and validity. Yin (2003) 
summarizes the four design tests as construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability.  
Construct validity concerns the measurement issue of major concepts, that is, do 
the measurements really approach what it intends to measure (i.e., concepts)? To increase 
the construct validity, we use several tactics. Firstly, we review the high-quality empirical 
studies on a similar topic to see how they measure similar concepts. If their way of 
measuring can be applied to our research, we replicate their approaches. For example, 
measuring decision rights allocated to firms, specific investment by firms/farmers, 
monopsony-oligopsony power, are approached in this way. Secondly, for some measures 
such as the measurement for reputation and quality, we ask both peer researchers and 
professionals/experts to check the accurateness since we develop them by ourselves. 
Thirdly, we pilot-test the semi-structured questionnaire by asking several people: a 
Chinese researcher specialized in agricultural institutions and organizations; a Chinese 
researcher specialized in finance and being quite familiar with rural societies; a senior local 
officer who was once responsible for both industry and agriculture development in a local 
district; two local officers who are currently working in agricultural supervision and 
regulation agencies; a manager in an agricultural firm. The final English version of the 
questionnaire is included in the appendix 4-1, the final Chinese version in the appendix 4-2. 
The fourth tactic to guarantee validity is to use multiple sources of evidence. We use 
individual interviews, group interviews, on-site observations, casual talks with farmers and 
textual materials to generate evidence. In addition to these data collection tactics, we also 
telephoned one key interviewee to generally illustrate our findings in the stage of 
composing reports.  
Internal validity concerns whether a causal relationship is really established from 
cases. Carefully treating data when analyzing them help to increase internal validity. 
Explanation-building and addressing rival explanations are adopted in our research as the 
tactics. 
External validity concerns to what extent the study findings can be generalized. 
Case study methodology is often criticized for its low external validity. However, 
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following replication logic in multiple-case studies helps to increase external validity. In 
addition, this concern requires to treat the findings carefully: when a specific hypothesis is 
rejected, a new direction of testing hypothesis or potential of formulating a new hypothesis 
has to be incorporated; when a specific hypothesis is supported, it is worth pointing out the 
domain of generalization. 
Reliability demonstrates that the operation of a study can be repeated with the 
same results. We develop a case study database to establish reliability. All the 
interviewee’s talks and answers are written down by us as much as possible during the 
interviews. When allowed, we record the whole interview. Both the textual documents and 
tapes are kept for reference. 
4.5 Empirical Findings 
 
This section starts with introducing the general information about the interviewed firms in 
the cases (4.5.1). Next, contractual arrangements regarding price terms, quantity terms and 
decision rights are analyzed (4.5.2). Finally, the hypotheses are tested and empirical 
findings are summarized (4.5.3).  
4.5.1 General Information on Case Firms 
 
We interview eighteen firms for generating information on fruit and vegetable contracting. 
Seven firms deals with Chinese date farmers in the Dezhou district, Shandong province. 
Only two firms provided useful information and therefore are accepted as our object of 
analysis, because the remaining five do not use contracting with farmers when procuring 
Chinese dates.24 Five firms deals with vegetable farmers in Shouguang city. Four firms are 
involved in vegetable contract farming and accepted for further analysis, while one is 
abandoned for further study because the interviewee did not cooperate on several 
important issues (such as details of a contract) during the interview. We interview 4 firms 
involved in vegetable farming in Dezhou district and 2 firms with vegetable contact 
farming in Laiyang city. These six firms are included into the sample. In sum, we have 12 
cases, 10 of which are for vegetable contract farming and 2 for fruit contract farming. 
 
24 When checking the information regarding firms’ characteristics, we find that the size of the firm is 
not necessarily the reason for choosing spot market procurement. For the two firms using contract 
farming, one firm’s fixed capital is 1 million Yuan while the other’s fixed capital is 0.22 billion Yuan. 
For the five firms using spot market procurement, the largest one’s fixed capital is 18 million Yuan, 
the smallest firm’s fixed capital  0.56 million Yuan, and the average 7.58 million Yuan. Since this 
paper is not focusing on the choice between contract faming and spot markets, we will not analyze 
the material further for it. 
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Table 4.1 summarizes the establishment, location, size and profitability of the firms,25 and 
table 4.2 summarizes the involved vegetable or fruit business of each firm.  
 
Table 4.1  General information regarding the 12 cases 
Character
istic 
 
Firms 
 in cases 
Establish
ment 
Location ownership No. of 
fixed 
employee 
Fixed 
capital 
(million 
Yuan) 
2005 
Sales 
(million 
Yuan) 
Gross 
profitab-
ility 
Firm 1 1986* Laiyang Shareholding 21,000  26,020 -- 
Firm 2 1994 Laiyang Private joint 
venture 
1,800  1,200 -- 
Firm 3 1992 Shouguang Shareholding 200  28 -- 
Firm 4 2002 Shouguang Private  180  18 -- 
Firm 5 2001 Shouguang Limited 
liability  
1800 83.1 42.2 20% 
Firm 6 1994 Shouguang Shareholding 50 4  20% 
Firm 7 1994 Dezhou Limited 
liability 
40 3.2 14 22.9% 
Firm 8 2003 Dezhou private 248 6 1,500 20% 
Firm 9 2000 Dezhou private 120 20 27 18.3% 
Firm 10 2000 Dezhou shareholding 42 22 60 9.4% 
Firm 11 1998 Dezhou private 35 1 1.85 20.5% 
Firm 12 1999 Dezhou shareholding 1300 2,200 3,400 -- 
 
Table 4.2  Product information regarding the 12 cases 
Characteristic 
 
Firms 
 in cases 
Percentage of  
vegetable 
business 
Percentage of 
 fruit  
business 
Percentage of 
export in 
vegetable/fruit 
business 
Major vegetable/fruit 
Firm 1 20% in all 
exports 
-- 60% spinach, broccoli, 
capsicum, burdock, green 
soy bean, snow pea 
Firm 2 Main business -- 100% spinach, broccoli, 
capsicum, green soy bean, 
snow pea 
Firm 3 99% -- 100% garlic, carrot, capsicum, 
ginger 
Firm 4 100% -- 0% seasonal vegetables such 
as tomato, cucumber, 
eggplant 
Firm 5 40% -- 100%  
Firm 6 50% -- 0% French shepherd's-purse 
Firm 7 30% -- 0% capsicum 
Firm 8 70% -- 2% Cabbage, capsicum, 
carrot, garlic 
Firm 9 50% -- 100% capsicum 
Firm 10 100% -- 100% Leek, green Chinese 
onion, capsicum 
Firm 11 -- 90% 0% Chinese date 
Firm 12 -- 40% 10% Chinese date 
                                                 
25 The real names and contact details of the interviewed firms and the title of the interviewees are 
listed in appendix 4-3.  
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Firm 1 was formerly established in Laiyang city, Shandong province as a brick 
and tile manufacturing factory in 1975. In 1986, it was re-established and shifted its 
business first to fresh vegetable and fruit, and later to processed vegetable and fruit. In 
1989, it was re-organized by introducing the share-holding institution. In 1993, it 
developed into a large enterprise group which has diversified in agricultural sectors. 
Currently, it has 21,000 permanent employees. In 2005, its sales turnover reached 26,020 
million Yuan. Vegetable business accounts for 20% of its export. It deals with both fresh 
vegetables and processed vegetables such as seasoned vegetables and frozen vegetables. 
Main vegetables are spinach, broccoli, capsicum, burdock, green soy bean, snow pea, etc. 
60% of the vegetables are exported to abroad and 40% are sold in domestic markets. Japan 
is the most important export destination taking 90% of its export, and the EU and USA and 
Singapore consume the remaining 10%.  
Firm 2 was established in 1994 in Laiyan city, Shandong province as a private 
joint venture enterprise. It grows very fast. Currently it has 1,800 permanent employees. In 
2005, its sales turnover reached 1,200 million Yuan. Its main business involves fresh and 
processed vegetables, which sums up to almost 60 different products. All products are sold 
abroad. Similar to firm 1, Japan is its most important client taking 90% of its export while 
the EU and the USA take the remaining 10%.  
Firm 3 was established in 1992 in Shouguang city, Shandong province as a 
shareholding company. Currently it has 200 permanent employees. In 2005, its sales 
turnover reached 28 million Yuan. Vegetable business accounts for 99% of its businesses. 
Main vegetables are garlic, carrot, capsicum, ginger. All products are sold abroad, and 
Japan is also its most important export destination.  
Firm 4 was established in Shouguang city, Shandong province in 2002 as a 
private company. Currently, it has 180 permanent employees. In 2005, its sales turnover 
was 18 million Yuan. Its main business involves only fresh vegetables, and all products are 
sold in domestic markets. Main vegetables are seasonal vegetables such as tomato, 
cucumber, eggplant, etc. Up to 2005, it has obtained Green Food certificates for 13 kinds 
of vegetables. 
Firm 5 was established in Shouguang city, Shandong province in 2001 as a 
limited liability company. Currently it has 1800 permanent employees, and its fixed capital 
is 83.1 million Yuan.  In 2005, its sales turnover reached 42 million Yuan. Vegetables 
account for 40% of its business. All vegetables are sold abroad. Main vegetables are 
cauliflowers, sword beans, okras.  
Firm 6 was established in Shouguang city, Shandong province in 1994 as a 
share-holding company. Currently it has 50 permanent employees, and its fixed capital is 4 
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million. Vegetable accounts for 50% of its business. All vegetables are sold in domestic 
markets. The main vegetable is French shepherd’s purse.  
Firm 7 was established in Dezhou district, Shandong province in 1994 as a 
limited liability company. Currently it has 40 permanent employees, and its fixed capital is 
3.2 million. In 2005, its sales turnover reached 14 million Yuan. Vegetable accounts for 
30% of its business. All vegetables are sold in domestic markets. The main vegetable is 
capsicums. 
Firm 8 was established in Dezhou district, Shandong province in 2003 as a 
company. Currently it has 248 permanent employees, and its fixed capital is 6 million. In 
2005, its sales turnover reached 1500 million Yuan. Vegetable accounts for 70% of its 
business. Most vegetables are sold abroad. The main vegetables are cabbage, capsicums, 
carrot, and garlic. 
Firm 9 was established in Dezhou district, Shandong province in 2000 as a 
private company. Currently it has 120 permanent employees, and its fixed capital is 20 
million. In 2005, its sales turnover reached 27 million Yuan. Vegetable accounts for 50% 
of its business. All vegetables are sold abroad. The main vegetable is capsicums. 
Firm 10 was established in Dezhou district, Shandong province in 2000 as a 
shareholding company. Currently it has 42 permanent employees, and its fixed capital is 
22 million. In 2005, its sales turnover reached 60 million Yuan. Vegetables account for 
100% of its business. All vegetables are sold abroad. Main vegetables are leeks, green 
Chinese onions, capsicums. 
Firm 11 was established in Dezhou district, Shandong province in 1998 as a 
private company. Currently it has 35 permanent employees, and its fixed capital is 1 
million. In 2005, its sales turnover reached 1.85 million Yuan. Chinese date accounts for 
90% of its business, and is all sold in domestic markets.  
Firm 12 was established in Dezhou district, Shandong province in 1999 as a 
shareholding company. Currently it has 1300 permanent employees, and its fixed capital is 
2200 million. In 2005, its sales turnover reached 3400 million Yuan. Chinese date accounts 
for 40% of its business, and is mainly sold in domestic markets.  
In short, firm 1 to 10 are involved in vegetable contracting, while firm 11 and 
firm 12 are in fruit contracting. None of the firms are state-owned firms. Firm 1 is the 
oldest firm and established in 1986.  Firm 8 is the youngest firm and established in 2003. 
The size of the firms varies a lot, measured in terms of permanent employees, fixed capital 
or sales turnovers. Regarding diversification/specialization, firms 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 mainly 
deal with vegetables and firm 11 mainly deals with Chinese date, while the remaining 
firms 1, 6, 7, 11 also deal with other products. Regarding marketing channels, firms 2, 3, 5, 
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9 and 10 export all vegetables to foreign markets, and firm 1 targets both foreign and 
domestic markets, while the remaining firms mainly or wholly target domestic markets. 
4.5.2 Contractual Arrangements 
 
This section illustrates contract arrangements in terms of price specifications, quantity 
specifications and decision rights allocation.  
4.5.2.1. Price term 
 
Price terms vary across different contractual relations. In case 1 and 2, the price is 
determined by the firm by calculating the costs of planting vegetables in contracted land 
and transporting vegetables to the delivery sites. In case 3 and 4, both contracts specify the 
pricing as the spot market price at delivery. In practice, case 3 usually adds a premium (e.g. 
0.05 Yuan in 2005) to current unit cash price for the contracted vegetable. Case 4 usually 
adopts the higher price among various spot market prices at delivery date. In case 7, the 
contract specifies a fixed price without bonus. In the remaining cases (i.e., case 5, 6, 8, 9, 
10, 11 and12), the price clauses in the contracts are contingent: it first specifies a minimum 
price; then it stipulates that the firm will pay the minimum price when the spot market 
price at delivery is lower and will pay the spot market price otherwise.    
In none of the cases, the price paid to farmers is obviously based on the price of 
final products sold at the downstream stage. However, in one case, farmer growers do 
share the benefits of downstream marketing by gaining returns from the firm. In Case 4, 
clause II.5 of the contract reads, “…… every shed delivers 2,500 kilogram; when the 
current season’s cooperation ends, the firm will allocate returns to growers according to 
the actual delivery minus 500 kilogram, and no returns are allocated to growers in case of 
less than 500 kilogram delivery. If the delivery is purchased at the unit price of above 1 
Yuan per half kilogram, 0.2 Yuan will be paid to the grower for each delivered half 
kilogram; if the delivery is purchased at the unit price of below 1 Yuan per half kilogram, 
0.1 Yuan will be paid to the grower for each delivered half kilogram. No returns are 
allocated for the delivery above 2,500 kilogram. ” This contractual arrangement guarantees 
the expected delivery in two ways. First, the higher quality of the delivery is, the more 
returns the grower will receive.  Thus, the contracted quality is more likely to be reached. 
Secondly, no returns are allocated to growers when the delivery is either too low (less than 
500 kilogram per shed) or too high (more than 2,500 kilogram per shed), thus the 
contracted quantity is more likely to be reached.  
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4.5.2.2. Quantity terms 
 
Sykuta and Parcell (2002) examine the quantity terms of identity-preserved soybean 
production contracts. They find all sample contracts are denominated in acres, although the 
price premiums are paid on the number of bushels of GMO-free soybeans delivered.  They 
call these contracts acreage contracts. 
In our study, four cases (i.e., case 1, 2, 5, 8) are dominated in acreage, while 6 
cases (i.e., case 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12) are dominated in kilograms. The remaining two cases, 
i.e., case 6 and 7, do not specify the quantity in contracts. In Case 6, the firm has the rights 
to require the exact quantity of one contracted farmer delivery, while in case 7, the farmers 
make decisions by themselves. 
According to Sykuta and Parcel, acreage contracts shift some of the production 
volume risk to the buyer (2002, p.341). Buyers deal with this in two ways. Firstly, 
compared with the buyers specifying kilogram requirement, the two buyers with acreage 
are much bigger in size. It reflects the larger processing and marketing capability, which 
may increase firms’ flexibility for dealing with temporal surplus or deficiency. Secondly, 
both firms adopting acreage contracts closely supervise/monitor growers’ production 
volume.  In the contract from case 2, it reads (clause II6) “when the party B finishes 
planting seeds, the grower must inform the party A, and party B must cooperate with party 
A to measure the actual seeding acreage, which will be adopted as the basis for delivery 
quantity”. 26  By providing seeds before seeding and measuring seeding acreage after 
seeding, the firm has a clear idea on potential delivery quantity and thus abnormal surplus 
or shortage of delivery will not happen.  
The price and quantity terms in the contracts in the twelve cases are summarized 
in table 4.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 The incentive for party B (i.e., vegetable growers) informing party A (i.e., the firm) is that the final 
delivery quantity is calculated based on the seeding acreages. In addition, it is easy for the firm to 
find out the exact seeding acreage, because the firm will send employees to monitor growers’ 
planting activities very often. According to our interviews, growers are willing to cooperate on 
reporting and measuring seeding acreage, since it is one of the first steps establishing trust between 
two parties.  
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Table 4.3  Price and quantity terms in contracts 
Basic Clauses 
Contract 
Price Term Quantity Term 
Case 1 Planting-transporting-cost 
based 
Acreage 
Case 2 Planting-transporting-cost 
based  
Acreage 
Case 3 Spot market price at delivery Kilogram 
Case 4 Spot market price at delivery Kilogram 
Case 5 Minimum protection price Acreage 
Case 6 Minimum protection price Not specified 
Case 7 Minimum protection price Not specified 
Case 8 Minimum protection price Acreage 
Case 9 Minimum protection price Kilogram 
Case 10 Minimum protection price Kilogram 
Case 11 Minimum protection price Kilogram 
Case 12 Minimum protection price Kilogram 
 
4.5.2.3. Decision rights 
 
The decision rights are listed in table 4.4. We will look into several sub-groups of decision 
rights. Firstly, the 12 cases show some decision rights variations regarding input. For the 
four potential input control activities, major firms have allocated two or three: 6 firms have 
the rights to control seed, fertilizer and pesticide, and 1 firm controls fertilizer and 
pesticide. Firm 8 and 11 allocates only one decision right, while firms 7 and 9 do not 
control inputs. No firm has decision rights regarding planting, irrigation and cropping 
facilities to be used by growers. One reason for major firms controlling fertilizer and 
pesticide may be related with the specific industry in this study, i.e., vegetable and fruit 
industry. The quality (e.g. safety attribute) of vegetables is highly dependent on what 
fertilizer/pesticide to use and how to use them. The manager in firm 1 tells us, “when and 
how to use pesticide is very important to control quality. We send technicians to inspect 
the fields two times a week. It is required that our quality guarantee staffs must be on-site 
when growers spread pesticide. Our quality guarantee staffs will supervise what pesticides 
to use and the compounding of pesticides. The use of pesticides before harvesting is 
especially important for us. We call the ten days from pesticide spreading to harvesting 
‘Pesticide Security Management Period’. During these ten days, the fields will be 
supervised 24-hour around.’’ 
 
116                                                                    Chapter 4  
                                                                               
 
Table 4.4  Decision rights allocated to agricultural firms 
Case 
Decision rights 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Price of delivery × ×     ×      
Quantity of delivery       ×      
Quality specification × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Input control 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 0 0 3 1 3 
 Specified/provided seeds × × × × × × ×  × 
Specified/provided 
fertilizer 
× × × × × × ×  × 
Specified/provided 
pesticide 
× × × × × × × × × 
Specified/provided   
planting, irrigation, 
cropping equipments 
    
In-process control 5 5 2 1 5 3 1 0 1 5 1 5 
Planting plan × ×    
Plowing  × × × × ×   
Seeding   × × ×   
Cultivating  × × × × ×   × 
Use of fertilizer × ×  × 
Use of pesticide × × × × × 
Harvesting × × × × ×   × 
After-process control 5 5 6 4 6 5 4 5 3 4 4 3 
Packing before delivery × × × ×    
Storing before delivery  × × × ×    
Delivery time/place × × × × × × × ×    
Quality measuring × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Sorting, sizing, grading, 
packing for weighing and 
labeling 
× × × × × × × × × × × × 
labeling × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Monitoring rights 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Fulfillment of delivery × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Direct inspection of 
growers 
× × × × × × × × × × × × 
Grower’ duty to provide 
field records 
× ×    
Termination rights × ×  ×   ×  ×    
Decision Rights by firms: 
Total 19 19 14 11 17 14 10 11 8 20 9 14 
 
Secondly, the 12 cases demonstrate variation regarding in-process decision rights. 
For the 7 potential control activities, five firms allocate 5 decision rights, and 1 firm 
allocates 3. 5 firms have only one or two decision rights, while for 1 firm (i.e. case 7) no 
decision rights are allocated at all. It is worth mentioning the decision rights regarding 
cultivating and harvesting here. In the majority of the cases, cultivating and/or harvesting 
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is controlled by firms somehow. Growers are required to grow according to the firms’ 
technical guidance and the field management requirement or guidebooks. Growers are still 
taking care of the daily cultivating operations, however, these operations must be aligned 
with the firm’s requirements. Most firms send their technicians to supervise and guide the 
growing activities.  
Thirdly, the 12 cases have many similarities in allocating after-process decision 
rights. For the 6 potential control activities, 12 firms are allocated more than 3 decision 
rights. All 12 firms have rights to measure quality, to sort, size and grade, and to label. In 
all 12 cases except two (i.e., cases 9 and 12) delivery time and/or place is decided by firms. 
Three points should be mentioned here. Firstly, three firms (cases 1, 2 and 4) clearly state 
that they make calls to growers when they need products, the products are delivered 
immediately after harvesting. Several firms claim that they have rights to decide delivery 
time and place, although the way of informing growers are not told. Secondly, firms have 
rights to tell a farmer how to store before delivery. For example, firm 3 is mainly 
processing and exporting processed garlic, which is less perishable than fresh vegetables 
such as spinach. It may be the reason why growers store the harvest for some time before 
delivery. Thirdly, no growers have rights to measure the quality of their delivery. This 
right is allocated completely to firms. In all 12 cases, no third-party is involved.  
Fourthly, regarding monitoring rights, the fulfillment of delivery and the rights 
of direct field visits are allocated to firms in all 12 cases, while two firms (cases 1 and 2) 
additionally ask growers to record their field operations.  
Fifthly, regarding termination rights, in five cases firms are allocated the rights 
to terminate contracts by judging if growers breach contractual terms, while in the 
remaining 7 cases clauses specify when to terminate contracts legally. 
Sixthly, regarding quality specification rights, firms have the right to specify the 
exact quality requirement.  
Seventhly, regarding the decisions on price and quantity, in the majority of the 
cases they are ex ante specified in contracts, thus firms or farmers are not allowed to 
decide by themselves. However, in case 7 the firm has rights to decide the quantity, while 
in case 6 the farmers decide how much to deliver. In the cases 1 and 2, the firms have 
rights to decide the price.  
4.5.3 Testing Hypotheses 
 
This section starts with illustrating how the questions and answers in the interviews are 
transferred to the measurement of different variables (section 4.5.3.1), which will be used 
further to test hypotheses. Table 4.5 summarizes the measurements of the eight variables in 
 
118                                                                    Chapter 4  
                                                                               
the twelve cases. Then, the following predicted relations are tested based on the data: the 
relations between quality, contract completeness and decision rights allocated to firms 
(section 4.5.3.2); the relations between reputation, contract completeness and decision 
rights allocated to firms (section 4.5.3.3); the relations between uncertainty, contract 
completeness (section 4.5.3.4); the relations between firm’s specific investment and 
decision rights allocated to firms (section 4.5.3.5); the relations between farmer’s specific 
investment and decision rights allocated to firms (section 4.5.3.6); the relations between 
monopsony-oligopsony power and decision rights allocated to firms (section 4.5.3.7). 
Finally, section 4.5.3.8 summarizes the findings.  
4.5.3.1. The Measurements of the Variables 
 
To test the hypotheses, the (qualitative) answers to the questions regarding each variable 
have to be transformed to comparable measures (see section 4.4.4 for detailed tactics).  
Table 4.5 lists the results.  
 
Table 4.5  Independent variables and dependent variables (to be continued) 
                   Case       
Variable 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Dependent 
Variables 
      
contract 
completeness N.A. 20 clauses N.A. 8 clauses 34 clauses N.A 
decision rights 
allocated to firms 
High 
(19) 
High 
(19) 
Medium 
(14) 
Medium 
(11) 
High 
(17) 
Medium 
(14) 
Independent 
Variables 
      
quality High  High  Medium  Medium High Medium 
reputation        
-brand name 
capital 
National 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
No brand Local 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
      -official 
honor/award 
national  provincial  local  local  provincial No honor/ 
award 
uncertainty Medium Medium Medium Low High Medium 
firm’s specific 
investment High High High Low High Medium 
farmer’s specific 
investment Low Low Low Low Medium Low 
monopsony-
oligopsony power Medium Medium Low High High High 
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Table 4.5 Independent variables and dependent variables (continued) 
                   Case       
Variable 
Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 
Dependent 
Variables 
      
contract 
completeness N.A. 7 clause N.A. 8 clauses Oral N.A 
decision rights 
allocated to firms 
Medium 
 (10) 
Medium 
 (11) 
Medium 
(8) 
High 
(20) 
 Medium 
(9)  
Medium 
(14) 
Independent 
Variables 
      
quality Medium Medium Low High Medium Medium 
reputation        
-brand name 
capital 
Local 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
No brand No brand No brand Local 
recognized 
       -official 
honor/award 
local provincial  local  provincial No honor/ 
award 
provincial 
uncertainty Medium Medium High Medium Low Medium 
firm’s specific 
investment Low Medium Low Medium Low Low 
farmer’s specific 
investment Low Low Low Low Low Low 
monopsony-
oligopsony power Medium High Medium High Medium Medium 
 
It is worth formulating several remarks regarding table 4.5. Firstly, not all cases 
provide the information regarding completeness of a contract, since some firms did not 
show us the real written contracts. Only cases 2, 4, 5, 8 and 10 show the actual clauses to 
us. Case 11 is the only case using an oral contract, which is thought to be less complex and 
complete than written ones. Thus, we can test the hypotheses regarding completeness of 
contracts in 6 cases.  
Secondly, regarding decision rights allocated to firms, we first calculated the 
number of decision rights assigned to a firm (the result is listed in the last row in table 4.4). 
Then, the cardinal number of decision rights allocated to a firm is further transformed to an 
ordinal ratio to facilitate the testing (see row 3 in table 4.5). In each case, the firm’s actual 
decision rights are divided by 23 (i.e., the total number of possible decision rights allocated 
either to firms or to farmers in our research). If the ratio is smaller than 0.34, then the firm 
is perceived as allocating a ‘low’ proportion of all decision rights (i.e., less decision rights 
are allocated to firms); if it is between 0.34 and 0.67, then the firm is perceived as 
allocating a ‘medium’ proportion of all examined decision rights; if it is larger than 0.67, 
then the firm is perceived as being allocated ‘high’ proportion of all decision rights. It is 
obvious that ‘high’-marked firms have more decision rights compared with ‘medium’-
marked firms, and the same with ‘medium’-marked firms and ‘low’-marked firms. 27
                                                 
27 Another way to transforming this cardinal number to ordinal number is to first calculate the 
average value of all ratios. In our case, it is 7.23/12=0.6. Then, the firm with a ratio larger than 0.6 
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Thirdly, regarding firms’ specific investment, quantitative measures from five 
questions are first added up, and then the sum is divided by 5 to obtain the equally 
weighted total measure for this variable. To facilitate testing, this numerical measure is 
further transformed to an ordinal one. If it is smaller than 3, then the firm’s specific 
investment level is perceived to be ‘low’; if it falls between 3 and 4, then the firm’s 
specific investment level is perceived to be ‘medium’; If it is larger than 4, then the firm’s 
specific investment level is perceived to be ‘high’. The same rule applies to farmers’ 
specific investment.  
4.5.3.2. Quality, Contract Completeness and Decision Rights Allocated to Firms 
 
The data shows that four cases require high quality products while seven cases require 
medium quality products. Regarding the high quality cases, case 1 specifies high quality 
standards based on Japanese strict regulation on pesticide residuals, case 2 specifies high 
quality standards based on ISO9002 and HACCP, case 10 is certified with IS09000 and 
HACCP, and case 5 requires strict Organic Food standards. The remaining cases, except 
case 9, specify relatively lower quality standards based on national quality standards Non-
Pollution Food and Green Food. Notice that case 9 is the only one being thought of low-
quality. The interviewee in this case claimed that the firm required the farmers to meet 
Non-pollution Food quality, however, after detailed discussion, we found that this firm’s 
vegetables were not certified as NPF at all, and no detailed quality requirement equivalent 
to NPF was specified in the contracts. Thus, compared with the other cases, the quality 
requirement in case 9 is rather low. 
Before we go further to test hypothesis 1, we illustrate the quality requirements 
with some example cases (i.e., cases 1, 2, 3 and 4). Both case 1 and 2 have a strict quality 
requirement for vegetables. In case 2, the clause I4 of the contract reads, ‘Contractor A 
sets up specific quality standards for all procured vegetables (based on ISO 9002 and 
HACCP)’. In case 1,  the manager interviewed spent nearly 15 minutes to describe the 
importance of the high quality requirement and how the firm tries to guarantee the quality 
by contracting instead of by procuring from the market. In this case, 90% of the vegetables 
are exported to Japan. Japan has strict regulation on pesticide residuals, antibiotics and 
additives of exported fresh and processed vegetables, especially since 2002. To deal with 
Japan’s rising demand for high quality, an office is set up in Japan to acquire the most 
recent information on legal requirements and regulation on food. The firm specifies strict 
 
can be perceived to have more decision rights than the firm with a ratio smaller than 0.6. In this way, 
there are only two values: high or low. We did do this calculation as a way to check the reliability of 
the main-text transforming tactic, and the result shows that the two methods do not differ much.  
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quality requirements when procuring vegetables. To measure and test quality, the firm has 
invested around 20 million Yuan in laboratories. It has bought 2 expensive pesticide 
residual testing machines, and is going to buy a new one, which costs 310,000 Yuan. Case 
3 and Case 4 have a relatively lower quality requirement. In case 3, the firm also exports 
processed vegetables to Japan. It once had the HACCP certification. However, the 
manager told us they only require NPF standard when procuring vegetables. In case 4, the 
firm sells fresh vegetables in domestic markets. NPF and GF are required when procuring 
vegetables from contracted growers.  
In the four high quality cases, i.e., case 1, 2, 5, and 10, the proportion of decision 
rights allocated to firms are marked as ‘high’, which means more decision rights are 
allocated to firms. As the quality standard requirement is decreased to a medium level in 
the cases 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the proportion of decision rights allocated to firms is also 
decreased to ‘medium’ and thus less decision rights are allocated to firms. As the quality 
standard requirement is further decreased to a low level in case 9, the proportion of 
decision rights to firms remains at the ‘medium’ level. However, further compared with 
the exact number of decision rights to firms in all medium-quality cases, the firm in case 9 
has the least decision rights, i.e., 8 (see the last row in table 4).  Therefore, the data shows 
that quality is positively related with the decision rights allocated to firms, thus hypothesis 
7 is supported. 
Since only 6 cases provide the information on the completeness of contracts, we 
could only check these 6 cases. The 6 cases vary in the firm’s quality standards, which 
gives us a nice setting to test hypothesis 1. Quality is high in the cases 2, 5 and 10, while 
quality is medium in the case 4, 8 and 11. In the high-quality cases 2 and 5, the number of 
clauses are rather high, that is 20 and 34 respectively. However, in the third high-quality 
case 10, the number of clauses is fairly small, i.e., 8.28 In the medium-quality cases 4, 8 
and 11, the number of clauses is correspondingly 8, 7 and oral, which implies that the 
contracts are relatively less complete. Thus, as the quality increases from medium level to 
a high level, the clauses of a contract tend to increase and consequentially the 
completeness of a contract is increased. Therefore, the data shows that quality is positively 
influencing the completeness of contracts, and thus the hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 
 
28 We check the reasons why the number of clauses in high-quality case 10 is so small. We found in 
this case, the firm contracts with farmers via a cooperative. Cooperatives, as member-owned and 
member-managed governance structure, have advantage in coordinating its members, thus it is less 
necessary to specify detailed contracts. This may be the reason why the contractual terms are less 
complex compared with other firms.  
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4.5.3.3. Reputation, Contract Completeness and Decision Rights Allocated to Firms 
 
Two kinds of measurements are adopted to measure reputation: brand name capital and 
official honor/award. Firstly, let us look at the first measurement of reputation: brand 
name capital. The 12 cases exhibit large differences. The firm in case 1 has a national 
well-recognized brand. In 2005, the firm spent 1,000,000 Yuan in advertising. The firms in 
cases 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12 have well-recognized local brands, while the firm in the cases 3, 
9, 10 and 11 have no registered brands at all.   
The interviews indicate that firms may not be very interested in establishing 
brands. For example, in case 1, although the advertising fee is large compared with the 
other cases, the fee is quite small compared with its sale volume (i.e., 2.6 billion Yuan).  
The manager told us that the advertisement is mainly for selling vegetable and related 
products in domestic markets. If products are only sold abroad, managing and maintaining 
the relationships with old customers are more important than acquiring recognition in 
foreign markets. In other word, if not for domestic marketing, the firm will not spend too 
much in advertising. This consideration is also reflected in other cases. The general 
director also showed no interest in advertising the firm’s brand in case 2. We were told that 
managers having a good relationship with large foreign customers are vital for the success 
of a firm, not any brand on itself. In case 3, the manager even told us directly his firm will 
not waste the money in registering a brand. Compared with these foreign-market-oriented 
firms, domestic-market-oriented firms hold different views regarding brands and 
advertisement. For example, in case 4 where the firm is mainly active in the domestic 
market, the two interviewees agree that branding is important. The firm spent 6,000 Yuan 
in advertising in 2005.  
It is not clear if brand name capital positively influences the completeness of a 
contract. In the 6 cases providing the completeness information of contracts, 4 cases have 
local brands, while 2 have no registered brands.  For the 4 cases with the locally 
recognized brand names, the number of clauses varies from 7 to 34, with the average of 17. 
For the 2 cases with no brands, case 10 has 8 clauses while case 11 uses an oral contract. 
When brand name capital is increased from a no-brand level to a recognized local brand 
level, the number of clauses in a contact may decrease (see case 8), or may increase (see 
cases 2, 4 and 5). Therefore, we can not say confidently that brand name capital positively 
influences the completeness of a contract.  
We cannot draw a conclusion regarding the brand name capital and decision 
rights allocation either.  In case 1, a national-recognized brand name is associated with a 
high proportion of decision rights allocated to the firm. When brand name capital 
decreases from a national-recognized level to a local-recognized level, the proportion of 
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decision rights allocated to firms either maintain a high level (see cases 2 and 5) or 
decrease to a medium level (see cases 4, 6, 7, 8 and 12). Till now, it seems that there may 
be a positive relationship between the two variables. However, as brand name capital 
further decreases (i.e., no registered brands), the proportion of decision rights allocated to 
firms still maintains a medium level (see cases 3, 9 and 11) or even increase to a high level 
(see case 10). Thus, the data does not show the predicted relationship.  
Secondly, let us check the second measurement of reputation: official 
honor/award. The 12 cases are distinguished by considering four levels regarding official 
honors/awards. One case (i.e., case 1) has several national honors/awards, five cases have 
several provincial honors/awards, and four cases have several local honors/awards, while 
two cases have no official honor/award. In detail, the firm in case 1 is the most well 
recognized, because it is awarded ‘national dragon-head enterprise’ and meanwhile 
acquired several national awards such as ‘500 Leading China Manufacturing Enterprise’, 
‘100 Leading China Food Enterprise’, etc. The firms 2, 5, 8, 10 and 12 acquire several 
honors or awards from provincial governments, such as ‘provincial dragon-head 
enterprise’. The firms 3, 4, 7 and 9 are honored or awarded as ‘local dragon-head 
enterprise’ by local governments. In the cases 6 and 11, the two firms claim they have not 
acquired any honors/awards from local governments.  
The relationship between official honor/award and the completeness of contracts 
is investigated now. In case 11 with no official honor/award, an oral contract is used, 
which represents the least complete contract. In case 4 with local honor/award, the number 
of clauses is 8. Till now, the prediction holds as we expect. However, when we look into 
the remaining 4 cases, which all have provincial honors/awards, the number of clauses 
remains the same (see case 10) or increase in three cases (see case 2 and 5), while it is 
decreased to 7 in one case (see case 8). Since one case offers an opposite relationship, we 
can not confidently draw a conclusion that here is a positive relationship between the two 
variables. Therefore, hypothesis 2 regarding a positive relationship between reputation, 
either measured by brand name capital or measured by official honor/award, and the 
completeness of contracts is not supported by the data. 
The relationship between official honor/award and decision rights allocated to 
firms is investigated now. For the one case with national honors/awards, the proportion of 
decision rights allocated to firms is high. For the four cases with provincial honor/award, it 
is either high (see cases 2, 8 and 10) or medium (see case 12). For the four cases with local 
honors/awards, it is all medium, while for the 2 cases with no honor/award, it is medium. 
Thus, as the firm acquires a higher-ranked government honors/awards, which implies that 
the reputation is more established and recognized at a larger scale than the local 
environment, more decision rights are allocated to firms. Therefore, the data shows that 
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there is a positive relationship between reputation, measured by official honor/award, and 
decision rights allocated to firms. It means that hypothesis 8 regarding a positive 
relationship between reputation, measured by official honor/award, and decision rights 
allocated to firms is supported. 
4.5.3.4. Uncertainty and Contract Completeness 
 
In general, two firms characterize the market by a high level of uncertainty, and eight firms 
think that the market is characterized by a medium level of uncertainty, while two firms 
perceive the uncertainty of the market to be at a low level. For the six cases with the 
information regarding the completeness of contracts, one firm ranks the market as highly 
uncertain, and three firms rank it as medium uncertain, while two firms rank it at a low 
level of uncertainty.  
For the two cases with low uncertainty, case 11 uses an oral contract (i.e., the 
least complete), while case 4 has 8 clauses in its written contract. For the three cases with 
medium uncertainty, the number of clauses is increased to 8 in case 10,  and 20 in case 2, 
while it is decreased to 7 in case 8.  For the case with high uncertainty, the number of 
clauses is increased dramatically to 20. Thus, low uncertainty is associated with a less 
complete contract, while high uncertainty is associated with a more complete contract. 
However, the data regarding medium uncertainty does not show a clear pattern. Therefore, 
we think the hypothesis 3 is partly supported. More data or alternative measurement 
regarding uncertainty may be adopted to test the robustness of this hypothesis in future 
research. 
4.5.3.5. Decision Rights Allocated to Firms and Firm’s Specific Investment  
 
In the twelve cases, firms make specific investments regarding physical investment as well 
as human capital investment. In four cases, the firm perceives its specific investments to be 
at a high level, and three cases classify its specific investment at a medium level, while the 
firm in five cases classifies its specific investment as a low level.   
For the five cases with low firm’s specific investment, the proportion of decision 
rights allocated to firms is all ranked as ‘medium’. As the firm’s specific investment is 
increased from a low level to a medium level, the proportion of decision rights allocated to 
firms remains at a medium level (cases 6 and 8) or increase to a high level (case 10). As 
the firm’s specific investment is further increased from a medium level to a high level, 
three cases shows that the proportion is increased to a high level too, and only one case 
remains at the same medium level. What we learn from the four cases is, therefore, as 
specific investment is increased, the decision rights allocated to firms are increased as well. 
Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and Vegetable Contracts                       125 
 
That is to say, the level of specific investment by firms is positively related with the 
decision rights allocated to firms.  
4.5.3.6. Decision Rights Allocated to Firms and Farmer’s Specific Investment  
 
In eleven cases, the farmer grower is thought to have a low level of specific investment, 
and only one case (case 5) perceives the farmer grower to be at a medium level of specific 
investment. For the cases with low farmer’s specific investment, the proportion of decision 
rights allocated to firms is either high (in three cases) or medium (in seven cases). As the 
farmer’s specific investment is increased to a higher level, the proportion of decision rights 
allocated to firms is increased to a higher level too (see case 5), which is contrary to our 
prediction. Thus, the hypothesis regarding a negative relationship between farmer’s 
specific investment and decision rights allocated to firms is not supported. It means that 
farmer’s specific investment is not the determining factor regarding the allocation of 
decision rights. The reason may be, although farmers made specific investment, this 
investment seems to be too limited to drive farmers in the direction of more decision rights.  
4.5.3.7. Decision Rights Allocated to Firms and Monopsony-Oligopsony Power  
 
In all twelve cases, firms have some monopsony-oligopsony power. This is in accordance 
with the fact that farmer growers are weak in most transactions. In five cases, the firm is 
perceived to have a high level of monopsony-oligopsony power, and in six cases, the firm 
has a medium level of monopsony-oligopsony power, while only in one case (i.e., case 3) 
the firm has a low level of monopsony-oligopsony power.  
It is interesting to point out that the size of a firm is not the reason determining 
the level of monopsony-oligopsony power. For example, firm 4 is rather small in terms of 
permanent employees or in terms of fixed capital investment, however, this firm is 
perceived to have a larger bargaining power. Two reasons may explain high monopsony 
power. One factor is the market in which the firm operates. Take case 4 as example again. 
This firm mainly deals with fresh vegetables in domestic markets. When asked about the 
competitiveness of the market in which the firm operates, we were told that the 
competition is not very intensive. The reason is that they develop a market niche by 
making use of the rapid rise of supermarkets. The firm signs contracts with supermarkets 
to supply them with high-quality fresh vegetables. Since most agricultural firms around 
this firm are less sensitive to the development of supermarkets, it establishes its success in 
marketing to supermarkets. The other factor is the size of growers from whom the firm 
procures vegetables. Larger growers may have more channels to market their products, and 
may attract more firms to do business with them. In contrast, small farmers have fewer 
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alternatives to contract with other firms because they are small in size and may lack a good 
reputation. For example, in case 1 where the largest firm with only medium monopsony-
oligopsony power, the smallest contracted landing scale for one grower is 100 mu. 
However, the small firm in case 4 contracts with more than 200 farmers, and each farmer’s 
contracting land is only around 2 or 3 mu. 
For the case with low monopsony-oligopsony power, the proportion of decision 
rights allocated to firms is ranked as medium. As the monopsony-oligopsony power is 
increased to a medium level, the proportion of decision rights allocated to firms either 
remains at a medium level (in 4 cases) or increases to a high level (in 2  cases). As the 
proportion of decision rights allocated to firms is further increased to a high level, 2 cases 
show a high level of the proportion of decision rights allocated to firms and 2 cases show a 
medium level of the proportion of decision rights allocated to firms. Therefore, the 
hypothesis regarding a positive relationship between firm’ monopsony-oligopsony power 
and allocated decision rights is partly supported.  
4.5.3.8. Summary 
 
We summarize the empirical results in table 4.6. Among the 8 hypotheses, 4 are supported, 
2 are partly supported, while 2 are not supported. Two main findings are as follows. Firstly, 
quality positively influences the completeness of a contract. Secondly, when the firm deals 
with a high quality product, has a well-recognized reputation, and has made substantial 
specific investments, more decision rights will be allocated to the firm when contracts are 
signed.  
Table 4.6  Empirical results 
Hypothesis Dependent Variable Independent variable Predicted sign 
Empirical 
result 
1 Contract completeness  Quality + Supported 
2 Contract completeness Reputation  + Not supported 
3 Contract completeness Uncertainty - Partly supported 
4 Decision rights allocated to firms 
Firm’s specific 
investment + Supported 
5 Decision rights allocated to firms 
Farmer’s specific 
investment  - 
Not 
supported 
6 Decision rights allocated to firms 
monopsony-
oligopsony power + 
Partly 
supported 
7 Decision rights allocated to firms Quality + Supported 
8 Decision rights allocated to firms Reputation + Supported 
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4.6 Conclusion and Future Research 
 
We empirically examine the determinants of the completeness of a contract and 
the allocation of decision rights / decision rights in the context of fruit and vegetable 
contracting. Three main conclusions follow. Firstly, it is shown that the extent of 
completeness of a contract and the allocation pattern of decision rights vary substantially 
across different supply chains in China. This observation is in line with many other studies. 
Secondly, a contract is more complex when the firm designing the contract sells high 
quality products. In addition, market uncertainty may determine the completeness of a 
contract too, while reputation has no effect on the completeness of a contract. Thus, the 
predictions regarding uncertainty (measured by market uncertainty) and contracting value 
(measured by quality and reputation) is partly supported by our empirical findings.  
Thirdly, under contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to 
firms. Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms positively influence the 
number of decision rights allocated to agri-business firms under contract farming, while 
monopsony-oligopsony power and specific investments by farmers have no effect on the 
allocation of decision rights.  
There are several directions for future research. First, this research is limited by 
the size of the sample, which consists of only 12 contract farming networks. Collecting 
more data regarding new cases will help to test the robustness of our findings. Especially, 
regression analysis can be adopted and add additional value to the generalization issue if 
more than 50 cases are selected. Second, this research is focused on the fruit and vegetable 
sector. Other sectors will again help to test the robustness of our findings. 
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Appendix 4-1 Questionnaire (English)  
 
Project Objective： 
This research explores contractual arrangements under contract farming in fruit and 
vegetable sectors in China. This research aims to contribute to the literature regarding 
contracting completeness and decision rights allocation, by examine detailed coordination 
and motivation arrangements between agri-business firms and upstream primary growers. 
 
Targeted object of this interview 
This questionnaire applies to agri-business firms which procure fruits and/or vegetables via 
written contracts or oral contracts. Senior managers are targeted interviewees. Your 
cooperation is very important for our research. Thank you in advance for your cooperation. 
 
Questions to be clarified： 
1) The name, Title of the interviewee and the contact telephone are used for spot tests and 
follow-up data verification. The pricy is guaranteed. 
2) For some questions, the choice items have been designed; for the rest, the interviewee 
has to develop answers by himself. 
3)This questionnaire is suitable for both vegetable contacting and fruit contracting.  
 
Contact Person: 
If you have any questions regarding this questionnaire or you have any suggestion, or you 
wish to receive final reports, please contact Drs. Yamei Hu. The telephone is 
0031(10)4081966, and the email is yhu@rsm.nl 。  
 
 
A Background of the interviewee and the firm 
We would like to know some background information on you and your firm. 
 
1. Name of the firm: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
2. Established time of the firm: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
3. Name and Title of the interviewee: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
4. Contact telephone of the interviewee:_______________________________ 
5. The ownership structure of the firms can be classified as:  
(1) State-owned firms 
(2) collective-owned firms 
(3) 100% owned by senior managers and their relatives 
(4) other types (please specify)＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
6. Permanent employees of the firm: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿  
7. The fixed capital investment of the firm: _____________________________Yuan 
8. Total Sale of the firm in 2005:    ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿Yuan 
9. Gross profit of the firm in 2005: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿Yuan 
10. Net profit before tax of the firm in 2005: ____________________________ Yuan 
11. The proportion of vegetable business in all businesses:    ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿(%) 
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12. Main vegetables the firm deals with (please specify): ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
13. The vegetables are mainly sold to:  
(1) ______% of vegetables is sold in local markets; 
(2) ______% of vegetables is sold with your province; 
(3) ______% of vegetables is sold outside your province; 
(4) ______% of vegetables is sold in foreign markets. 
 
B. Procurement 
We would like to know where do you procure your vegetables and how do you buy your 
products. 
 
14. how many vegetables did your firm processes or sales last year?  
(1) ＿＿＿＿＿＿(in terms of Yuan); or, (2) ＿＿＿＿＿＿ (in terms of kilogram) 
15. Where do your firm buy vegetables? (Please choose the relevant buying channels) 
• farmers__________________________________________ 
• agricultural company_______________________________ 
• farmer cooperatives/ associations/other cooperative 
organizations_____________________________________ 
• firm’s self-owned or self-rented production base_________ 
• Firm’s contracted production base_____________________ 
• Agricultural wholesale markets_______________________ 
• Agricultural wet markets____________________________ 
• distribution center_________________________________ 
• other, please specify_______________________________ 
16. Regarding the vegetables procured by your firm: 
＿% from your firm’s self-owned or self-rented production base (i.e., grown by your firm)  
＿% from Firm’s contracted production base(i.e., procured via contacts by your firm) 
＿% from spot markets 
17. Regarding the vegetables procured by your firm:  
(1) ______ % is used for processing; 
(2) ______% is used for selling fresh vegetables; 
(3) ______% is used for other purposes, please specify_____________ 
18. Does you firm use contracts when procuring vegetables?  
(1) Yes, we use Written contracts;  
(2) Yes, we use Oral contracts; 
(3) No, we do use contracts 
19. Does you firm use contracts when selling vegetables?  
(1) Yes, we use Written contracts;  
(2) Yes, we use Oral contracts; 
(3) No, we do use contracts 
20. Regarding the farmers who provide vegetables to your firms, are there other firms to 
contract with them to grow and/or market vegetables?  
(1) There is no other firms which may contract with farmer for growing (or marketing) 
vegetables; 
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(2) There are no more than five firms which may contract with farmer for growing (or 
marketing) vegetables; 
(3) There are no more than ten firms which may contract with farmer for growing (or 
marketing) vegetables; 
(4) There are more than ten firms which may contract with farmer for growing (or 
marketing) vegetables; 
 
C. Market information 
We would like to know the some properties regarding the market where your firm is in. 
 
21. The extent of competition of your firm’s business can be classified as  
(1) The competition is not intensive at all;  
(2) The competition is to some extent intensive;  
(3) The competition is intensive;  
(4) The competition is very intensive;  
(5) The competition is extremely intensive. 
22. The main competitor firm of your firm is located in 
(1) Local;  
(2) The province where your firm is located;  
(3) Outside of the province where your firm is located;  
(4) Abroad. 
23. Regarding the market where you firm is in, what kind of products the consumers tend 
to search for  
(1) The consumers tend to search for high quality products; 
(2) The consumers tend to search for low price products;  
(3) The consumers tend to search for new products; 
(4) Others, please specify ________________________________ 
24. Regarding the market where you firm is in, how is the supplying condition?  
(1) The product is over-supplying for several years; 
(2) The product is short of supplying for several years; 
(3) The product’s supply is not stable; 
(4) Others, please specify ________________________________ 
 
D. Investment information 
We would like to know the investment on assets by your firm and by your upstream 
suppliers.  
 
25. In the last three years, your firm may have made physical investments in procuring, 
processing and marketing vegetables. Please choose the right level regarding this kind of 
investment:  
(1) No investment at all; 
(2) Very limited investments; 
(3) Some investments;  
(4) Large investments; 
(5) Extremely large investment. 
26. If your firm does not operate the current vegetable business, then the investments made 
in procuring, processing and marketing vegetables by your firm may occur loss. Your firm 
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may continue making use of these physical assets, or may transfer these physical assets to 
other firms. Please evaluate the extent of the loss, after considering all these possibilities:  
(1) No loss at all; 
(2) Very limited loss; 
(3) Some loss;  
(4) Large loss; 
(5) Extremely large loss. 
27. Does your firm train the employees to procure, process, market vegetables?  
(1) No training at all; 
(2) Only few training; 
(3) Sometimes train the employees;  
(4) From time to time train the employees;  
(5) a large number of trainings.  
28. If your firm does not operate the current vegetable business, then the knowledge as 
well as the skills for procuring, processing, and marketing may occur loss. Please evaluate 
the extent of such a loss:  
(1) No loss at all; 
(2) Very limited loss; 
(3) Some loss;  
(4) Large loss; 
(5) Extremely large loss. 
29. Did your firm invested in controlling quality of vegetables in last three years?  
(1) No investment at all; 
(2) Very limited investments; 
(3) Some investments;  
(4) Large investments; 
(5) Extremely large investment. 
30. The investment of your firm in procuring, processing, marketing and quality 
controlling is  about: ___________Yuan 
31. The farmer who provides vegetables for your firm come from:   
＿＿＿＿% from local society； 
＿＿＿＿% from the province where your firm is located； 
＿＿＿＿% from outside of the province where your firm is located.  
32. The farmer may need to make physical investment in order to deliver qualified 
vegetables to your firm. Please evaluate the extent of such an investment by a farmer:  
(1) No investment at all; 
(2) Very limited investments; 
(3) Some investments;  
(4) Large investments; 
(5) Extremely large investment. 
33. The farmer may need to learn new technology or skills in order to deliver qualified 
vegetables to your firm. Please evaluate the extent of such an human capital investment by 
a farmer:  
(1) No investment at all; 
(2) Very limited investments; 
(3) Some investments;  
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(4) Large investments; 
(5) Extremely large investment. 
E Brand 
We would like to know the branding strategies of your firm. 
 
34. Is your firm recognized as Dragon-head Enterprise? 
(1) Yes, our firm is _________ (national-level; provincial-level; district-level; county-level) 
(2) No,  our firm is not a dragon-head enterprise. 
35. In the last three years, your firm may acquire honors and/or awards from governments. 
Please classify:  
How many honors and awards are from local government: ______________ 
How many honors and awards are from provincial government: __________ 
How many honors and awards are from central government: _____________ 
36. Please specify the most important honor/award for your firm: ____________ 
37.  Does your firm have brands?  
(1) Yes, the brand is _________________________________; 
(2) No, we have no brand at this moment. 
38. Has the brand of your firm been already registered?  
(1) Yes, the brand has already been registered; 
(2) No, the brand has not been registered yet. 
39. What kind of honor/award does the brand of your firm get?  
(1) There is no honor/award at this moment;  
(2) Local-level famous (well-known) brand;  
(3) Provincial-level famous (well-known) brand;  
(4) National-level famous (well-known) brand;  
(5) Other, please specify __________________________________________ 
40. The market value of your firm’s brand is about __________________ Yuan.  
41. Your firm has invested _____________ yuan in advertisement for this brand.  
42. Has the vegetable which your firm deals with acquired any national or international 
quality certifications?  
(1) No Pollution Food;  
(2) Green Food; 
(3) Organic Food; 
(4) International quality certification, please specify _________________ 
(5) Others, please specify ______________________________________ 
(4) National-level famous (well-known) brand 
 
F Procure or grow vegetables via contracts 
We would like to know the contractual relationship between agri-business and farmers.  
 
43**. Does your firm procure (or grow) vegetables by contracts? 
(1) Yes, we use contracts; 
(2) No, we do not use contracts.  
  
If the interviewee answers ‘No’ to Question 43, then ask the interviewee Question 44 
and 45. After answering to these two questions, the interview will be closed. Thanks for 
the participation! 
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If the interviewee answers ‘Yes’ to Question 43, then jump Question 44 and 45, and 
directly ask the interviewee Question 46.  
 
44. Has your firm never used contracts to procure vegetables?  
(1) Yes, We has never used contracts to procure vegetables.  
(2) No, We once used contracts to procure vegetables, but will not use contract any 
more for some reasons.   
45. What are the reasons why your firm stopped using contracts?  
(1) Too many farmers used to breach contracts; 
(2) The cost of using contract is too high; 
(3) Our firm grows vegetables by ourselves.  
(4) Others, please specify: _____________________________________ 
 
If your firm is now using contracts to procure or grow vegetables, then please answer 
the following questions. Thanks for your patience! 
 
46. The proportion of the vegetables procured by contracts:＿＿＿＿＿＿＿% 
47. The sales of the vegetables procured by contracts: __________________Yuan 
48. The gross profit of the vegetables procured by contracts: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿Yuan 
49. The net profit of the vegetables procured by contracts: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿Yuan 
50. Regarding the vegetables procured by contracts,  
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿% are grown in the open field;  
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿% are grown in the shed-field. 
Others, please specify: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
51. Does your firm sign contracts directly with farmers or via other organizations/agencies?  
(1) We sign contracts directly with farmers;  
(2) We sign contracts with farmer via farmer cooperatives/ associations.  
(3) We sign contracts with farmer via village commission or town-level government 
agencies;  
(4) Others, please specify _________________________________________ 
52. Since when did your firm begin signing contracts with farmers?＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
53. How many farmers do your firm sign with: ____________________________ 
54. Regarding the farmers who sign contacts with your firm,  
The average scale for the contracted farmers is: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿  
The largest scale for the contracted farmers is:  ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿  
The smallest scale for the contracted farmers is: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿  
 
55. Regarding the contract with the longest duration,  how many years it lasts? ＿＿＿ 
56. Where did your firm get the information on farmers before your firm signed contracts 
with them?  
(1) We do not have any information regarding the farmers before we sign contracts; 
(2) We get the information regarding the farmers from other similar enterprises; 
(3) We get the information regarding the farmers from other farmers; 
(4) We get the information regarding the farmers from business organizations; 
(5) We get the information regarding the farmers from government; 
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(6) We get the information regarding the farmers from our own research; 
(7) We get the information regarding the farmers from families, relatives and friends; 
(8) Others, please specify: ________________________________________ 
57. To what extent does the current legal system provide guarantees for enforcing contracts. 
(1) It does not play any role; 
(2) It plays a very limited role; 
(3) It plays a role; 
(4) It plays a quite important role; 
(5) It plays very important role. 
58. Your firm may need to re-negotiate the contract with farmers after signing the contract. 
Please evaluate to what extent it is necessary to negotiate and adjust contractual terms:   
(1) It is not necessary at all; 
(2) To a very limited extent; 
(3) To some extent; 
(4) To a large extent;  
(5) To a very large extent; 
59. If your firm breaches a contract with a farmer, will other farmers knows about it?  
(1) Yes, other farmer will know it; 
(2) No, other farmers may not know it.  
60. If a farmer breaches a contract with your firm, will other farmers knows about it?  
(1) Yes, other farmer will know it; 
(2) No, other farmers may not know it.  
61. Please evaluate: is it complex for the transaction between your firm and farmers? 
(1)  Not complex at all; 
(2)  Very limited complex; 
(3)  Quite complex; 
(4) Very complex;  
(1) Extremely complex; 
62. Regarding the vegetable procured by contracts, is the growing of this vegetable 
influenced by the national environment such as weather? 
(1) Not at all; 
(2) To a very limited extent; 
(3) To some extent; 
(4) To a large extent;  
(5) To a very large extent. 
63. Regarding the vegetable procured by contracts, the technology for growing this 
vegetable influenced can be classified as 
(1) It does not have any development; 
(2) It develops very slowly; 
(3) It develops slowly; 
(4) It develops fast;  
(1) It develops very fast. 
64. Regarding the vegetable procured by contracts, to what extend does your firm feel 
difficult to predict the market information such as supply, demand and price:  
(1) Not at all; 
(2) To a very limited extent; 
(3) To some extent; 
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(4) To a large extent;  
(5) To a very large extent. 
F Basic terms in contracts 
We would like to know the terms regarding price, quantity and quality in your contracts.  
 
65. Does the contract specify a fixed quantity regarding the vegetable to be delivered?  
(1) Yes, it specifies the quantity in terms of how many mu; 
(2) Yes, it specifies the quantity in terms of how many kilogram;  
(3) No, it does not; however, we have rights to require the farmer to deliver a assigned 
amount of vegetables; 
(4) No, it does not; and, a farmer makes decision on how many to deliver by himself; 
(5) Others, please specify: ____________________________________________ 
66. Does the contract specify how to pay to farmers?  
(1) Yes, it specifies a fixed unit price, regardless high or poor quality of the delivery; 
(2) Yes, it specifies a fixed unit price, plus a quality bonus; 
(3) Yes, it specifies a minimum protection price. If the spot market price is higher than 
this minimum protection price at delivery, the market price will be adopted; otherwise, 
our firm pays to farmers based on the protection price.  
(4) Yes, it specifies that our firm will pay farmers based on the spot market price at 
delivery; and we have rights to decide the actual price later on; 
(5) No, the contract does not say anything on price. 
(6) Others, please specify: _________________________________________  
67. Is the price paid by your firm to farmers is obviously dependent on the final price of 
marketed/sold products?   
(1) Yes; 
(2) No. 
68. Does the contract specify that a part of payments will be paid to farmers before actual 
delivery?  
(1) Yes, it says that a part of payment will be paid before delivery; 
(2) No, it does not specify on it, and we will not pay farmers in advance; 
(3) No, it does not specify on it, but we usually pay a part of payments to farmers; 
69. If your firm pays a part of the payment to farmers in advance, then the proportion of 
the pre-paid to the overall payment is : ________%. 
70. Does the contract specify that farmers have to submit a certain of money as credit when 
signing contracts?  
(1) Yes, it requires farmers to submit __________________ Yuan; 
(2) No, it does not require it; 
(3) Others, please specify: ___________________________ 
71. Does the contract specify that your firm has to submit a certain of money as credit 
when signing contracts?  
(1) Yes, it requires our firm to submit __________________ Yuan; 
(2) No, it does not require it; 
(3) Others, please specify: ___________________________ 
72. Does the contract specify what quality standard the vegetable delivered by a farmer 
should meet?   
(1) Yes, it specifies Non Pollution Food quality standard; 
(2) Yes, it specifies Green Food quality standard; 
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(3) Yes, it specifies Organic Food quality standard; 
(4) Yes, it specifies a quality standard made by our firm; 
(6) No, it does not specify quality standard. 
73. If your firm makes your own quality standard, to which national quality standard does 
it equals?  
(1) Non Pollution Food quality standard; 
(2) Green Food quality standard; 
(3) Organic Food quality standard 
74. How many transactions between your firm and farmers is this contract applied to?  
(1) Only one transaction; 
(2) Several transactions; 
(3) Many transactions.  
75. The duration of the contract is:  
(1) _________ days;    (2) ___________ months; (3) _______ years 
76. If the current contract expires, will the contract automatically update between your firm 
and contracted farmers?  
(1) Usually it automatically updates 
(2) It will not automatically update, and our firm decide if to continue contracting with 
current contracted farmers; 
(3) It will not automatically update, and we need to negotiate with the current contracted 
farmers to continue contracting.  
 
G Restrictive terms in contracts 
We would like to know the clauses regarding quality control, standardization production.  
 
77. Does your firm specify regarding farmers’ inputs? For a specific input, a contract may 
require what input to use, or may not say anything on it and let firms or farmers decide 
later on. Please choose the right option for each input.  
 
   Actual 
situation 
 
 
 
Input 
 (1) 
provided 
by us; 
 (2) The contract 
specify what kind 
of inputs (such as 
brand, type) 
farmers should 
use  
 (3) The contract does 
not specify, but we 
have rights to decide 
on what kind of inputs 
(such as brand, type) 
farmers should use;  
(4) The contract 
does not specify, 
but farmers have 
rights to decide by 
themselves. 
seeds     
fertilizer     
pesticides     
Planting 
equipments 
    
irrigation 
equipments 
    
harvesting 
equipments 
    
 
Other cropping 
equiqments 
(please 
specify) 
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78. Does the contract specify regarding farmers’ production activities? (e.g., planting time, 
methods, etc) 
 
       Actual situation 
 
 
 
planting 
activities 
 (1) we 
provide 
production 
guidance 
booklet 
(2) The contract 
requires farmers to 
grow vegetables 
according to our 
requirements.   
(3) The contract 
does not 
specify, but we 
send technicians 
to guide or help 
farmers   
(4) The contract does 
not specify, and 
farmers made their 
own decisions  
Planting plan     
activities before planting 
(such as ploughing) 
    
planting     
use of pesticide     
use of fertilizer     
harvesting     
 
79. For the following activities, does the contract make any specifications?  
         Actual situation 
 
 
 
 
after-planting  
activities 
(1) The contract 
specifies how to 
do it 
(2) The contract 
does not specify, 
but we have 
rights to require 
farmer to do what 
we would like 
them to do 
(3) The contract 
does not specify, 
and farmers have 
rights to  made 
the decision 
 (4) The contract 
does not specify, 
and  we have rights 
to  made the 
decision 
Packaging before 
delivery by farmers  
    
storing before delivery 
by farmers  
    
delivery time and place     
sorting, grading, 
packaging for weighing 
and labeling 
    
labeling     
storing     
processing     
marketing     
 
80. Regarding the farmer who contracts with your firm, the land where this farmer grows 
vegetables belongs to:  
(1) This farmer; 
(2) Our firm; 
(3) Others, please specify: ______________________________ 
81. Does the contract specify under what condition the contract will be terminated?  
(1) Yes, it clearly specifies the conditions; 
(2) No, it does not specify the conditions; however, we have rights to make decision; 
(3) No, it does not specify the conditions; however, farmers have rights to make decision. 
82. Does the contract specify that your firm has rights to monitor production activities of 
contracted farmers?   
(1) Yes; 
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(2) No, the contract does not specify, but we have rights to monitor farmers’ 
production activities; 
(3) No, the contract does not specify, and we do not have rights to monitor farmers’ 
production activities.  
83. Does your firm often monitor contracted farmers’ production?  
(1) Never; 
(2) Seldom; 
(3) A few times; 
(4) Many times; 
(5) Very often. 
84. Does the contract specify regarding how to control quality?  
(1) Yes; 
(2) No. 
 
I Effect of contracts 
We would like to know your evaluation on the quality and quantity of vegetables provided 
via contracts.  
 
85. Regarding the vegetable procured by contracts, the actual quality of the vegetable 
provided by the contracted farmers is reliable. Do you agree on it?  
(1) Strongly disagree; 
(2) To some extent disagree; 
(3) Basically agree; 
(4) To large extent agree; 
(5) Strongly agree. 
86. Regarding the vegetable procured by contracts, the actual quality of the vegetable 
provided by the contracted farmers is steady and consistent. Do you agree on it?  
(1) Strongly disagree; 
(2) To some extent disagree; 
(3) Basically agree; 
(4) To large extent agree; 
(5) Strongly agree. 
87. Regarding the vegetable procured by contracts, the actual quantity of the vegetable 
provided by the contracted farmers meets the expected level when signing contracts. Do 
you agree on it? 
(1) Strongly disagree; 
(2) To some extent disagree; 
(3) Basically agree; 
(4) To large extent agree; 
(5) Strongly agree. 
88. If a farmer fails to deliver the vegetable, i.e., his vegetables can not meet the 
requirement specified by contracts in terms of quality or quantity, how will your firm deal 
with this problem?  
(1) We will never sign contracts with this farmer again; 
(2) We will make decision after finding out the reason for breaching contracts by this 
farmer; 
(3) Other, please specify: ________________________________________ 
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The is the end of the interview. Thank you very much for the information. If you 
could show us a copy of actual contracts or a blank contract sample, it will be 
especially helpful for our research. Thank again for your cooperation!
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Appendix 4-2 Questionnaire (Chinese) 
 
 关于农业合同的问卷调查 
问卷设计人：  胡雅梅博士(中国) Hendrikse 教授(荷兰) 
 
 
研究目的： 
本研究项目考察中国农业定单生产和销售的合同设计及治理结构问题。该研究的理论目的是对契约完整性研究
做出贡献，实际目的是对协调农业企业与上游初级产品生产者之间的关系、探索农业一体化的多种方式做出贡
献。 
问卷调查的对象： 
本问卷适用于采用书面合同或者口头合同方式从事蔬菜或者瓜果生产、销售、加工、贸易的农业企业(含各类农
民合作组织)。中高级经理人是适当的答卷人。您的合作对于我们的研究非常重要，衷心感谢您的合作! 
需要澄清的问题： 
1) 答卷人姓名、职务与联系电话用于后期抽查、核实、补充部分数据。 
2) 多数问题已经给出备选答案，您只需要选出正确的选项；少数问题没有给出备选答案，此时需要您写下自己
的答案。 
3) 该问卷既适用于蔬菜合同、也适用于水果合同。如果您的企业主要经营水果，但是收到的问卷却只提到“蔬
菜”、未提及“水果”，请把题干中所有的“蔬菜”用“水果”替代即可。 
联系人及联系方式： 
如果您对问卷中的问题或者问卷本身有问题或者建议，如果您想了解最终的研究报告，欢迎联系胡雅梅博士，
0031 (10) 4081966 ，yhu@rsm.nl 。  
 
 
 
一、答卷公司及答卷人的背景（本部分了解贵公司及您的一些背景信息） 
 
1．公司名称：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
2．公司建立时间：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
3．答卷人姓名及职务：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
4．答卷人联系电话：______________________________________________ 
5．公司的所有权结构属于： 
− 国有企业 
− 集体企业 
− 100%由高级管理人员及其亲属所有的私营企业 
− 其他类型私营企业（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
6．公司固定员工的人数：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿人  
7．公司固定资产投资的规模：____________________________________元 
8． 2005 年公司的总销售额：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元 
9． 2005 年公司的毛利润：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元 
10．2005 年公司的税前净利润：_________________________________元 
11．蔬菜业务占贵公司总业务量的比例（%）：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
12．贵公司主要经营的蔬菜品种（请说明）： 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
13．贵公司的蔬菜主要销售地区： 
（1）蔬菜总量的＿＿＿%在本地销售（2）蔬菜总量的＿＿＿%在本省销售； 
（3）蔬菜总量的＿＿＿%销往外省；（4）蔬菜总量的＿＿＿%销往国外； 
 
二、蔬菜的采购（本部分了解贵公司的蔬菜采购渠道及方式） 
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14．去年贵公司销售或者加工了多少蔬菜？ 
(1)＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿（按人民币计算）；  (2)＿＿＿＿＿＿   （按重量计算） 
15．贵公司在哪里购买蔬菜？（请选出所有正确的选项） 
（1）农民 
（2）农业公司 
（3）农民合作社、农民协会及其他合作组织 
（4）贵公司的自主生产基地 
（5）贵公司的合同生产基地 
（6）农产品批发市场 
（7）零售农贸市场 
（8）配送中心 
（9）其他渠道（请说明是何种渠道）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
16．贵公司所采购的蔬菜， 
＿＿＿＿%来自于公司的自主基地（即：公司自己生产的蔬菜） 
＿＿＿＿%来自于公司的合同基地（即公司通过合同购买的蔬菜） 
＿＿＿＿%来自于市场 
17．贵公司所采购的蔬菜： 
（1）＿＿%用于加工； 
（2）＿＿%用于销售新鲜蔬菜； 
（3）＿＿%用于其他用途（请说明是何种用途）：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
18．贵公司采购蔬菜时是否使用合同？ 
（1）是的，我们采用书面合同； 
（2）是的，我们采用口头合同； 
（3）不是，我们不使用合同生产或者收购这种方式。 
19．贵公司销售蔬菜时是否使用合同？ 
（1）是的，我们采用书面合同； 
（2）是的，我们采用口头合同； 
（3）不是，我们不使用合同这种方式。 
20．就为贵公司提供蔬菜的农民而言，其他企业可能与他们进行定单生产或销售吗？ 
（1）没有一家其他企业可能与农民进行定单生产（或者销售）； 
（2）可能与农民进行定单生产（或者销售）的其他企业不多于 5 个； 
（3）可能与农民进行定单生产（或者销售）的其他企业不多于 10 个； 
（4）可能与农民进行定单生产（或者销售）的其他企业多于 10 个。 
 
三、市场情况(本部分了解企业的市场情况) 
 
21．贵公司所经营业务的竞争程度属于： 
（1）竞争一点都不激烈； 
（2）竞争不怎么激烈； 
（3）竞争激烈； 
（4）竞争很激烈； 
（5）竞争非常激烈。 
22．贵公司最主要的竞争对手位于： 
（1）当地；         （2）本省；        （3）省外；         （4）国外 
23、在贵公司所处的市场中，消费者喜欢什么样的产品？ 
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（1）消费者倾向于寻找高质量产品； 
（2）消费者倾向于寻找低价格产品； 
（3）消费者倾向于不断寻找新产品； 
（4）其他(请说明)_______________________ 
24．在贵公司所处的市场中，产品的供给情况稳定吗？ 
（1）产品的供给连续多年过剩； 
（2）产品的供给连续多年不足； 
（3）产品的供给不稳定； 
（4）其他(请说明)_______________________ 
 
四、投资情况（本部分了解贵公司及上游供应商的资产投资） 
 
25．在过去三年中贵公司可能在采购、加工、销售蔬菜上进行了投资，请选出正确的投资数
量： 
（1）没有任何投资 
（2）少量投资 
（3）较多投资 
（4）大量投资 
（5）巨额投资 
26．如果公司不再经营现有的蔬菜业务，那么公司对采购、加工、销售蔬菜所进行的投资可
能遭到损失。公司可能继续使用这些投资，也可能转让给其他企业。在考虑到这些情况之
后，请说说贵公司的损失： 
（1）完全没损失 
（2）基本没损失 
（3）一些损失 
（4）损失很大 
（5）巨大损失 
27．为采购、加工和销售蔬菜，贵公司是否培训员工？ 
（1）没有培训 
（2）偶尔进行培训 
（3）有时进行培训 
（4）定期培训 
（5）非常多的培训 
28．如果公司不再经营现有的蔬菜业务，那么公司对于采购、加工和销售的知识及技能会受
到损失。请评价这种损失的大小： 
（1）完全没损失  
（2）基本没损失       
（3）一些损失 
（4）损失很大            
（5）巨大损失 
29．贵公司在过去三年中对控制蔬菜的质量进行过投资吗？ 
（1）没有任何投资 
（2）少量投资 
（3）较多投资 
（4）大量投资 
（5）巨额投资 
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30．贵公司对蔬菜采购、加工、销售、质量控制的投资为___________（元） 
31．为贵公司提供蔬菜的农民来自于： 
＿＿＿＿%来自于本县和本地区； 
＿＿＿＿%来自于本省； 
＿＿＿＿%来自于外省。 
32．为向贵公司提交质量合格的蔬菜，农民可能需要进行投资。相对于农民的承担能力而
言，您估计一下农民的这种投资的数量： 
（1）没有任何投资 
（2）少量投资 
（3）较多投资 
（4）大量投资 
（5）巨额投资 
33．为向贵公司提交质量合格的蔬菜，农民需要学习新的技能或者技术。请说说这种人力投
资的大小： 
（1）没有任何投资  
（2）少量投资               
（3）较多投资 
（4）大量投资                         
（5）巨额投资 
 
五、品牌(本部分了解企业的品牌策略) 
 
34．贵公司是否是龙头企业？ 
（1）是，我们公司是_______（国家级、省级、地区级、县(市)级）龙头企业 
（2）不是。 
35．在近三年中，在政府给予贵公司的荣誉和奖励中，各级政府的荣誉和奖励分别是： 
＿＿＿项荣誉和奖励来自于当地政府； 
＿＿＿项荣誉和奖励来自于省政府； 
＿＿＿项荣誉和奖励来自于中央政府。 
36．请说说对贵公司来说最重要的荣誉和奖励是什么？__________________ 
37．贵公司有自己的商标(牌子)吗？ 
（1）是的，该商标的名字是＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
（2）现在还没有自己的商标。 
38．贵公司的商标(牌子)经过注册了吗？ 
（1）是的，我们已经注册过；            
（2）不是的，我们现在还没有注册。 
39．贵公司的商标或者牌子得过什么样的荣誉？ 
（1）现有还没有什么荣誉； 
（2）当地著名(驰名)商标； 
（3）省级著名(驰名)商标； 
（4）国家级著名(驰名)商标 
（5）其他 (请举例)_____________________________________________ 
40．该商标的市场价值大约是＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元。 
41．贵公司已经为这一品牌投入的广告费用大约是＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元。 
42．贵公司所经营的蔬菜产品获得国家或者国际的质量认证了吗？ 
（1）无公害食品； 
 
144                                                                    Chapter 4  
                                                                               
（2）绿色食品； 
（3）有机食品； 
（4）国际质量论证（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
（5）其他（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
 
六、通过合同生产或者销售蔬菜(本部分了解企业与上游农民之间的合同关系) 
 
43**．贵公司采购(或者生产)蔬菜时是否使用合同？ 
 （1）是的，我们使用合同 
（2）不是，我们不使用合同 
 
如果答卷人对问题 43 回答“不是”，那么请接着回答问题 44 和 45。 回答完问题 44 和 45 之
后，您已经完成与我们的合作。谢谢您的参与！ 
如果访谈人对问题 43 回答“是的”，那么请跳过问题 44 和 45，直接回答问题 46。   
 
44．贵公司是否从未通过合同方式采购蔬菜？ 
（1）是的，我们从未通过合同采购蔬菜； 
（2）不是，我们曾经使用过合同，但是因为某些原因不再使用合同。 
45．使贵公司停止使用合同的原因是什么？ 
（1）违约的农民太多； 
（2）使用合同的成本太高； 
（3）我们公司自己生产蔬菜； 
（4）其他，(请举例)______________________________________________ 
 
如果贵公司正在使用合同生产或销售蔬菜，那么请继续回答以下问题。感谢您的耐心！ 
 
46．贵公司通过合同采购的蔬菜占总采购量的比例是：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿% 
47．通过合同采购的蔬菜的销售额是_____________________________元 
48．通过合同采购的蔬菜的毛利润大约是＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元 
49．通过合同采购的蔬菜的净利润大约是＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元 
50．在通过合同收购的蔬菜中， 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿%属于大田菜， 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿%属于大棚菜， 
其他（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
51．贵公司是直接与农民订合同还是通过其他中介组织或者公司？ 
  （1）直接与农民订合同； 
  （2）与农民合作社、农民协会等合作组织订合同； 
  （3）与村委或者镇政府机构订合同； 
（4）其他（请举例）____________________________________________ 
52．公司从哪年开始与农民定合同？＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿年 
53．现在与贵公司订合同的农民总数是多少？____________________户 
54．就与贵公司订合同的农民而言， 
农民种植的平均规模是＿＿＿＿＿＿亩 
农民种植的最大规模是＿＿＿＿＿＿亩 
农民种植的最小规模是＿＿＿＿＿＿亩 
55．贵公司与农民之间最长的合同关系已经有几年了？＿＿＿＿＿＿年 
Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and Vegetable Contracts                       145 
 
56．贵公司在与农民定合同之前，是从哪里得到这些农民的信息？ 
（1） 在定合同之前我们没有任何关于这些农民的信息； 
（2）从其他类似企业那里得到这些农民的信息； 
（3）从其他农民那里得到这些农民的信息； 
（4）从商业组织那里得到这些农民的信息； 
（5）从政府那里得到这些农民的信息； 
（6）自己的研究； 
（7）家族成员或者朋友； 
（8）其他，(请举例)______________________________________________ 
57．现有的法律体系可以为实施合同提供的保障程度是： 
（1）没有任何实际作用  （2）没什么实际作用 （3）有一些实际作用 
（4）实际作用很大    （5）实际作用非常大 
58．订合同之后，公司与农户可能需要就合同的实施进行再协商。请您估计一下订合同之后
协商和调整条款内容的可能性： 
（1）根本不用进行再调整和再协商； 
（2）不太需要再调整和再协商； 
（3）可能会再调整和再协商； 
（4）再调整和再协商的可能性很大； 
（5）再调整和再协商的可能性非常大。 
59．如果公司对一个农户违约，其他农户会知道这件事吗？ 
（1）是的，其他农户会知道的 
（2）不是，其他农户不一定知道 
60．如果一个农户对公司违约，其他农户会很快知道这件事吗？ 
（1）是的，其他农户会知道的 
（2）不是，其他农户不一定知道 
61．请您评估一下：公司与农民之间的蔬菜交易复杂吗？ 
（1）根本不复杂 
（2）不复杂 
（3）有些复杂 
（4）很复杂 
（5）非常复杂 
62．就通过合同收购的蔬菜而言，这种蔬菜的种植会受到天气等自然环境影响吗？ 
（1）完全不受影响  
（2）影响很小      
（3）有影响 
（4）影响很大       
（5）影响非常大  
63．就通过合同收购的蔬菜而言，这种蔬菜的种植技术属于： 
（1）技术根本没有任何发展  
（2）技术发展很慢 
（3）有一些技术发展 
（4）技术发展很快      
（5）技术发展非常快 
64．就通过合同收购的蔬菜而言，贵公司预测市场上的供给、需求、价格等的困难程度属
于： 
（1）一点都不困难     
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（2）不怎么困难     
（3）有些困难 
（4）困难很大       
（5）困难非常大 
 
七、合同的基本条款（本部分了解合同中的价格、数量、质量条款） 
 
65．合同规定了农民应当提交某一固定数量的蔬菜吗？ 
（1）是的，合同规定农民应当提交多少亩蔬菜 
（2）是的，合同规定农民应当提交多少公斤蔬菜 
（3）不是，合同没有规定具体的收购数量，但是我们有权要求农民提交我们所指定的数量； 
（4）不是，合同没有规定具体的收购数量，农民自己决定提交蔬菜的数量 
（5）其他情况（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
66．合同规定了如何向农民支付价款吗？ 
（1）是，合同规定了一个固定单价，无论提交产品的质量好坏，价格不变； 
（2）是的，合同规定了一个固定单价再加上质量奖金； 
（3）是的，合同规定一个最低保护价，在市场价格高于此保护价时按市场价格收购；否则按
最低保护价收购。 
（4）是的，合同规定按市场价格收购，我们有权以后决定具体的价格； 
（5）不是，合同根本没有规定价格； 
（6）其他情况（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
67．贵公司向农民支付的价款是否明显取决于贵公司销售的最终产品的价格？ 
（1）是的 
（2）不是 
68．合同规定了一部分价款可以在收购农民的产品前支付吗？ 
（1）是的，合同规定一部分价款可以在收购之前支付； 
（2）不是，合同没有规定，我们也不会提前支付价款； 
（3）不是，合同没有规定，但是我们通常会提前支付一部分价款给农民。 
69．如果贵公司提前支付一部分价款，那么这部分价款占总价款的比例是 ________%。 
70．合同规定了农民在签合同时要交付定金吗？ 
（1）是的，合同要求农民交的定金是＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元 
（2）不是，我们不要求农民交定金 
（3）其它情况（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
71．合同规定了公司在签合时要交付定金吗？ 
（1）是的，合同要求公司交的定金是＿＿＿＿＿＿＿元 
（2）不是，合同不要求公司交定金 
（3）其它情况（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
72．合同规定了农民提交的蔬菜所应达到的质量标准了吗？ 
（1）是的，合同规定了无公害食品质量标准； 
（2）是的，合同规定了绿色食品质量标准； 
（3）是的，合同规定有机食品质量标准； 
（4）是的，合同规定公司自己制定的质量标准； 
（5）不是，合同根本没有规定具体的质量标准。 
73．如果贵公司是针对下游客户要求而制定的私人质量标准，这种质量标准基本达到国家规
定的哪一级质量标准？ 
（1）无公害食品；   （2）绿色食品；    （3）有机食品  
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74．这份合同适用于贵公司与农民之间的几次交易？ 
（1）合同只适用于我们与农民之间的一次交易； 
（2）合同适用于我们与农民之间的几次交易； 
（3）合同适用于我们与农民之间的多次交易。 
75．这份合同的有效期是： 
（1）_______天；   （2）_________月；  （3）_________年 
76．如果合同到期，现有的合同能够自动更新吗？ 
（1）通常合同会自动更新； 
（2）合同不会自动更新，我们决定是否与现有农民继续签约； 
（3）合同不会自动更新，我们需要与农民重新协商签订新的合同。 
 
八、合同的限制性条款(本部分了解合同关于质量控制、标准化生产等条款) 
 
77．贵公司如何规定农民的投入品？对于一种投入品来说，合同可能写明应当用什么类型的
投入品，也可能不做任何规定，由公司或者农民自己决定。请就各种投入品，选出相对应的
实际情况。 
 
       实际情况 
 
各类 
投入品 
(1) 由我们提供 (2) 合同规定了农民
应当使用什么样的
投入品 
(3)合同没有任何规
定，但是我们有权
决定农民应当使用
什么样的投入品 
(4) 合同没有任何规
定，由农民自己决
定
种子     
化肥     
农药     
耕地设备     
浇水设备     
收割设备     
 
其他种植设备 
(请注明哪类设备)    
 
78．合同规定农民如何进行生产了吗？(比如种植时间、方法等) 
          实际情况 
 
各类 
生产活动 
(1) 我们提供生产
指导手册 
(2) 合同规定按照
我们的要求进行
种植 
(3)合同没有任何
规定，但是我们
派出技术员进行
指导 
(4) 合同没有任何
规定，由 农民自
己决定
种植计划     
种植前的活动（如耕地
等） 
    
种植     
农药喷洒与使用     
化肥使用     
收割     
 
79．对下列活动，合同是否做出规定？ 
         实际情况 
 
各类 
 产后活动 
(1)合同规定了如
何做 
(2) 合同没有任何
规定，但是我们有
权要求农民如何做
 
(3)合同没有任何
规定，农民自己决
定如何做 
(4)合同没有任何规
定，但是我们有权
决定自己如何做 
农民交货前的包装     
农民交货前的存储     
交货时间和地点     
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产品分类、分级、为称
重和贴标签进行包装 
    
贴标签     
存储     
加工     
销售     
 
80．就与公司订合同的农民而言，农民种植蔬菜所用的土地属于： 
（1）农民自己 
（2）公司 
（3）其他（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
81． 合同是否规定终止条款？ 
（1）是的，合同明确规定在什么情况下合同可以终止； 
（2）不是，合同没有规定在什么情况下合同可以终止，但是我们有权对此做决定； 
（3）不是，合同没有规定在什么情况下合同可以终止，但是农民有权对此做决定。 
82．合同是否规定贵公司有权视察（监督）签约农民的生产活动？ 
（1）是的； 
（2）不是，合同没有规定，但是我们有权视察（监督）菜农的生产活动 
（3）不是，合同没有规定， 我们无权视察（监督）菜农的生产活动 
83．贵公司直接视察菜农生产的次数多不多？ 
（1）根本没有 
（2）很少  
（3）有一些  
（4）很多 
（5）非常多 
84．合同是否对如何控制质量做出规定？ 
（1）是的           （2）不是 
 
九、合同的效果 
 
85．就通过合同采购的蔬菜而言，农民提供的蔬菜的实际质量是可信赖的。您同意吗？ 
（1）强烈不同意 
（2）不太同意 
（3）基本同意  
（4）很同意  
（5）非常同意 
86．就通过合同采购的蔬菜而言，农民提供的蔬菜的实际质量是稳定的、连贯一致的。您同
意吗？ 
（1）强烈不同意 
（2）不太同意 
（3）基本同意  
（4）很同意  
（5）非常同意 
87．就通过合同采购的蔬菜而言，农民提交的蔬菜的实际数量达到了订合同时的预期数量水
平。您同意吗？ 
（1）强烈不同意 
（2）不太同意 
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（3）基本同意  
（4）很同意  
（5）非常同意 
88．如果农民不能交货时，在质量或者数量上不能完全达到合同的要求，那么贵公司是怎么
做的？ 
（1）下一次绝不会与这个农民定合同  
 （2）在进一步了解农民违约的原因后，再做决定 
（3）其它（请说明）＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
 
 
问卷调查到此全部结束，非常感谢您提供的信息！如果您能附上一份空白合同样本或者实际
合同的复印件，对我们的研究有重要的意义。谢谢您的合作！ 
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Appendix 4-3 List of the interviewed firms 
 
 
 Name  Location Contact 
telephone 
Interviewee 
Firm 1 Shandong Long-da 
Enterprise Group 
Laiyang 0086 (535) 
7717036 
Manager 
Firm 2 Laiyang Long run Food 
Limited Company 
Laiyang 0086 (535) 
726118 
General Manager 
Firm 3 Shandong Shouguang 
Da-seng Food Limited 
Liability Company  
Shouguang 0086 (533) 
5102654 
Export&Import 
Manager, office 
manager 
Firm 4 Shouguang Tian-yuan 
Fruit and Vegetable 
Production Limited 
company  
Shouguang 0086 133 
56791737 
Business 
manager, 
Manager 
assistant 
Firm 5 Shouguang Tian-cheng 
Food Limited 
Company  
Shouguang 0086 (536) 
5196296 
Deputy General 
manager 
Firm 6 Beijing Fu-kang-duo 
Technology Limited 
Companey 
Shouguang 0086 136 
15365045 
Manager 
Firm 7 Shandong Pang-da 
Seasoned Food Limited 
Company  
Dezhou 0086 (534) 
6602032 
Manager, 
General 
Accountant 
Firm 8 Shandong Fei-da Group 
Limited Company 
Dezhou 0086 (534) 
6601321 
Director of 
General office 
Firm 9 Wucheng Ying-chao 
Economic and Trade 
Limited Company 
Dezhou 0086 (534) 
2175482 
Manager 
Firm 10 Ningjing Rui-feng 
Food Limited Liability 
Company 
Dezhou 0086 (534) 
5234865 
Manager 
Firm 11 Shandong Laoling 
Cheng-xin Food 
Processng Factory 
Dezhou 0086 (534) 
6682222 
Manager/Factory 
director 
Firm 12 Minimum protection 
price 
Dezhou 0086 (534) 
3751562 
Manager 
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5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Many forms of governance of agricultural products co-exist in agricultural 
sectors, such as spot markets, cooperatives, investor-owned agribusiness, and contract 
farming. Various stakeholders such as primary growers, processors, wholesalers, retailers, 
consumers and other parties are involved into the process as well as the structure of 
governing agricultural products. How to align the interests of these stakeholders and how 
to maintain or increase the efficiency of governance forms regarding agricultural products 
are becoming increasingly significant.  
This thesis studies cooperatives and contract farming as two types of governance 
forms regarding agricultural products. Agricultural cooperatives emerged as early as in the 
19th century. They played an important role in organizing and coordinating agricultural 
production and transactions in many agricultural industries. Cooperatives may continue to 
play an important role in providing agricultural producers with access to markets and an 
efficient vehicle for capturing value-added. Contract farming has been adopted, as an 
important vertical coordination form, both in developed and developing economies since 
the 1960s.  
We treat cooperatives and contract farming as two particular governance 
structures for vertically coordinating various agricultural production stages. A governance 
structure consists of both decision rights and income rights. The allocation of decision 
rights tells who has rights to guide or direct activities, i.e., how authority is allocated 
among various stakeholders. The allocation of income rights specifies how benefits and 
costs are allocated among different stakeholders. Governance structures matter when 
contracts are incomplete. 
The major research objective of this thesis is to add knowledge to co-existing 
governance structures in agricultural sectors. As there are various arrangements regarding 
governing agricultural products, it is important to understand deeply how each governance 
structure is characterized and works. Theoretically, we aim to add new knowledge 
regarding cooperatives by highlighting the role and added value of board of directors in 
screening investment projects. Empirically, we aim to explore the interaction of 
governance structure and other attributes of cooperatives, and delineate the allocation 
pattern of decision rights under contract farming as well as explore the driving forces for 
such arrangements.  
The contribution of this thesis is as follows. Firstly, it extends the exogenous 
screening model of Hendrikse (1998) by building an endogenous double screening model 
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of selecting efficient governance structures (Chapter 2). This enriches the research on 
cooperative theory by highlighting the role and added-value of the board of directors in 
cooperatives. Secondly, it describes the historical development of farmer cooperatives in 
China, it presents the data on the membership of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in the 
Zhejiang province, it provides a detailed case study of a fruit cooperative in the Zhejiang 
province, and it studies the coherence of this organization by using the approach of a 
system of attributes (chapter 3). This enriches the empirical research on cooperatives by 
adding empirical observations regarding how cooperatives are organized and work 
efficiently in transitional economies. Thirdly, it provides the data on fruit and vegetable 
contracts in China and studies the driving forces for decision rights shift among various 
stakeholders (chapter 4). This enriches the empirical research on incomplete contracts.  
The more detailed summary of the individual chapters are presented in the 
following, in order to see how each research question is answered and how the research 
objective is reached. For convenience, we list the research questions here again:  
 
- Q1: What are the differences between cooperatives and investor-owned firms regarding 
the structure of the decision making process?  
- Q2: How does the difference influence the efficiency of various governance structures?  
- Q3: How are the new farmer specialized cooperatives in China organized?  
- Q4: What determines the form and extent of decision rights allocation between farmer 
growers and downstream processors in contract farming? 
 
Chapter 2 provides answers to the first and second research questions. Both 
cooperatives and investor-owned firms are viable organizational forms in many 
agricultural sectors (Nilsson, 1997; Hendrikse, 1998; Carriquiry and Babcock, 2004). 
Various studies show that cooperatives and investor-owned firms behave differently (Van 
der Krogt, 2005; Hendrikse and Van Oijen, 2004; Chaddad and Cook; 2004). Compared 
with investor-owned firms, cooperatives have disadvantages as well as advantages. We 
explore a potential advantage deriving from a difference in the decision making structure 
in Chapter 2. It is well known that there are differences regarding the board of directors 
(Vitaliano, 1983). Board monitoring is a public good, but more active participation by 
members in board monitoring is expected in cooperatives due to the substantial financial 
stake in the cooperative by the members (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001). Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003) address the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors in 
stock-listed enterprises. They argue that there is substantial scope for managerial power 
due to actual incentives of directors being geared towards the interests of the CEO rather 
than the interests of the owners. USDA (2002, p11) states that “In an investor-owned firm, 
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the chief executive officer (CEO) often has a large, if not dominant voice, in selecting the 
board of directors…In a cooperative, the CEO usually has significantly less influence over 
who sits on the board…As a result, directors often do not feel beholden to the manager for 
their position and have the independence, if they choose to exercise it, to question 
management decisions and reject its recommendations.” These arguments motivate us to 
characterize a cooperative by a dual screening decision process, whereas an investor-
owned firm consists of a single screening decision process. The organization of the 
screening process matters, because it affects the errors made by individuals within the 
organization, and how those errors are aggregated at the organizational as well as industry 
level.  
A four-stage game theoretic model is developed to capture the influence of the 
difference in the structure of the internal decision making process of these two governance 
on the efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. The first stage consists of 
the choice of architecture, that is, Investor-Owned Firm or Co-operative. Screening levels 
are chosen in the second stage of the game. Third, nature chooses the type of project. 
Finally, project acceptance decisions are made by the organization.  
It is shown that an investor-owned firm is prone to accept more investment 
projects than a cooperative because a cooperative requires approval of the society of 
members as well as the management of the cooperative. However, lower screening levels 
are chosen in a cooperative in order to compensate for its hierarchical decision-making 
structure. Screening levels are strategic substitutes because a lower screening level by the 
rival enterprise makes it more likely that the market has to be shared when a project is 
good. The payoff maximizing response is to increase the screening level at local bureaus. 
Cooperatives are predicted in markets with attractive portfolio compositions because the 
cooperative is good at rejecting bad projects. Similarly, investor-owned firms thrive in 
markets with bad portfolio compositions because they select good projects more frequently 
than cooperatives. This finding is a reversal of the exogenous screening case. Governance 
structure choice entails an externality because choosing an investor-owned firm as 
organizational form makes the market less attractive for the rival enterprise. The 
heterogeneity of behaviour of enterprises with the same governance structure as well as the 
coexistence of cooperatives and corporations is driven by the same trade-off. The 
advantage of being more frequently a monopolist compensates for accepting more bad 
projects. 
              In chapter 3 we have answered the third question: How are the new farmer 
specialized cooperatives in China organized? Different from chapter 2 which only focuses 
on the decision making structure of cooperatives, chapter 3 treats cooperatives as a more 
complex institutional arrangement by adopting the approach of a system of attributes. A 
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detailed case study regarding a watermelon marketing cooperative is presented to illustrate 
what attributes a cooperative has and how each attribute interacts with others.  
               The institutional environment has been explored before we study the details of 
cooperatives in a transitional economy, since the originations are embedded into the 
environment. It is shown that cooperatives are not a new phenomenon in China. However, 
new cooperative organizations have emerged since the 1980s. They are different from old 
cooperative forms. We distinguish two basic forms: farmer specialized associations and 
farmer specialized cooperatives. The farmer specialized cooperatives is our research focus 
in Chapter 3. It also shows that relations play an important role in Chinese rural society, 
thus the origin and development of farmer cooperatives in China have an informal 
institutional background based on relations.  
Next, we present a sample of 66 cooperatives in the Zhejiang province to capture 
the ownership characteristics of cooperatives in general. It shows that most cooperatives 
are small; shareholding is pervasive among most cooperatives; the cooperatives are usually 
composed of a minority of core members (usually big shareholders) and a majority of 
common members (usually users or patrons); the cooperatives can be generally divided 
into two types: one is with a minority of members as its shareholders; the other is with a 
majority or all members as its shareholders. For most cooperatives, shareholding is quite 
concentrated; big shareholders play a dominant role in providing capital. 
Then, we describe a specific farmer specialized cooperative in details: Ruo-heng 
watermelon cooperative. We identify three major groups of attributes in this organization: 
governance which consists of decision rights and income rights, quality control system, 
and strategy. Firstly, decision rights are not uniformly distributed among the members. 
Director members have real control on important issues such as pricing, financing, 
investment screening, etc. Meanwhile, sharing benefits/costs among members are not 
solely based on membership. Income rights are confined by share contributions. Secondly, 
the quality control system is tight in this cooperative. For example, there are ex-ante 
contracted quality standards, which are agreed upon by all members and which are stricter 
than the legal requirements regarding fruits. Further, many control tools, such as input 
controls, production standardization, and group production/inspection, are adopted to 
monitor and guide members through different stages of production. In addition, quality-
based pricing is used to complement the control tools. Thirdly, it adopts a branding 
strategy. Fourthly, it shows that various attributes complement each other. Tight quality 
control system, skewed decision rights allocation, and branding strategy complement each 
other to make this cooperative function well.  
What we observe from these three levels of data regarding cooperatives in China 
adds new insights to cooperative research. Firstly, cooperatives are complex organizations 
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which are embedded into their local institutional environment. The characteristics of the 
local institutional environment shape the functional forms of a cooperative. Cooperatives 
exhibit substantial heterogeneity, in terms of farmers being member and skewness in the 
distribution of control rights. A cooperative is co-governed by both core members and non 
core-members based on relations and abilities. Human asset specificity in terms of 
establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more important 
than physical asset specificity in accounting for governance structure choice in the current 
institutional setting. Secondly, the complementarities among various attributes determine 
the success of a cooperative. Choosing values of various attributes in a coherent way is 
thus a big challenge for managers. 
While chapter 2 and 3 have focused on cooperatives, in chapter 4 we mainly 
study another vertical coordination form, i.e. contract farming. Contract farming is mainly 
an agreement between a farmer and a firm, where the farmer produces a fresh or partially 
processed product and the firm has a commitment to buy it (Grosh, 1994). It is an 
intermediate economic institution between spot market and vertical integration. The main 
research question in this chapter is ‘What determines the form and extent of decision rights 
allocation between farmer growers and downstream processors in contract farming?’. We 
have answered this question by investigating 12 fruit and vegetable contracts to test several 
hypotheses regarding their allocation pattern and driving forces.  
According to the literature on writing costs, incomplete contracting models and 
franchising, the completeness of a contract is determined by quality, reputation and 
uncertainty, while the quality, reputation, specific investment and monopsony-oligopsony 
power determine the extent of decision rights allocation between farmer growers and 
downstream processors. To test these hypotheses, we have made each variable operational. 
Then, each fruit and vegetable contracting case is checked to see how explanatory 
variables are linked with the dependent variables. 
The extent of completeness of a contract and allocation pattern of decision rights 
varies substantially across different supply chains in China. Regarding completeness of a 
contract, both written contracts and simple oral contracts are observed in our sample. Most 
contracts specify price and quantity regarding delivery. How many decision rights are 
being allocated to firms, according to contracts, varies across different contracting 
networks. One important observation is that most firms have rights to guide or direct the 
activities of contracted farmers regarding inputs and/or in-process activities. This 
observation is consistent with other studies.  
A contract will become more complex when the firm designing the contract sells 
high quality products. In addition, market uncertainty may determine the completeness of a 
contract too, while reputation will not determine the completeness of a contract. Thus, the 
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predictions regarding uncertainty (measured by market uncertainty) and contracting value 
(measured by quality and reputation) is partly supported by our empirical findings.  
Under contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms. 
Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms positively influence the number of 
decision rights allocated to agri-business firms under contract farming, while monopsony-
oligopsony power and specific investments by farmers do not play a role in allocating 
decision rights. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Dit proefschrift analyseert besluitvormingsprocedures en de toewijzing van 
besluitvormingsrechten in twee beheersstructuren in de landbouw sector: cooperaties en 
contracten. De belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen hebben betrekking op de wijze waarop 
zeggenschap de keten verticaal coördineert in verscheidene beheersstructuren in een 
transitie economie (China), en onder welke omstandigheden een bepaalde beheersstructuur 
efficiënt is. Het theoretisch onderzoek richt zich op de rol van de Raad van 
Commissarissen in coöperaties, terwijl het empirische onderzoek gericht is op de 
organisatorische en strategische attributen van Chinese land- en tuinbouwcooperaties en de 
contractuele arrangementen in de Chinese fruit- en groente sector. In het theoretisch 
onderzoek is vastgesteld dat de Raad van Commissarissen waarde toevoegen in 
coöperaties vanwege het tweemaal beoordelen van investeringsvoorstellen. Het niveau van 
het beoordelingscriterium is gekarakteriseerd als een strategisch substituut. Het tweede 
resultaat is dat Chinese coöperaties worden bestuurd door zowel kernleden als niet 
kernleden, waarbij relaties en capaciteiten van de bestuurders een grote rol spelen. 
Specifiek menselijk kapitaal, in de vorm van het bewerkstelligen en onderhouden van 
relaties, en toegang tot markten blijkt een grotere rol te spelen dan specifiek fysiek kapitaal 
om de keuze van beheersstructuur te verklaren in de huidige Chinese institutionele 
omgeving. In de derde plaats, vele besluitvormingsrechten zijn van boeren naar verwerkers 
verschoven in contracten. Kwaliteit, reputatie en specifieke investeringen door 
ondernemingen bepalen het aantal besluitvormingsrechten dat wordt toegewezen aan 
ondernemingen, terwijl marktmacht en specifieke investeringen van boeren geen rol 
blijken te spelen in de toewijzing van besluitvormingsrechten.   
166                                                                                                             
                                                                               
 
中文摘要（Summary in Chinese） 
 
在农业部门中，各种治理结构纵向协调着上游生产者和下游加工商之间的活动，例
如现货市场、投资者所有制公司、合作社、契约农业、以及其它一些混合组织形
式。一个非常有趣现象的是：这些治理结构并存在许多市场上，并且，它们与制度
之间有着互动关系。各种治理结构是如何运转的？什么决定了各种不同的治理结构
的效率及并存状态？制度背景的影响何在？这些问题值得我们进行深入地探讨，以
期既为企业理论增加新的知识、又为经理人员提供有用的建议。 
治理结构可以分为收益权与决策权。决策权的分配指出了谁有权利指导或者指
挥活动，即：权威如何在各个利益相关者之间进行分配。收益权的分配指明了收益
与成本如何在不同的利益相关者之间进行分配。本论文研究合作社与契约农业这两
类治理结构中的决策制定程序与决策权分配问题。主要的研究问题是：在过渡经济
（中国）制度背景下，权威在各类治理结构中如何协调上游活动与下游活动，在什
么条件下某一特定的治理结构是有效的？本论文既包括理论研究又包括实证研究，
理论研究聚焦于农业合作社的董事会所起的作用，实证研究则聚焦于中国农民专业
合作社的组织属性与策略属性、以及中国果蔬行业的契约安排。 
本论文共分五章。第一章概述研究目的与研究问题。第二章引入了一个博弈模
型以探讨内生的项目筛选规则如何影响有效的组织选择与产业结构。第三章首先描
述了中国的制度背景，接着从“属性系统”这一理论视角出发，剖析了新一代农民
专业合作社在此特定制度背景下如何组织其活动。第四章基于 12 个果蔬契约网络的
案例分析，解释了决策权分配模式的决定因素和农业契约完全性程度的决定因素。
第五章对全文进行总结。 
本论文的主要结论如下。第一，由于合作社的二重筛选特征，董事会在筛选投
资项目时为合作社创造了价值。筛选水平是策略替代。第二，中国的农民专业合作
社由核心社员与非核心社员共同基于关系与能力进行治理。在决定现有制度背景下
的治理结构选择上，以建立与维持关系、以及拥有市场进入渠道为表现形式的人力
资产专用性比实物资产专用性更为重要。第三，农业契约的完全性程度和决策权的
分配模式在不同的农产品供应链中有着显著的差异。质量和市场不确定性影响着农
业契约的完全性。在契约农业中，许多决策权从农民手中转移到企业手中。质量、
声誉、企业的专用投资影响着分配给企业的决策权数量，而垄断力与农民的专用投
资并不决定决策权的分配。
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